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ABSTRACT
United States Policy and the Diplomacy of Limited
In Korea:

1950-1951

Nathan Yu-jen Lai, B. A.

M. A.
Ph. D.

,

,

,

War

(September 1974)
National Taiwan University

Clark University

University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Directed by: Dr. John M. Maki

This dissertation attempts to study the nature and problems

war

in

Korea as they are reflected

respect

to:

of 1950; (3)

(4)

(2)

the decision to cross the 38th parallel in September and October

the policy on Chinese

America's

and diplomacy with

the decision to intervene militarily at the outbreak of the

(1)

Korean War;

in United States policy

of limited

initial

Commimist

intervention in Korea; and

reactions and responses to Communist China's full-scale

counter offensives in Korea from later November 1950 through February

The study takes the approach
policy decisions were made.

of

1,

1951.

an examination of how and v/hy these

For the question

of "how, " the viewpoint of the

policy-mal^ers, particularly at the time of their decisions, is emphasized.
the assessment of "why" certain decisions

For

were made, various uiterpretations and

behind
explanations by scholars and experts were consulted, and assumptions
the policies

were examined.

These assumptions are not necessarily restricted

those of which the policy-makers were conscious.

to

/

vii

In

in

summary,

Korea and

its

the

major problems surrounding

maintenance were:

(1)

the policy of limited

America's exclusive control

war

of the

international force for field operations, which reduced the restraining influence
of other

(2)

members

America's

the collective

of the United Nations in

allies,

UN

some important

tactical

whose cooperation and support were needed

action in Korea, but

who were eager

to seek

moves;

to continue

peace at a

Mgh

price to the United States, even though their influence was significant in opposing
the expansion of the

a total victory over,

war

MacAtthur, who demanded

to China; (3) General Douglas

North Korean forces, then, over the Chmese

first, the

troops in Korea, even advocating extending hostilities to China after their
scale intervention in Korea;

once asserted

(4)

its influence to

America's traditional approach

to war,

full-

which

change the policy of limited war with respect

to

North Korea.

Because

of these

problems. United States policy of limited war

had to go through various stages before

it

At first the war was limited with respect

was

finally

Union and Communist

non-violation
China in terms of geography and military contact:

With respect

to

Korea

worked out and maintained.

to the Soviet

and Manchurian borders and no provocation

in

of Siberian

to bring their forces into

North Korea, the war was also limited in

Korea.

its objective to

parallel with no intention of destroying
restore South Korea's border at the 38th

enemy forces completely.

of Soviet
Soon, due to the lack of any indication

intention to intervene and due to

American military

tradition, the

abjective
;

was

viii

changed to a

total victory over

North Korean forces with the consequent

necessity of crossing the 38th parallel and driving to the Yalu.

The change

of

policy also produced Chinese reaction and limited military contact with China
in

Korea.

The policy objective further became

the destruction of all the

enemy

forces, including the Chinese, in Korea, but without attacking Manchuria.
Finally, China's full-scale intervention and attacks in

the United

Korea forced

or a victory
States to abandon the goal of a total victory over North Koreans
the war
over the Chinese in Korea, since this would necessarily expand

involve the Soviet Union.

to

First and foremost, the United States wanted to

managed
prevent Soviet intervention in Korea and over Korea, and

to do so

throughout the war.

The policy

of limited

war succeeded

in preventing a general

victory.
preventing North Korea from achieving military

war and

ix
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation attempts to study the nature and problems

war

in

Korea as they are reflected

respect

War;
1950;

(4)

to:

(1)

(2) the

(3)

in

of limited

United States policy and diplomacy with

the decision to intervene militarily at the outbreal< of the ICorean

decision to cross the 38th parallel in September and October of

Communist

the policy on Chinese

America's

initial

intervention in Korea; and

reactions and responses to Communist China's full-scale

counter offensives in Korea from late November 1950 through February

For the purpose

compared

to all-out

of this study,

it is

1,

1951.

determined that limited war, as

war, has at least four elements:

limited use of

(1)

available resources and weapons for the prosecution of war;

(2)

limited objective

total
with respect to a particular enemy, especially with no attempt to win a

victory over all of the
their surrender;

other areas

may

(3)

enemy forces by

be used as bases to support war; and

in the policy with

As war goes

(4)

on, one or

no contact with the

more

of these elements

respect to a certain nation.

For a better understanding

Korea from

them or forcing

confinement of hostilities to a limited area even though

forces of a real enemy in war.

may change

either destroying

of the nature

and extent of limited war

this study takes the
the beginning tlirough February 1, 1951

in

Xlll

approach

of

an examination of how and why the above-mentioned policy decisions

An

were made.
policies

effort is

made

were formulated from

to separate the analysis of the

the assessment of

manner

which

why they were made, even
For the question

though both were closely connected and related.

in

of

"how,

time of their decisions,
the viewpoint of the policy -makers, particularly at the
is

emphasized.

Thus

official

documents, papers, statements, and military

used and quoted as
histories which contain original telegrams and papers, are

much

as possible.

and interviews.

James
volume

These are supplemented by the policy -makers' memoirs

Special mention

may be made

F. Schnabel's Policy and Directions:
in the series United States

Armv

of three recent publications:

The First Year

in the

Korean War published by
,

United States
Office of the Chief of Military History,
in 1972.

This book is very valuable because

primary materials

in

it

is the third

Army,

the

Wasliington, D.C.

identifies the sources of

complete form
great detail and uses them in a rather

which often camiot be found elsewhere.

Especially significant are numerous

between Washington and General Douglas
exchanges of telegrams and cables

MacArthur's Headquarters

Department
views

of the

Army

in

ToLto, and the utilization

tiie file

in the

studies and the
regarding National Security Council

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

all
this study, though, as with

Acheson's

of

Two memoirs

are also indispensable to

Dean
memoirs, they must be used with care.

Presentatjh^^

and J. Lawton Collins'

miMnPe^

xiv

both published in 1969, present their personal perceptions and assessments from
the viewpoints of a civilian and a military leader
in the

who had

participated intimately

Korean policy-maldng process.
For the assessment

of

why certain decisions were made, various

inter-

pretations and explanations by scholars and experts were consulted and assumptions

behind the policies were examined.

These assumptions are not necessarily

restricted to those of which the policy -maimers were conscious.

sequence

is

Since the time

very important for the subject under investigation, the treatment

in

this study follows generally a chronological order.

A word

about terminology.

Since the United States Government at the

time often used "Communist China" or "the Chinese Communists'' and "Formosa"
in their public statements

of

and

official

documents to refer

to the People's Republic

China and Taiwan, the less correct but more familiar terms are also used

throughout the text of this dissertation.

CHAPTER

I

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR: THE FIRST TWO DAYS
Commimication of the News
the North Korean Attack

Official

The North Korean Army invaded South Korea
morning

of

of

at four o'clock in the

June 25, 1950—3:00 P.M. Eastern Daylight Saving Time, June 24,

1950, in Washington, D. C.

Communist

units burst across the 38th parallel

swiftly and in strength.

About six and a half hours after the attack,

at 9:26 P.

(Washington time), the Department of State received the first

from

the

American Ambassador

in Seoul,

John

J.

M.

,

June 24

official report

Muccio, on the Korean

fighting.

Seoul, June 25, 1950

According to Korean Army reports which are partly
confirmed by Korean Military Advisory Group field advisor
reports, North Korean forces invaded Republic of Korea
territory at several points this morning. Action was
initiated about 4 a. m. Ongjim was bkisted by North Korean
artillery fire.

crossing the

m. North Korean infantry commenced
parallel in the Ongjim area, Kaesong area.

About

[38th]

6 a.

Cri sis,
Departm.ent of State, United States Policy in the Korean
(Washingto:
Publication 3922
1950 Far Eastern Series, No. 34, Dept. of State
S. Truman, Memoirs,
Harry
Also,
5^rnm3nt Printing Office, 1950), p. 1.
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), p.
Vol n- Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City,
^U.

S.

.

2

and ChuDchm area and an amphibious landing was reportedly
made south of Kangnung on the east coast. Kaesong was
reportedly captured at 9 a. m. with some ten North Korean
tanks participating in the operation. North Korean forces,
spearheaded by tanks, are reportedly closing in on Chunchon.
Details of the fighting in the Kangnimg area are unclear,
although it seems that North Korean forces may cut the
highway. I am conferring with Korean Military Advisory
Group advisers and Korean officials this morning concerning
,

the situation.

would appear from the nature of the attack and the
manner in which it was launched that it constitutes an all2
out offensive against the Republic of Korea.
It

It

was Saturday

night.

of

America's most important policy-makers were

The President, Harry

out of town.

the Secretary of State,

Army

Maryland;

Some

Truman, was

S.

Dean Acheson, was

Far East, including Korea, ^ was
at Scientists' Cliffs,

Nations, Ambassador

Among

farm

in

Sandy Spring,

Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, who was also

Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of

Bay

at his

in Independence, Missouri;

Staff for military operations in the

at his retreat cottage on the Chespeal^e

Maryland; America's chief delegate

Warren

Austin,

the key officials

who

was

at his

home

first got hold of

to the United

in Burlington,

Vermont.

Ambassador Muccio's

for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean
report were the Assistant Secretary of State

Rusk, and the Secretary

2u

of the

Army, Frank Pace,

Tirnnrtm->7^

S

Jr.

They met

at the State

TTnTtod States Policy in the Korean_Crisis,

TheRecor^
Also reprinted in U. S. Dept. of State,
of State Publ-a.on .084
1943-1960, Far Eastern Series 101, Dept.
Truman, II, 33o-31.
I960), pp. 86-87. Also
*

1950

p

11.

H'cLn,

^^^^^[si^^^^

^Joseph Lawton Collins,
1969), p. 6.

War

in

Pea cetime. (Boston: Houghton

Mifflin,

3

Department.

Dean Rusk immediately telephoned. Secretary Acheson

Spring, Maryland and read

him

the text of

Ambassador Muccio's

Acheson regarded Muccio as an "experienced and level-headed

in

Sandy

cable.

officer,

""^

so his report carried considerable weight.'^

The telephone

call

from Dean Rusk

to Secretary

informational in nature; no recommendations were

Acheson was purely

made or agreed

However, they both agreed that an attack had apparently come
that the situation

was "serious.

the

Department of

State.

Ambassador

When Hickerson

Acheson asked for his recommendation.
the

UN

in force

imd

"^

John Hickerson, Assistant Secretary
Affairs, and Philip C. Jessup,

upon.

of State for United Nations

at

Large, were soon called to

telephoned Secretary Acheson,

"Hickerson suggested a meeting

for a
Security Council the next morning (Sunday) to call

missions
and urgent requests to our civilian and military

in

of

cease-fire,

Korea for

continuing information.

^Dean Acheson, Present

at the

Creation (New York: Norton, 19G9),

p. 402.

Decision (New York: Free
^See also Glenn D. Paige, The Korean
Press, 1968), pp. 91-92.

and interview with Acheson,
^Interview with Rusk, Aug. 22, 1955;
91-92.
Oct. 25, 1955; see Paige, pp.
'^Acheson, p. 402.

4

The Secretary approved, and authorized Ernest Gross, Ambassador
Austin's deputy, to ask Secretary-General of the United Nations Trygve Lie to
call the Security Council.

Then Secretary Acheson telephoned President Truman
"Mr. President,
South Korea.

I

have very serious news.

in

Independence:

The North Koreans have invaded

Acheson reported the situation and the President's

reaction was to get back to the capital immediately.
taking a hurriedly arranged night flight and urged

first

Acheson dissuaded him from

him

to wait for a further report

next morning, when the information should be more complete, and then return
to

Washington later

in the day.

President

suggestion of holding a meeting of the

UN

Truman agreed and approved Acheson 's
Security Council to call for a cease-fire.

Secretary Acheson then made a call of confirmation to Hickerson.^

Meanwhile,

Army

duty officers in the Pentagon had notified appropriate

senior staff members, the other services, and kept

Department.
special

in

touch with the State

Secretary Pace returned to his office in the Pentagon.

map room and message

center was established, and a teletype

conference with Major General Charles A. Willoughby

Truman, H, 332.
Acheson,

p. 404;

A

Truman,

II,

332.

in

Tokyo, the Far

5

East Command's Intelligence Officer, G-2, provided further information confirming
the scale of the North

Korean Attack.

North Korea's invasion

One

leaders by surprise.

of South

of the

Korea took American

political and military

reasons was that American intelligence evalua-

tions and estimates, prior to June 25, 1950, had all discounted the probability of

such a full-scale attack being launched in the

alarming reports had been received.

summer

Acheson later

of 1950,

even though some

testified before the Senate

hearings:
Intelligence

was

available to the Department [of

State] prior to the 25th of June,

made

available by the

Far East Command, the CIA, the Department of the Army,
and by the State Department representatives here and
overseas, and shows that all these agencies were in agreement that the possibility for an attack on the Korean
Republic existed at that time, but they were all in agree-

ment

that its laimching in the

summer

of 1950 did not

appear imminent.
The view was generally held that since the Communists
had far from exhausted the potentialities for obtaining their
objectives through guerrilla and psychological warfare,
political pressure and intimidation, such means would
probably continue to be used rather than overt military
aggression.
It

was

fully realized that the timing of any

Korea would be ordered from the Kremlin.

"Collins, p. 9.

ISee Paige, p. 98.

move

in

6

Now, the same situation that existed in Korea existed in
a number of other places, where the possibility of attack existed,
but it was not believed that the attack would take place at that
time.

•'2

Acheson gave an example

On March

10, 1950, a joint

of

how an

Far East, noted: "Report received

Korea

in

"

To

was not believed.

weekly intelligence cable from the Commander in

Chief,

June 1950.

intelligence report

that cable

that People's

was attached

Army

will invade South

the following:

Comment: The People's Army will be prepared to invade
South Korea by fall and possibly by spring of this year indicated
in the

current report of armed-force expansion and major troop
at critical thirty' -eighth parallel areas. Even if future
bear out the present indication, it is believed civil war

movement

reports
in Korea
will not necessarily be precipitated; so that intentions
Southeast
are believed closely related to Communist program in
in
measures
Asia. Seems likely that Communist overt military
Korea will be held in abeyance, at least until further observations
by Soviets of results of their program in such places as

made

Indochina,

Burma, and Thailand.

If

the Soviets are satisfied

probably will
they are winning the struggle for these places they
ripen for
be content to wait a while longer and let South Korea
in
operations
their
future harvest. If checked or defeated in
share of their
these countries in Asia they may divert large
People's Army
in
a
result
effort to South Korea, which could
invasion of South Korea.

^^

Services and Committee
Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
^"^"^
Situation in the Far East.
on Foreign Relations, Mimnrv
United
Relations,
Forei^
on
Committ^ on Armed S^^^^^T^iT^d the Committee
into
Inquiry
an
to Conduct
"senate, Eighty-Second Congress, First Session,
Re lef of
East and the ^-^s Surrounding «.e
the Military Situation in the Far
Are^ (5
That
from H- Assignment sm
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
Hereafter
Office, 1951), Pt. 3, 1990-91.
parts; Washington, Govt. Printing
cited as Hearings.

U

S

^^Hearings, Pt.

Ee^^,

3, 1991.

7

Fifteen days after this report
stated his conclusion on

was sent

March

in, the

G-2

of the

Far East Command

25, 1950:

believed that there will be no civil war in Korea
summer. The most probable course of North
Korean action this spring or summer is furtherance of its
attempt to overthrow the South Korean Government by the
It is

this spring or

creation of chaotic conditions in the Republic through
guerrilla activities and psychological warfare.

However, even

if it

had been forecast accurately

to the

very day of the

attack, the United States still had no plans to counter an invasion in Korea.

only reaction

was

to evacuate U. S. nationals

significant aspect of

the Korean

The

from Korea. 15 This was a

American Policy-makers' surprise

in the first

few days

of

War.

of the Situation by America's
Policy-Malcers, Juno 25, 1950

Percep tion

On Sunday morning, June
awakened

in his retreat cottage

the "startling" news:
to get to the

Amry

"General, the North Koreans have attacked, and you have

He

Ibid.

,

"

tliought of another

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

^^

Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins was

by his driver, Sergeant Ed Davis, who told him

Pentagon as fast as you can.

toward Washington.
of the

25,

In a

few minutes, Collins was heading

Sunday morning when he heard word

He reflected:

Pt. 3, 1991-92.

First Year (Washington:
F. Schnabcl, Policy and Direction: The
1972), p. G5. Also, Collms,
Officeof the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army,

15james

p. 77.

8

This time, unlike 1941, the United States was not
being attacked directly; we had no troops imder fire in
Korea and no commitment to come to the aid of South
Korea in the event of attack. Nonetheless, I felt certain
that we would not stand idly by in the face of this nnked
aggression against a country we had helped to liberate in

World War n from Japanese domination.
As Sergeant Davis and I rolled on toward Washington,
I thought how fortunate it was for us that the Soviets had
picked for this venture the one area in the world v/here the
United States military forces of all arms were well positioned
if we should decide to intervene.
We had in Korea only a
training mission, the Korean military Advisory Group,
advisory to the newly created army of the Republic of Korea,
but in near-by Japan our Eighth Army, on occupation duty,

had four infantry divisions, with eighteen

squadrons,
a light-bomber wing, and a troop-carrier wing of the Air
Force availabl e for support. Our Navy ships in the Far
East consisted of one cruiser, four destroyers, and a number
of amphibious and cargo vessels.

We

flight

had also

in the

western

more powerful Seventh Fleet, including the aircraft
carrier Valley Forge a heavy cruiser, and a number of
destroyers, submarines, and auxiliary vessels. All these
forces except the Seventh Fleet were under the command of
General Douglas Mac Arthur, Commander in Chief, Far East,
with headquarters in Tokyo. Nowhere else abroad did we have
such forces of all arms immediately available for employment.
Pacific the

,

Acheson arrived
25.

Department shortly

at the State

The news was bad.

A

A.M.

,

June

full-scale attack centering around a tank column

was driving toward Seoul and Kimpo
outclassed.

after 11:00

airport.

South Korean

arms were

Acheson also learned that a cable had been received

clearly

at 10:30

'Collins, pp..l, 4.

New York

Herald Tribune

'Acheson, p. 404.

,

June 26, 1950,

p.

2;

see Paige, p. 110.

A. M.

9

from Ambassador John Foster Dulles and Mr. John M.

Allison in Japan.

19

Dulles had been at work for some time for the State Department on the

preparation of the peace treaty with Japan.

The cable

said:

possible that South Koreans may themselves
contain and repiilse attack, and, if so, this is the best way.
If, however, it appears they cannot do so then we believe
force should be used even though this risks Russian
that US
It is

by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start disastrous chain of events
leading most probably to world war. We suggest that Security
Council might call for action on behalf of the organization
counter moves.

To

sit

under Article 106 by theOAfive powers or such
are willing to respond.
Before noon,

Defense met

at 11:30

at the State

in the light of present

the

UN

A.M.

officials of the

,

Department

knowledge and

to prepare

them as

Departments

of State and

recommendations for action

to draft a resolution for presentation to

Secretary of the

Security Council.

of

Army Pace and

General Collins

22 Acheson arrived at the
joined this group after the discussion had started.

meeting

at 12:15 P.

M. 23

it

was an impromptu session.

the
representatives outlined a plan for supporting

ROK

Department

with munitions and

^^Paige, p. 111.

^^Truman,

II,

336.

21paigc, p. 109; Acheson,
22collins, p. 11.

2^Paige, p. 109.

p. 404; Collins, p.

of State

11.

10

equipment and with U.

S.

naval and air forces. 24

General Collins later Avrote that "the available records
insufficient and do not

meeting. "25

make clear everything

to

General

Mac Arthur

this State-Defense meeting

in the afternoon or early evening.

Shortly before the President arrived in Washington from his

on this Simday

,

June 25, the Joint Chiefs of

General Mac Arthur.

and State officials

They

notified

to ship supplies

him

present are

that transpired at this staff

However, relevant conclusions of

were transmitted

at

Staff

home

in Missouri,

held a teletype conference with

of the tentative plans

made by Defense

and equipment, and to extend his responsi-

bility to include operational control of all U. S.

They said he might also be directed

to

military activities in Korea.

commit certain forces,

naval and air, to protect the Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area

to

principally

assure the safe

evacuation of American nationals and to gain time for action on the measures
then before the United Nations.

ready to send U.

S.

Most

significantly, they alerted

him

to

be

ground and naval forces to stabilize the combat situation

24

Report to Senate Committee on Armed Services and Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, Record of Action Tal^en by JCS Relative to the U.N.
Operation in Korea from 25 June 1950 to 11 April 1951, 30 April 1951. See
Schnabel, p. G7.
25collins, p. 11.

11

and,

if

feasible, to restore the 38th parallel as a boundary.

said, might be necessary,

the United Nations asked

if

This action, they

member

nations to employ

Of)

military force.

Meanwhile,

phoned Truman

at 2:45

P.M.

in Independence.

,

June 25, Washington time

^'^

Acheson reported

,

that the

Ache son had

UN

tele-

Security

Council had been called into emergency session and he secured the President's

approval of the resolution to be introduced.

He

told the President that the

Security Council would probably adopt the resolution calling for a cease-fire, but
in

view of the complete disregard the North Koreans and their "big allies" had

shown for the United Nations

in the past, the United States

UN

Some decision would have

order would be ignored.

had to expect that the

to be

made

at

the degree of aid or encouragement which the American Government
to extend to the Republic of

once as to

was

willing

Korea. 29 Acheson said that additional reports had

3417, CINCFE and JCS 2330 Z, 25 Jun 50, see Schnabel,
wrote that this teleconference was with
p. 67; also Collins, pp. 11-12. Collins
MacArthur's Chief of Staff, Maj Gen Edward M. Almond, and his G-2, Gen

^^Telecon,

Willoughby, p.

TT

12.

Decision in
2'^Based on the Sp ecial Collection of Materials on the Korean
as SCDS), see Paige, p. 113,
the Historical Office, Dept. of State (hereafter cited
"Acheson's next call came through around eleven-thirty
Truman recalled,
ready to sit do\vn to
Sunday morning I Independence time], just as we were getting
This would be 12:30 P. M.
an early Sunday dinner. " See Truman, H, 332.
and fifteen minutes
Washington time. There would be a gap of about two hours
version should be 12:45 P. M.
the two accounts. It is possible that Paige's
,

m

Washington

time.

^^Acheson,

p. 404.

29Truman, H, 332.
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been received from Korea, and there was no doubt that an all-out
invasion was

underway there.

from

The President instructed Acheson

State and Defense

meet with him

recommendations for him. ^0
that he

was returning

to

at Blair

to

House

have the available people

that evening and prepare

xhe President informed

Washington

at

once

Later

.

the Secretary of State

he sent a message from the

plane to Acheson saying that the group should come to Blair House for a dimier
conference.

Blair House

was

the President's temporary residence in Washington

while the White House was being reconstructed.

As President Truman was

flying

from Missouri

to

Washington for about

three hours, he "had time to think aboard the plane. " In his memoirs, he

recounted his thought

at this point:

In

when

my

generation, this was not the first occasion

the strong had attacked the weak.

I

recalled

some

Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I
that the democracies failed
to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead.
Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini,
and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years

earlier instances:

remembered how each time

earlier.
fall

I felt

Communist

South Korea was allowed to
leaders would be emboldened to override

certain that

if

own shores. If the Communists were
permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea
without opposition from the free world, no small nation
nations closer to our

and aggression by
stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go
unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as
similar incidents had brought on the second world war.

would have the courage

30

Acheson,

p. 404;

Truman,

II,

to resist threats

332.

13

It

was

also clear to

me

of the United Nations

Acheson had also conferred
(H.

unless this unprovoked

at stake
O

Korea could be stopped.

attack on

Dean Rusk, and Doc

that the foundations and the principles

were

at the State

-1

"^^

Department with Philip Jessup,

Freeman) Matthews, later joined by George Kennan.

They were now considering what the American reaction should

be.

Kennan took

the position that "we would have to react with all necessary force to repel this

attack and to expel the North

Korean forces from the southern

half of the

peninsula. " Kennan also took occasion to emphasize

.on that first occasion and on a number of others,
that we would now have to talce prompt steps to assure that
Formosa, too, did not fall into Communist hands; for two
such reverses coming one on the heels of the other, could
.

.

easily prove disastrous to our prestige and to :ur entire
position in the Far East. 32

Later that afternoon, Acheson had everyone and

all

messages kept out

the situation.
his office for an hour or two while he "ruminated" about

c

His

perception and estimates were recorded in his memoirs:

"Thought" would suggest too orderly and purposeful a
like
process. It was rather to let various possibilities,
patterns
of
series
glass fragments in a kaleidoscope, form a
from them. Our
of action and then draw conclusions

recommendations for the President dealt with the next
as we could see
twenty -four hours or so, which was as far

SlTruman,

II,

332-33.

^^George F. Kemian. Me
pp. 485-86.

-noirs,

1925-1950 (Boston:

Little, Bro^vn, 1967),
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at the time.

But what must we contemplate beyond that?
was that the attack woiild be called off;
the other, that it would not be. For some months, as
tensions had mounted again after the Berlin blockade, we
had run exercises on danger spots for renewed Soviet
probing of our determination. Korea was on the list but
not among the favorites. Berlin, Turkey, Greece, Iran-all seemed spots where the balance of convenient operation
dipped in favor of the Soviets. Korea was too near major
forces and bases of ours in Japan and too far from any of
theirs to offer a tempting target, though they could have
judged our interest in it less than in the other places. But

One

possibility

now

the attack had

come there. What was likely to happen
next and how should we determine our response? It seemed
close to certain that the attack had been mounted, supplied,
and instigated by the Soviet Union and that it would not be
stopped by anything short of force. If Korean force proved
unequal to the job, as seemed probable, only American
military intervention could do

it.

Troops from other sources

would be helpful politically and psychologically but unimportant
militarily. My two weeks in Europe left little doubt of that.
Plainly, this attack did not amount to a casus belli
against the Soviet Union. Equally plainly, it was an open,
undisguised challenge to our internationally accepted position
as the protector of South Korea, an area of great importance
to the security of American-occupied Japan. To back away
from this challenge, in view of our capacity for meeting it,
would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the
United States. By prestige I mean the shadow cast by power,
which is of great deterrent importance. Therefore, we could
not accept the conquest of this important area by a Soviet
puppet under the very guns of our defensive perimeter with
no more resistance than words and gestures in the Security
Council. It looked as though we must steel ourselves for
the use of force. That did not mean, in words used later by

General Mark Clark, that we must be prepared "to shoot the

works for victory,

S^Ach eson,

p. 405.

" but

rather to see that the attack failed.

15

In the Pentagon,

Army

Chief of Staff Collins was reviewing, that same

afternoon, the strength and dispositions of United States and Soviet military

forces in the Far East; the missions that had been assigned to General MacArthur
as

Commander

in Chief,

Far East; the duties

of the

Group; the military-aid agreement with the Republic

documents applicable toihe Korean
the Secretaries of

attack

was

of

Korea and other existing

At 3:00 P.M. Collins briefed

34
Army, Navy, and Air Force on these items.

The Involvement

The

situation.

Korean Military Advisory

of the United Nations Security Council

first reaction of the United States Governm-cnt to the North

Korean

an urgent basis.
to activate the United Nations into the situation on

As mentioned

earlier, while the reports on the

Korean

fighting

were

still

President Truman approved
incomplete, the State Department recommended, and
at

an immediate meeting
once over the telephone, that the United States request

of the United Nations Security Council

UN

and that the United States introduce a

resolution to call for a cease-fire in Korea.

This proved to be a decisive

the United Nations involved in the
first step for the United States to get

War.

America would subsequently

Korean

actions
take the initiative to put its Korean

support
Nations and provide leadership and
within the framework of the United
security.
in the interest of collective
to the international organization

^^Collins, p. 12.
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Less than six hours

after the United States received its first officifil

report of the North Korean attack, Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, Deputy

Representative of the United States to the United Nations, was instructed to
telephone Secretary-General of the United Nations Trygve Lie, at 3:00 A.M.

on June 25, 1950, officially asking him
Security Council.

Gross informed Lie

to call an

emergency session

of an attack

of the

UN

upon the territory of the

Republic of Korea at several points by the forces of the North Korean regime,

which constituted "a breach

of the

peace and an act of aggression.

"

35

Secretary-

General Lie arranged the requested meeting for 2:00 P.M. on the same date.
At mid-morning Secretary-General Lie received a cablegram dated 25

June from the United Nations Commission on Korea reporting the latest

fighting.

The report concluded:

Commission wishes

to

draw

attention of Secretary-

General to serious situation developing which is assuming
character of full-scale war and may endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security. It suggests that he
consider possibility of bringing matter to notice of Security
Council. Commission will communicate more fully considered

recommendation

As a result
held

its

473rd

meeting

of the

at 2:00

later.

request by the United States, the

P.M.

,

,

p. 2, fn 2.

Security Council

Sunday, June 25 at Lake Success,

•^^See United Nations Security Council, Official
Meeting, June 25, 1950, No. 15, p. 1, fn 1.

^^Ibid.

UN

Records

,

New York.

Fifth Year,
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Both the message from Ambassador Gross

UN Commission

of the Soviet Union,

ia the agenda.

Jacob Malik, was absent from

He had been boycotting the Council meetings ever since his

view of Chinese representation was not accepted

had argued

and the cablegram from the

on Korea to the Secretary -General were included

The representative
this meeting.

to Lie

in early

Malik

January 1950.

that the Chinese seat in the Security Coimcil should be taken by a

representative of the Chinese Communist government in Peking instead of by
the Chinese Nationalist representative.

Malik's absence relieved the United

States of the threat of a Soviet veto at his meeting.

Security Council in the month of Jime was

The President

Sir Benegal N.

Rau

of the

The

of India.

representatives of the follomng countries were present at this meeting: China,

Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Ladia, Norway, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and Yugoslavia.

After the agenda was adopted, Secretary-

General Lie made some remarks.
General Assembly on October

21,

He recalled

the action taken by the

1949 concerning Korea.

The report received by me from
as well as reports from other sources

the

He then

UN

stated:

Commission,

Korea, make [sic]
undertal^en by
it plain that military actions have been
a direct violation
are
actions
North Korean forces. These
in

[of Oct. 21, 1949]
of the resolution of the General Assembly
abstentions,
which had been adopted by a vote of 48 to 6 with 3
Charter.
the
well as a violation of the principles of

as

a serious one and is a threat to
in my
international peace. The Security Council is,
I consider
it.
opinion, the competent organ to deal with

The present situation

is

18
the clear duty of the Security Council to take steps
necessary to re-establish peace in that area. ^'^
it

Before Ambassador Gross made a statement of the U.

S.

position, he proposed that the representative of the Republic of

permitted to

sit at the

Government's

Korea be

Council table during consideration of the case.

With

no objection, the invitation w^as quickly extended.

Gross then remarked that the ag£;ression

in K^orea

threat to international peace and security, " and as such,

concern" to the United States Government.

He said

was "clearly a
it

was

"grave

of

that the full-scale attack

by North Korean forces was "an invasion upon a State which the United Nations
itself,

by action of

its

Genera] Assembly, has brought into beiag.

"

He

continued:
It is

armed aggression

against the Government

elected under United Nations supervision. Such an
attack strikes at the fundamental purposes of the
United Nations Charter. Such an attack openly defies
the interest and authority of the United Nations. Such

an attack, therefore, concerns the vital interest which
all the Member nations have in the Organization.
After reviewing briefly the history of the Korean problem, Gross

introduced and read the American draft resolution.

been worked on by Assistant Secretary of

This draft resolution had

State for United Nations Affairs

Hickerson as soon as Acheson and Truman approved the idea of requesting an

^'^Ibid.

,

p. 3.

Ibid.

,

p. 4.

,
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emergency session

of the

UN

Security Council to call for a cease-fire.

Ambassador Gross and David Wainhouse,
and Security Affairs

in the State

Both

acting head of the Office of Political

Department, had also participated

in the

preparation and development of the draft resolution and the speech to be

presented with

In the afternoon of June 25, the text of the draft

it.

was read by Secretary Acheson

resolution

to President

Truman over

The essence

telephone and received Presidential approval.

of the

the

American

draft resolution was:

Noting with grave concern the armed invasion of
the Republic of Korea by armed forces from North

Korea,
Determines that this action constitutes a breach
of the peace
I

Call upon the authorities in North Korea
(a) To cease hostilities forthwith; and
(b)

An
"armed

To withdraw

their

parallel;.

,41

.

armed forces

to the 38th

earlier draft of the resolution would have determined that the

attack on the Republic of

stituted "an

unprovoked act

Korea by forces from North Korea" con-

of aggression. "

However, when

this draft

was

See Paige, pp. 106-08.
40

Ibid.

,

p.

113; Acheson, p. 404.

Records
41see United Nations Security Council, Official
473rd Meeting, June 25, 1950, No. 15, p. 7.

,

Fifth Year,
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shown

to

some members

of the Security Coimcil, they

available information had established

prepared

to

say that

for this statement

it

the conclusion.

had not yet been instructed what the U.
call for an

meet these views
Still,

the change

Their preference

American representative

that the

course would be should the North

S.

immediate cessation of

drawal of their forces to the 38th parallel as provided
to

that the

Nonetheless, they were

"constituted a breach of the peace. "

was strengthened upon learning

Koreans disregard the

were not sure

hostilities and a with-

in the resolution.

In

order

was made. 42

as the discussion continued in the Seciirity Council meeting, some

representatives, friendly to the United States, desired further drafting changes.
adopted a
After a brief recess and consultations, the Security Council finally

revised draft resolution of the United States, by a vote of
abstaining.

9 - 0, with

Yugloslavia

The adopted resolution read:
The Security Council,
Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its
Governresolution 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949 that the
established
ment of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully
over
government having effective control and jurisdiction
Temporary
Nations
that part of Korea where the United
and consult and
observe
to
able
Commission on Korea was
Korea reside;
of
people
in which the great majority of the
that this

Government

is

based on elections which were a

electorate of that
valid expression of the free will of the
by the Temporary
part of Korea and which were observed
Government
such
Commission; and that this is the only

m

Korea,

'^^Acheson, p. 404.

21

Mindful of the concern expressed by the General
Assembly in its resolution 195 (III) of 12 December 1948 and
293 (TV) of 21 October 1949 about the consequences which
might follow unless Member States refrained from acts
derogatory to the results sought to be achieved by the United
Nations in brtngiag about the complete independence and unity
of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation described
by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report
menaces the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea
and of the people of Korea and might lead to open military
conflict there,

Noting with grave concern the armed attack on the
Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,
Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the
peace; and
I

C all s^ for the immediate cessation of hostilities;
Calls upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw
forthwith their

armed forces

to the 38th parallel;

II

Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea:
(a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible

delay;
(b)

To observe

the withdrawal of North Korean forces

to the 38th parallel;
(c)

To keep

the Security Council informed on the

execution of this resolution;
all Member States to render every assistance
resolution and to
to the United Nations in the execution of this
authorities.
refrain from givmg assistance to the North Korean
Calls upon

The American draft resolution which Ambassador Gross
the Council meeting

was changed

to

was revised

"armed attack

in three aspects.

on. "

^^nited Nations Security

First,

first

read to

"armed invasion

of"

Second, there was inserted a general call

Council, Official Records

Resolutions and Decisions, 1950, pp. 4-5.

,

Fifth Year,

22

for the "immediate cessation of hostilities" directed at both parties to the
conflict just before the resolution's specific call upon the authorities in North

Korea

withdraw

to

to the 38th parallel.

that the United Nations

Third, one item was added to request

Commission on Korea

also "communicate its fully

considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay.

The President
at 3:00

P.M.

P.M.

on June 27 to consider the recommendations of the Commission,

,

M.

45
,

And

the 473rd meeting adjourned

Sunday, June 25.

,

When Truman's plaie landed
7:20 P.

proposed that the next meeting be

of the Security Council

as provided in the resolution just adopted.
at 6:00

"'^'^

at

Washington National Airport

at about

he was met by Acheson, who reported the results of the

UN

Security Council meeting, and by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson.

They

hurried to Blair House for the dinner conference.
Secretary Johnson and General
Chiefs of Staff, had just

They returned
the

news

made

Washington

to

Omar

N. Bradley, Chairman of the Jomt

a thirteen-day inspection tour of the Far East.

at about noon,

June 24 (Washington time).

North Korean attack reached Washington on Saturday

of the

4:6

When

night,

Gross' original draft resolution, see UN Security Council,
No. 15, pp. 7-8.
Official Records 5th Year, 473rd Meeting, 25 June 1950,
'^'^For

,

45

Paige, p. 124.

^^Ibid.

,

p.

80.
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June 24, Secretary Johnson first received the information from one of the wire
services, about an hour or two before midaight.^'^

member

Army

of his staff

over the telephone.

Secretary Pace

,

Soon he was alerted by a

When he received a

telephone call from

he told Pace that he was delegating to him temporary

responsibility for acting for the Defense Department in the matter.

morning, Secretary Johnson and General Bradley decided

commitment

to participate in a military

officials of State

meet a long-standing

conference at Norfolk, Virginia.

returned later in the day but too late for the meeting

between

to

On Sunday

at the State

They

Department

and Defense.

The First Blair House Conference

,

June 25, 1950

Time: dinner
11:00

at 7:45

P.M. followed by major discussions

until about

P.M.

Present: The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretaries of the three services, all

and other State Department

officials.

members

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Their names: President Harry

S.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson,

^ '^

Hearings

,

Pt. 4, 2572.

48
°Paige, pp. 89-90.
'^^Collins, p. 11.

Truman,
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Secretary of the

Army Frank

Pace, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews,

Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff

Omar

Army

N. Bradley, Chief of Staff of the

J.

Lawton Collins, Chief

of

Naval Operations Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of

S.

Vandenberg, Under Secretary of State James E. Webb, Assistant Secretary

of State for

Staff of the

Air Force Hoyt

Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary

of State for

United Nations Affairs John Hickerson, and Ambassador at Large Philip C.
en

Jessup.

"

It

may be

noted that this group included

Security Council except the Vice President

all

members

and the Chairman

of the National

of the National

Security Resources Board.

While the group was waiting for dinner

Johnson brought up the subject

to

of the strategic

to the security of the United States and

be announced. Secretary

importance of Formosa (Taiwan)

asked General Bradley

to

read a

memo-

randum on Formosa which had been prepared by General MacArthur. Secretary
Acheson "recognized

this as an opening gun in a diversionary

Truman, H, 333; Hearings H,
,

Schnabel, p. 68; fn 24

(1).

1049.

argument

that

"

25

CO

Johnson wished to start with me.

"

President Truman allowed Bradley

to

finish his reading but then announced that discussion of the Far Eastern situation

h^d better be postponed

As

the

first called on

Acheson

until after dinner.

major discussions began,

after the dinner, President

Truman

Secretary Acheson to give "a detailed picture of the situation.

initiated the talk

by reading and summarizing the messages from

The Secretary "gave a darkening report

Ambassador Muccio.

of great

confusion" and then read three recommendations:

General MacArthur should be authorized and directed
to supply Korea with arms and other equipment over and above
that already allocated under the Military Assistance Program.
The U. S. Air Force should be ordered to protect Kimpo
2.
airport during the evacuation of United States dependents by
attacking any North Korean ground or air forces approaching it.
The Seventh Fleet should be ordered to proceed from
3.
the Philippines north and to prevent any attack from China on
1.

Formosa or

vice versa.

^"^

At this point, President Truman "interrupted

^^Acheson,

to

say that the Seventh

p. 406.

333.
Acheson, p. 406; Collins, p. 13; Schnabel, p. 68; Truman, H,
to
asked
again
According to Johnson's testimony, he, later in the evening,
question. And "the only
discuss Formosa further before taking up the Korean
myself ever had took place for
really violent discussion Secretary Acheson and
that he would tal<e Formosa
a moment. ... The President at that time incUcated
meeting about Formosa until
up later. There was no further discussion in that
Pt. 4, 2580.
the motion was made the next night." Hearings,

^Sruman,
55

Acheson,

II,

333-34; Collins, p.

p. 406.

13.
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Fleet should be ordered north at once but that

making any statement

recommendations

until the fleet

that Secretary

was

I

[Truman] wanted

in position. "^^

In addition to the three

Ache son read, he also urged

assistance to Indochina be stepped up.

to withhold

that military

^'^

Acheson's recommendation to move the Seventh Fleet north from the
Philippines to protect
in

Formosa from

response to George Kennan's

by MacArthur's

memorandum

attack by

initiative

Communist China was probably

and urging, rather than influenced

on the strategic importance of Formosa to the

United States, which was brought back by Secretary Johnson and read by General

Bradley

at the beginning of the first Blair

House dinner conference.

and Bradley had not attended the meeting between
of State and

Defense

at noon.

Collins' account and
at this

James

Acheson went

officials of the

Departments

to this noon meeting late.

F. Sclmabel's record of the tentative plans

noon meeting, which were later transmitted

to

was not mentioned.

view on Formosa

It

11,

334.

made

to the

MacArthur hearings, Louis
who initiated in this
moving north from the Philippines

In his testimony at the

Johnson stated that it was he, as Secretary
meeting the recommendation to start the fleet
and that the President agTeed immediately. See Hearings
p. 406.

Formosa

At the same time, the Secretary

of Defense,

Acheson,

in a

would seem that Acheson had not known Johnson's

until the dinner conference.

^^Truman,

And from

General Mac Arthur

teleconference, the subject of moving the Seventh Fleet northward
Strait

Johnson

,

IV, 2580-81.

1
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had

of State

started.

to have his

recommendations ready before the dinner conference

He wrote: "When

no plan, but

my mind was

recommend would

set off to

meet

the President, [at the airport]

pretty clear on where the course

lead and

After Acheson

I

why

made

it

was necessary

that

we were about

we follow

had

I

to

that course. "^^

his report in this first Blair House meeting,

Truman

"asked each person in turn to state his agreement or disagreement and any views
rQ

he might have in addition.

"

"No one demurred from Acheson's recommendation.

"The recommendations were supported with varying degrees
and Vandenberg

felt that air

"if the

army

of the Republic of

hurt, United States ground forces would be needed. "^^
to

Acheson,
the subject of

who

p. 405.

initiated

Sherman

Korea was badly

Collins suggested that

send a survey party to Korea

situation and the condition of the

58

6

and naval aid alone might suffice to halt the North

Koreans, but Collins stated that

MacArthur be authorized

of detail. "

to

determine the actual

ROK Army.

For some views, based on less complete records, on
the idea of sending the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa

and why, see Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 558-59; Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as
History (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 208-12; Leland M. Goodrich,
Council
Korea: A Study of United States Policy in the United Nations (New York:
Strait,

on Foreign Relations, 1956), pp. 110-11.

Truman, H, 334.
^^CoUins,

^^Acheson,

p. 14.

p. 406.

^^Truman, H, 335;

Collins, p. 14.

"
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On

members

this occasion, the military chiefs

individual

of the defense establishment than presenting a formal estimate by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.
of the

were speaking rather as

American forces

All

members

in the

of the Joint Chiefs

Far East and the absence

emphasized the wealcness

of a general plan for

defending South Korea.

As

the discussion continued, President

Truman

stated that he "did not

expect the North Koreans to pay any attention to the United Nations.

would mean that the United Nations would have
obeyed. "

The President also said

a further testing of U.

S.

to apply force if

that he regarded the North

it

This.

wanted

.

its

.

order

Korean attack as

determination to prevent the spread of the Communists'

areas of domination, like their tests in Iran, Turkey, Greece and Berlin.

General Bradley said that the United States would have

somewhere.

to

draw the

line

Russia, he thought, was not yet ready for war, but in Korea they

were obviously testing America, and the

line ought to be

Truman agreed emphatically and "expressed

^^Hearings, IV, 2632, 2580;
^'^Schnabel, p. 69.

^^Truman, H, 335.
^^Collins, p. 14.

II,

949.

drawn now.

President

the opinion that the Russians

were

29

trying to get Korea by default, gambling that
third world

war and would

we would be

67
offer no resistance. "

The President discussed with

the military chiefs

Soviet Union's pushing the crisis to general war.

Russian forces

in the

would be needed
in

Korea.

in the

the likelihood of the

He asked for information on

Far East and called for urgent study

to destroy Soviet

Far East air bases

if

to determine

what

Soviet planes intervened

President Truman also asked about the dispotion of Ameri can forces

Far East and how long

Philippines to the
to

afraid of starting a

Formosa

it

Strait, to

Korea, and to reinforce U.

The President

would take

S.

to

move

move two or

air units in the

the Seventh Fleet

from

the

three divisions from Japan

69
Far East.

"instructed the service chiefs to prepare the necessary

orders for the eventual use of American units

if

the United Nations should call

" 70
for action against North Korea.

The consensus

of the discussion

was

that

it

was unlikely

Union would start a general war with the United States

^^Truman, H, 335.
^^Sclinabel, p. 69.

69Truman,
70ibid.

II,

335.

that the Soviet

at this time, "since the

30
military balance

was more favorable

Soviet Union than

it

was

to the United States and
unfavorable to the

""^1
likely to continue in the longer
run.

Truman accepted Acheson 's recommendations,

Finally,

reserving decision on what orders

"although

to issue to the Seventh Fleet
until

reach the Formosa Strait about thirty-six hours
later and be able

Truman

out.

Vandenberg was instructed to

carry them

General

initiate a concentration of jet aircraft on

The President added two instructions

make

should

also approved the authorization for General
MacArthur to send a

survey party to Korea to make a first-hand
appraisal and report.

"to

to

it

of his

own

to

Formosa.

Secretary Acheson:

a survey of other likely spots for Soviet strikes
and to prepare a state-

ment for him

to

been done.

Before the group broke up at about eleven o'clock. President
Truman

"

emphasized

that

make on Tuesday (perhaps

no statement whatever was

on Tuesday, June 27.
to the press.

to

Congress) reporting what had

to be

made by anyone

until he spoke

There must be no leaks, not even background statements

73

At the end of the meeting, Acheson showed the President the message

71

Acheson,

p. 406.

"^Acheson,

p. 406;

79

"^^Acheson, p. 406.

Schnabel, p. 69.
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from Dulles

in

Truman

Tokyo.

thought that Dulles, too, seemed to have

doubt about the course of action America had to take.

Immediately after the meeting
Staff

at the Blair

arranged a teleconference with MacArthur.

sat in on this conference in the

MacArthur was advised

ROK Army

House, the Joint Chiefs of
Secretaries Pace and Finletter

Kimpo

Seoul, and the nearby port of Inchon,

sufficient air and navel

employ such naval and

power

to

air forces

ensure

in the

Pentagon.

arms and equipment needed by

to hold the capital city of Seoul, the

Han River from

'^'^

Army's communications center

that the shipment of

little

airfield ^ust across the

was

its safe arrival.

needed south

the

to be protected by

He was directed

to

of the 38th parallel to prevent

the overrunning of the Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area and to ensure the safe evacuation
of

American dependents and other American noncombatants.

told to send to

Korea a survey party

Korea.

MacArthur was informed

from the Philippines and Okinawa
operational control of the

to assist the forces of the Republic

that the Seventh Fleet had

to Sasebo, Japan,

Commander, U.

teleconference, MacArthur was not

S.

where

it

been ordered
would pass

Naval Forces, Far East.

made responsible

to

In this

for all operations in Korea.

The United States Military Training Mission (Korea Military Advisory Group

Truman, H,

336.

was

of selected officers to check and report

back on the military situation and how best
of

In addition, he

32

[KMAG]) and the actual evacuation were

still

being supervised by Ambassador

Muccio, acting under instructions from the State Department. ^5
Thus the Joint
Chiefs of Staff informed General MacArthur that the Secretary
of State wished

KMAG liaison

officers to stay with

ROK units

so long as these units remained

effective fighting forces.

General MacArthur was not placed in command of
activities in

Korea

until

all

U.

military

S.

June 27, when his survey group entered Korea.

'^'^

Summary
The response
in the first

of

America's policy-makers

to the

North Korean attack

two days consisted mainly of two important steps:

(1)

commit

the

United States to United Nations action by pressing for immediate adoption of the

UN

Security Council resolution of June 25, 1950 to deal with the Korean

situation; (2)

move

the U.S. Seventh Fleet northward

from

the Philippines with

a view to protecting Formosa from Chinese Communist attack.

such as the evacuation

of

American nationals and

Republic of Korea, were somewhat routine

Other measures,

the provision of

arms

to the

in nature.

'^^Collins, p. 15; Schnabel, pp. 69-70;

Truman, H, 335-36.

"^^Schnabel, p. 70.

77

Collins, pp. 15, 17; Schnabel, p. 71. Louis Jolinson testified that it
was toward the end of the Monday night conference at Blair House that he initiated
the proposal of putting General MacArthur in charge. See Hearings, Pt. 4, 2574.
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The United States could have acted alone
the United Nations, since the attack

was a

in

Korea without bringing

direct challenge to the prestige of

the United States as the protector of South Korea.

On

the other hand, the

authority and the interest of the United Nations were also at
to

in

be a response from the United Nations, too.

stalce.

Nevertheless,

if

There had

the United

States had not taken the initiative and leadership in the United Nations
for a
collective action,
did, with

it

was doubtful

speed and confidence.

that the United Nations could respond, as

The United Nations was only

the time and since the start the United States had been
to mal^e the

UN work

as the Charter provided.

UN

action on

Korea right from

ment

to

vitalize the

security.

world body

in its

5

it

years old at

committed

to trying

Thus America's firm commit-

the beginning of the conflict would

purpose of maintaining international peace and

At the same time the legal and moral position of the United States

with respect to Korea would be greatly strengthened by this commitment to
collective United Nations action.

follow in the

same

Subsequent U.

S.

actions in Korea would

direction.

Soon after Ambassador Muccio

in

Korea reported "an

all-out offensive

against the Republic of Korea," State Department official, Hickerson,

recommended
Council.

the call for an

emergency session

of the United Nations Security

Acheson and Truman promptly approved

it.

The Security Council

resolution of June 25 sponsored by the United States, callmg for a cease-fire

and calling upon the North Korean authorities

to

withdraw their armed forces

34
to the 38th parallel,

was adopted with

from the Security Council meeting.
It

the key absence of the Soviet delegate

The Soviet Union could have vetoed

it.

would seem that the State Department, rather than the Defense

Department, took the

recommend

initiative to

the

movement

Fleet to prevent any attack from Communist China on

of the seventh

Formosa or

vice versa.

This action ran parallel to General MacArthur's view, supported by General

Bradley and Secretary of Defense Johnson, that Formosa was strategically
important to the security of the United States.

The North Korean attack was perceived by both Acheson and Truman
in the context of the Soviet Union's

world-wide aggressive intentions and

ambitions, and in light of previous Communist challenges in Iran, Turkey,

Greence and Berlin.

Even though U.

S.

military intervention in Korea

not contemplated at this point, Dulles, Acheson and
the possibility of the need to use

United Nations efforts.
eventuality.

American forces

in

Truman had
Korea

Thus instructions were issued

all

was

considered

in conjunction with

to plan for such an

CHAPTER

II

UNITED STATES MILITARY INTERVENTION

IN

KOREA

The Second Blair House Conference an d the
Decision to Intervene with U. S. Navy and Air Force s
South of the 38th Parallel

On Monday, June

26, reports

from Korea continued

teriorating situation, forecasting the early

fall of Seoul. ^

to picture a de-

Acheson engaged

in

a series of conferences with his advisers and with Department of Defense officers
throughout the day.

He had a conversation with Counselor George F. Kennan on

overall Soviet intentions.
this time

seemed

a "local affair,

"

According to Kennan,

all the

to point to the conclusion that the

evidence available at

North Korean invasion v/as

not connected to a wider pattern and not indicative of a Soviet

desire to precipitate a third world war.

Kennan and Charles Bohlen, both

experienced diplomats on Soviet affairs, also "bet" against the presence of a

Russian

at the

UN

Security Council meeting on June 27. ^

After lunch, Acheson accompanied the South Korean Ambassador, who

presented a personal appeal for help from the President of the Republic

of

1

Collins, p. 15.
2

3

Interview with Kennan by Paige, Aug

Acheson,

p. 408.

1,

1955, see Paige, p. 147.

"
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Korea, Syngman Rhee, to Truman.
that "help

was on

At the
Council.

told the

Korean Ambassador

the way.

State

Later

The President

Department, a new resolution was drafted for the

in the afternoon,

draft paper at 6:30 P.

M.

,

Acheson wanted

to be alone and

which eventually became the statement

UN

Security

completed a
of the President,

issued on June 27 without any significant change. ^
After dinner and further conferences with State and Defense officers,

Acheson telephoned the President

that "the" situation in

desperate that he would wish to hear about

Truman

it

Korea was becoming so

firsthand and instruct us further.

called the second Blair House conference at 9:00 P. M.

Monday, June

,

26, 1950.

The same group who attended

the first conference on Sunday night

was

again present except Navy Secretary Francis Matthev/s, while Deputy Under

Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews took the place of Under Secretary Webb.
First, General Bradlej^ presented General MacArthur's

assessment

4
5
6

of the battle condition:

most recent

7

Truman, E, 336; Acheson,
Acheson,

p. 407; Paige, p.

Acheson,

p. 407.

p. 407.

151.

"^Beverly Smith, "The White House Story: Wliy We Went to War in Korea,
Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 10, 1951, p. 80. Also Collins, p. 15.
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Piecemeal entry into action vicinity Seoul by
South Korean Third and Fifth Divisions has not succeeded
in stopping the penetration recognized as the enemy main
.

.

.

effort for the past 2 days with intent to seize the capital

Tanks entering suburbs of Seoul. Govt,
transferred to south and commvmication with part of KMAG
opened at Taegu. Ambassador and Chief KMAG remaining
in the city.
FEC mil survey group en route to Korea has
been recalled, under this rapidly deteriorating situation.
South Korean units unable to resist determined
Northern offensive. Contributing factor exclusive enemy
possession of tanks and fighter planes. South Korean
city of Seoul.

show

casualties as an index to fighting have not

adequate

resistance capabilities or the will to fight and our estimate
is that a

complete collapse

is

imminent.

This message from Mac Arthur was alarming to Truman.

was now no

doubt!

of

Korea needed help

The conferees agreed

be overrun.
"rout"^'^ and

field,

The Republic

would not be able

that the

at

^

He

once

ROK Army was

to protect Seoul

felt:

Truman

thought, "a

was not

and Inchon and the Kimpo air-

Communist success

in

air.

"More

Korea would put Red

troops and planes within easy striking distance of Japan, and Oldnawa and

Formosa would be open

to attack

from two

12
sides. "

Truman, H, 337.
^Ibid.

^RusK Interview, Aug.
'''Collins, p.

^^ruman,

II,

15.

337.

to

apparently in a

from which Americans were being evacuated by sea and

seriously, "

if it

"There

22, 1955, see Paige, p. 162.
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The President

seemed
Berlin:

to

him

told his advisers that what

was developing

like a repetition on a larger scale of

"The Reds were probing for weakness

Korea was part

of opinion in the

Korea

what had happened

in our

armor; we had

their thrust without getting embroiled in a world-wide war.

The weight

in

to

in

meet

"-''^

conference was that the invasion of South

of a Soviet strategic

master plan.

^'^

In

response

to

Truman's

request for suggestions, Acheson recommended:

The Air Force and Navy should give all-out support
Korean forces, for the time being confining their efforts

1.

to the

to south of the 38th parallel.

The Seventh Fleet should be ordered to prevent an
2.
attack on Formosa, the Nationalists told not to attack the
mainland, and the Fleet told
necessary.
3.

U. S.

to

prevent their doing so,

if

forces in the Philippines should be strengthened

and aid to Philippine forces accelerated.
Aid to Indochina should be increased and we should
4.
propose to the French that we send a strong military mission.
If the President approved the foregoing, he should
5.
issue the statement I had prepared as directed and which
included actions recommended.
6.

At the Security Council meeting called for the next

morning [sic] we should propose a new resolution (which
Hickerson read) calling on UN members to give Korea such
help as might be needed to repel the armed attack and
restore peace in the area. If Malik returned to the Security
Council and vetoed the resolution, we v/ould have to carry on
under the existing one. If he did not return, it would pass
without opposition.

Ibid.

'^^Based on SCDS, see Paige, p. 171.

l^Acheson, pp. 407-08.

8

'
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No

objection

was raised

to

Acheson's recommendations and President Truman

"The Army officers present doubted whether naval

promptly approved them.

and air support could save the Korean forces, though the Navy and Air Force

view was more optimistic.
in

If it

became necessary

Korea, they thought some degree

The President asked
State

of mobilization

that this be given

Department records

to

commit ground forces

might become necessary.

immediate study.

"

of the conference reportedly indicate that the

danger of all-out war was "not seriously' discussed" and was "not a deterrent
factor" in the decisions that were talcen.

Orders

were issued

to carry out the decisions of the second Blair

at once and

were immediately carried

out.

1

It

House conference

was

also decided

that there would be a meeting with congressional leaders on Tuesday morning,
»

June 27,

to

"inform them on the events and the decisions of the past few days.

After an hour, the meeting at Blair House adjourned.

minutes after adjournment, the Joint Chiefs of

16

Acheson,

p. 408; see also Paige, pp. 165-^56.

''^Based on SCDS, see Paige, p. 173.
•'^Acheson, p. 408.
19

Truman,

Staff called

II,

338.

^^Schnabel, p. 73; Paige, p. 179.

20

Within a few

General MacArthur

40
into teleconference.

They removed restrictions against

air and naval operations

against North Korean military targets below the 38th parallel.

him about

the

new missions

They urged him

of the U. S. Seventh Fleet in

to spread the

news

that

Formosan waters.

American help was on the way

South Korea in order to maintain South Korean morale. ^^

was

They informed

MacArthur's mission

throw the North Koreans out of South Korea. "^^

"to

On Tuesday morning, June
State and Defense

27,

Truman and

his advisers

Departments met with congressional leaders.

from the
Nine Demo-

crats and five Republicans from Capitol Hill attended the meeting.

were Senate majority leader

Raybum
From

to

of

Scott

W. Lucas

House speaker Sam

of Illinois,

Texas, House majority leader John W. McCormack

the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee came

Included

its

of

Massachusetts.

chairman. Senator

Tom

Connally of Texas, and Senators H. Alexander Smith, Republican of

New

Jersey; Elbert D. Thomas, Democrat of

Republican

of

Wisccnsin.

^""Telecon,

TT

On

behalf of the Senate

3426,

p. 73; see also Paige, pp.

Utali;

and Alexander Wiley,

Armed

Services Committee

CINCFE and JCS, 270217 Z June

50, see Schnabel,

184-86.

See Paige, p. 181. MacArthur was evidently given full responsibility
of all U. S. military activities in Korea from this time onward. See Louis
Johnson's testimony in Hearings, Pt. 4, 2574; also David Rees, Korea: The
Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 23; Walter Millis,
A rms and the State (New York; Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 262.
MacArthur's mission was again referred to on June 30 as "clearing South
Korea of North Korean forces. " See Hearings, Pt. 2, 1012.

"
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came

its

chairman, Senator Millard E. Tydings of Maryland, and Senator Styles

Bridges, Republican of

New Hampshire.

Representing the House Foreign

Affairs Committee were its chairman, Representative John Kee of West
Virginia; Representative Charles A. Eaton, Republican of

Representative Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana.
Services Committee came

its

New

From

Jersey; and

the House

chairman. Representative Carl Vinson

and Representative Dewey Short, Republican

Truman asked Acheson

to

summarize

He reminded

unopposed would surely lead
he conclud,ed.

to

the situation.

Acheson reviewed

in this

measure

World War

This was the crux of the problem,

HI.

"But Dean, you didn't even mention the U. N.

then "pointed out that

it

was

case and had acted with great speed.

!" the

President

24

the United Nations which had acted
"

He then read

the statement

"which had already been prepared for release to the press later that day.

^^Paige, p. 187; Truman, II, 338; Acheson, p. 408.
Acheson also included Senator Walter F. George in the list.
of Georgia in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
24

Interview with a participant, see Paige, p. 188.

Truman, H, 338.

to

the congressional leaders that aggression

exclaimed as Acheson finished his remarks.

Truman

of Georgia,

of Missouri.

the desperate military situation and the necessity to take strong

repel the aggression.

Armed

25

Both Truman and

He was a Democrat
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Korea, the Government forces, which were armed
border raids and to preserve internal security,
were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The
In

to prevent

Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading
troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel.
This they have not done but, on the contrary, have pressed
the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of
the United Nations to render every assistance to the United
Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances, I have ordered United States air and sea forces to
give the Korean Government troops cover and support.
The attack upon Korea malces it plain beyond all doubt

communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to
conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion
and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of
the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and
security. In these circumsttmces, the occupation of Formosa
by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security
of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing
their lawful and necessary functions in that area.
Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent
any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am
calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all
air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh
that

Pleet will see that this is done.
future status of

Tlie determination of the

Formosa must await

in tlie Pacific, a

the restoration of security

peace settlement with Japan, or consideration

by the United Nations.
I have also directed that United States forces in the
Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the
Philippine Government be accelerated.
I have similarly directed acceleration in the fumishmg
of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated
States in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission to
provide close worldng relations with those forces.
I

know

that all

members

of the United Nations vdll

consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression
Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations.
A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have
far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to
in

uphold the rule of law.
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have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the representative of the United States to the Security Council,
to report
these steps to the Council.
I

Truman

then asked for the views of the congressional leaders.

"Various

questions about military dispositions were asked and answered by the
Chiefs,
including the fact that no ground forces had yet been committed.

Smith commented that "in Korea we would act as members

"^"^

of the

Senator

U.N. rather

than as a single nation. " The President said this was correct but pointed out,
"so far as our action concerned Formosa, we were acting on our own and not

on behalf of the U. N. "28

There was also some discussion

itself, the

at this time.

committed

proposed Security Council

Acheson pointed out that since the U.

resolution.

committed

of the

to

S. S.

R. had not yet publicly

United States was careful not to "engage" Soviet prestige

Congressman Eaton inquired whether
defend South Korea.

the United States

was now

"The President answered yes, as a member

of the United Nations and in response to the Security Council's resolutions. "^^

When

the question

was asked about help from other

Dept. of State Bulletin (Jul
27

28

Acheson,

p. 409;

3,

nations, Acheson replied that

1950), p. 5; Also

see also Paige, p. 191.

Truman,

II,

Acheson,

p. 409; see also Collins, pp. 16-17.

29

338.

Truman, n, 338-39.
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not

much could be expected

French, or had

little to

since others either had their hands

full, like the

spare.

At the conclusion of the meeting with the congressional leaders,
the

prepared statement by Truman was released to the press around
noon.
Prior to the release of the Presidential statement, President
Chiaag

Kai-shek

of the Republic of

China on Formosa was notified of America's

decision concerning Formosa.

Government announced

its

On June

28,

Formosan time,

the Nationalist

agreement.

The United States also informed and explained

to

her allies and friends

abroad about the actions that had been taken.
President Truman's public statement on June 27 was based upon a

fundamental assumption that the attack from North Korea was not an isolated
event, but

was part

of an overall attempt of global

independent nations" by force.

sea forces, was not enough.

had

to

Formosa, Indochina, and

30
31

32

,

Ache son,

in these

The

areas were connected and

See Paige, p. 184.
II,

"conquer

the Philippines all

belief

p. 409,

See Truman,

to

Thus, to help South Korea, even with air and

be defended against Communist forces.

movements and actions

"communism"

339-40; Paige, pp. 191-92.

was
i

that

Communist

would be coordinated
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to realize a bigger

master plan, which would be a threat

to the security of

the U. S. and the free world, as well as a breach
of international peace and

security.

Communist China reacted immediately and
Truman's statement

of

Gtrongly to President

June 27, especially with regard to Formosa.

In

Peking Foreign Minister Chou En-lai released a statement on
June 28:

On behalf of the Central People's Government of
the People's Republic of China, I declare that Truman's
statement of June 27, and the actions of the American
Navy, constitute aggression against tlie territory of
China, and a total violation of the United Nations Charter.
All that

Truman's statement does

is

.

.

openly expose

his premeditated plan and put it into practice. In fact,
the attack by the puppet Korean government of Syngman

Rhee on the Korean Democratic People's Republic at the
instigation of the U. S. Government was a premeditated

move by the United States, designed to create a pretext
for the United States to invade Taiwan, Korea, Viet Nam
and the Philippines.
.

.

... no matter what obstructive action the U. S.
imperialists may tals:e, the fact that Taiwan is part of China
will remain unchanged forever. This is not only an
historical fact it has also been confirmed by the Cairo and
Potsdam declarations and by the situation since the surrender

—

of Japan.
to the

All the people of our country will certainly fight

end single -mindedly

to liberate

Taiwan from the

grasp of the American agi>ressors.'^^

33

Extract,

New China News Agency,

Amerioan Relations, 1949-71
MacFarquhar (Royal Institute

,

June 29, 1950. Cited in Sinodocumented and introduced by Roderick

of International Affairs, 1972), pp. 83-84.

"
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On June 27

in

communicated a note

Moscow, American Ambassador Alan
to

G. Kirk had

Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko:

My Government has

instructed

me

to call

your

attention to the fact that North Korean forces have
crossed
the 38th parallel and invaded the territory of
the Republic
of Korea in force at several points. The refusal
of the
Soviet Representative to attend the Security Council

meeting
on June 25, despite the clear threat to peace and the
obligations of a Security Council member under the Charter
requires the United States to bring this matler directly to
the attention of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. In view of the universally known fact of the
close relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the North Korean regime, the United States Government
asks assurance that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
disavows responsibility for this unprovoked and unwarranted
attack, and that it will use its influence with the North
Korean authorities to withdraw their invading forces
immediately. ^'^

Later the same day, the State Department told the press of the content

of

this note to the Soviet Union.

^

to the Soviet Union, the State

Department did not expect significant results from

it.

Even though the note

America's policy concerning Korea was

still

signified a direct approach

focused on the United Nations.

34
note was

Dept. of State, U. S. Policy in the Korean Crisis
drafted on June 25,

^^Dept. of State Bulletin (Jul

^^See Paige, pp. 201-02.

3,

1950)

,

p.

5;

,

p. 65.

Acheson,

This

p. 410.
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The United Nations Security Council Resolution
of June 27

The UN Security Council met

,

1950

at 3:00 P.

M.

Tuesday, June 27.

The

representative of the Soviet Union was again absent from the meeting.

The

Council had received four cablegrams from the

were

all

dated June 26.

One

of

,

UN Commission

them (S/1505) was a summary report on back-

ground events, preceding the outbreak

of hostilities on June 25.^'^

cablegram (S/1504) expressed "unanimous gratification

move," but pointed
last eighteen

Still

on Korea, which

Another

at Securitj^ Council

out that the Com^tnission's "efforts to contact North during

months met only with negative response. "^^

another cablegram (S/1503) stated:

North Korean advances have created dangerous situation
with possibilities of rapid deterioration.

Impossible estimate
In view Commission's
past experience and existing situation Commission convinced
North Korea will not heed Council resolution nor accept UNCOK
good offices. Suggest have Council give consideration either
invitation both parties agree on neutral mediator to negotiate
peace or requesting Member Governments undertake immediate
mediation. Commission decided stand by in Seoul. Danger is
that critical operations now in progress may end in matter of
days and question of cease fire and withdrawal North Korean
forces suggested Council resolution prove academic. ^9
situation which will exist

The

texi-.

of the last report (S/1507)

tomorrow

in Seoul.

from the Commission followed:

S7

See UN Security Council, Offical Records, Supplement for June- Aug.
1950, pp. 23-26.

^^UN

Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year

27, 1950, No. 16, p. 2.
^^Ibid.

474th Mtg.

,

June

48

Commission met

this

morning 10 o'clock and considered

latest reports on hostilities and results direct observation along
parallel by UNCOK military observers over period ending forty-eight

hours before hostilities began.

Commission's present view on
basis this evidence is first that, judging from actual progress
of operations, Northern Regime is carrying out well-planned,
concerted and full-scale invasion of South Korea; secondly,
that South Korean forces were deployed on wholly defensive
basis in all sectors of the parallel; and thirdly, that they were
taken completely by surprise as they had no reason to believe
from intelligence sources that invasion was imminent.
Commission is following events and will report further developments. '^^

Ambassador Austin, before introducing a new American

draft resolution.

remarked:

We now have before us the report of the United Nations
Commission for Korea, which confirms our fears. It is clear
that the authorities in North Korea have completely disregarded
and flouted the decision of the Security Council.

...

It is

the

plain duty of the Security Council to invoke stringent sanctions
'^•^
to restore international peace.

He then read

the prepared draft resolution and the statement by

had been released earlier

at

noon

ia

Truman, which

Washington.

The Security Council adopted the draft resolution

of the United States

by

seven votes to one (Yugoslavia), Egypt and India not voting, since neither
delegation could obtain instruction

announced

its

from

their

government

in

time.

acceptance of this resolution, and Egypt said that

Fold.

^^Official Records, 474th Meeting, No. 16, pp. 3-4.

it

Later India

would have

:

49

abstained from voting had the Egyptian representative been able to participate
in the voting.

Following

is the text of the

adopted resolution of June 27

The Security Council
Having determined that the armed attack upon the
Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitute
a breach of the peace,
Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities,
Having called upon the authorities in North Korea to

withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel.
Having noted from the report of the United Nations
Commission on Korea that the authorities in North Korea have
neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to
the 38th parallel, and that urgent military measures are
required to restor international peace and security.
Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to
the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure
peace and security,

Recommends that the Members of the United Nations
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be
necessary to repel the armed attack and
peace and security in the area."^^

As Acheson

later analyzed the resolution, "the

significance in themselves. "

words were not pregnant with

They had been taken from Article 42

Nations Charter, which empowered the Security Council,
of.

.

.

to restore international

any breach of the peace or act of aggression"--as

if it

it

Official

'^''^83

Records, 475th Meeting, Jun 30, 1950, No.

(1950), S/1511, Official

Decisions, p.

5.

Records

,

found "the existence

had here--to "take

such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary

^^

of the United

to

maintain or

17, pp. 2-3.

Fifth Year, Resolutions and

50

restore international peace and security. "44
to interpretations.

In

General Collins' view,

^hus the resolution was subject
it

"confirmed actions already

taken by the United States and laid the
groundwork for subsequent United

moves and

States

The

the later active participation of other

explicit

attack in the

new

recommendation

resolution

was

member

of military assistance to repel the

a stronger

measure against

forces than the urging of a cease-fire and troop withdrawal
resolution.

countries. "45

The Soviet Union could have helped

the North

in the

armed

Korean

June 25

the North Koreans, at least

legally and diplomatically, by vetoing the Security
Council resolution of June
27.

Yet, once more, the continued absence of the Soviet representative
from

the Coimcil meeting enabled the United States to press successfully
for a stronger

UN

resolution.

of the

America's position had also been strengthened by

UN Commission

on

Korea

26 that the North Korean regime

in their

was

and full-scale invasion of South Korea.

On

report to the United Nations on June

carrying out "well -planned, concerted
"

the question of the origin of the

Korean War, James

writes:

44

Acheson,
45

the judgment

p. 448.

Collins, p. 16; see also Sclinabel, pp. 73-74.

F. Schnabel
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The international communist bloc later charged that
the South Korean Army had invaded North Korea,
thus
triggering a North Korean counter-attack. Two documents
captured following the fall of North Korea have been
authenticated as official attack orders issued by North
Korean military authorities to their commanders several days
before the assault. Both documents, Reconnaissance Order

No.

issued in Russian to the Chief of Staff of the North
Korean 4th Division and discovered in Seoul on 4 October 1950,
and Operations Order No. 4, North Korean 4th Division, were
issued on 22 June 1950. See ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts,
Issue 2. (Documentary Evidence of North Korean Aggression),
Part 2.46
1,

'

Also, in the Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea covering
the period

from December

15, 1949 to

September

4, 1950,

which was trans-

mitted to the United Nations General Assembly on September 4, 1950, the
finding of the

Commission with regards

to the fact of

aggression was:

The events now taking place in Korea did not breal^ out
on 25 June as the result of a provocative attack by the troops
of the Republic of Korea, much less as a result of the launching
of an invasion force across the parallel by the Republic of Korea,
as has been alleged. The Commission, having had free access
to all areas in South Korea, has been at all times aware of the
military situation in the South. Particularly regarding the
period immediately preceding the invasion, the Commission had
before it the report, referred to in paragraph 8 above, which
was submitted by the Commission's field observers on 24 Jmie 1950.
The team was composed of two observers, Squadi^on Leader
R. J. Rankin, RAAF, and Major F. S. B. Peach, RAI.
The report of the observers was completed on 24 June
1950, the eve of the invasion from the North. The events of
the following day conferred upon the observation regarding
.

the defensive positions of the South
of

Korean forces

which the observers when they drafted

46
Schnabel, p. 61, fn

1,

(2).

tlieir

.

.

a significance

report could not

52

have been aware.

This very imawareness gives to their
observations a special value, which the
Commission has
taken into due consideration.
.

.

On

the basis of this report and of its Imowledge
of the
general military situation, the Commission is
unanimously
of the opinion that no offensive could
possibly

have been
launched across the parallel by the Republic of
Korea on
25 June 1950.47
Further, the conclusion of the report of the

UN Commission

on Korea

stated in part:

The invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea
by the armed forces of the North Korean authorities, which
began on 25 June 1950,- was aa act of aggression initiated
without warning and without provocation, in execution of a
carefully prepared plan.

The Deteriorating

Situation and the Extension of

Air and Naval Operations

On Wednesday

He

a complete restudy made of

all

North Korea

Truman held

afternoon, June 28,

National Security Council.

to

a meeting of the

told the departments concerned that he wanted

U.

S.

policies in areas adjoining the U. S. S.R.

See UN General Assembly, Official Records
No. 16 (A/1350), p. 4.

,

Fifth Session, Supp.

48

See Ibid. p. 32. For a view which raises questions about common
explanations on the outbrealc of the war, see I. F. Stone, The Hidden History
of the Korean War 2nd ed. (New York: Montlily Review Press, 1969), pp.
1-66; 349-52. For some recent discussion, see Karunalmr Gupta, "How Did
,

,

the Korean

War Begin?" China

716; and three

comments on

Quarterly No. 52 (Oct-Dec. 1972), pp. 699the article and Gupta's replies in China Quarterly ,

No. 54 (Apr-June 1973), pp. 354-68.

,

For the problem of defining "aggression"
Tokyo War Crimes Trial,

in international law, especially in the context of the

see Richard H. Minear, Victors' Justice (Princeton:
1971), pp. 55-60.

Princeton Univ. Press,
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Acheson pointed out

that

"we could not count on the continuance

the enthusiastic support that our staunch attitude in

country and in the world.
involve casualties and

Korea had evoked

Firm leadership would be

taxes "^^

days might ultimately involve us

Acheson's purpose was

"For what had been done

in all-out

to

less popular

if it

of

in the

should

in the last three

war. "^^

prepare for criticism and hard sledding.

But the President replied "that the danger involved was obvious but that we
should not back out of Korea unless a military situation elsewhere demanded

such action.

Army

Secretary Pace reported that instructions had been issued to

military intelligence to be alert for any evidence of Soviet participation in
the

Korean

Truman

President

targets.

Pace asked

fighting.

there were any other special intelligence

if

thought that Soviet activities in the vicinity of

Yugoslavia, in Bulgaria especially, and in the vicinity of northern Europe
should be given special attention.

49

52

Acheson, p. 411. For examples of public reactions to Truman's
announcement of June 27, see Paige, pp. 193-201 and Eric F. Goldman,
The Crucial Decade and After: America, 1945-60 (New York: Random House,
a Vintage Book, 1960), pp. 158-60.

^^Truman,

II,

^^Ibid.

^^Ibid.

,

341.

340.
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On

Korean

the

front, the capital city of Seoul fell to the
North

forces by the nightfaU of June 28 (Korean time). ^3

Korean

At the same time, Major

General John H. Church, who had entered Korea as head

MacArthur's survey

of

group, was convinced that below Seoul a reasonable defense
of the Han River line

from

the south bank could be held for a while by the

parallel

be used.

were

to

ROK Army.

That evening, he radioed

tliis

Korea on June 29 (Korean time)

situation and to bolster the sagging

During the

MacArthur's

if

the 38th

be restored, he believed, American ground forces would have to
opinion to General MacArthur together

with an admittedly fragmentary report of the situation.
fly to

But

flight to

order

in

ROK Army

Korea, according

pilot, at about 0800,

^'^

MacArthur decided

to judge personally the military

morale.

to Lt.

Colonel Anthony F. Story,

June 29 (Korean time). General MacArthur

dictated a radiogram to Major General Earl E. Partridge,

Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer's absence.

who was aboard with MacArthur, wrote
the plane's radio.

The order

it

commanding FEAF

General Stratemeyer,

out and handed

it

to Story to send

"Partridge from Stratemeyer.

said:

North Korean airfields immediately.

No

publicity.

by

Take out

MacArthur approves.

"

^^Schnabel, p. 71.
^"^Schnabel, p. 72;

Collins, p. 18; Acheson, p. 411.

^^Schnabel, p. 74; Collins, p. 18.

^^Roy E. Appleman, South

to

Naldong, North to the Yalu (Washington:

Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the

Also Schnabel,

to

p. 77, fn 51; Collins, p.

18.

Army,

19G0), p. 44.

in
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The bombing action was taken twenty-four hours before MacArthur received
such authorization from the JCS, with the President's approval.

MacArthur and his party landed

at

Suwon Airfield.

They met with

General Church, Ambassador Muccio, President Syngman Rhee, and Chief
Staff of the

ROK Army,

General Chae Byong Duk.

of

Then MacArthur insisted on

driving up to the south bank of the Han River below Seoul, where they could see
the

enemy

firing

from

the city at targets

Han River, MacArthur saw thousands
moving away from the

battle area.

near them.

of refugees

MacArthur

departed about 1600 the same day for Japan.

On

the trip to and

and disorganized

retiirned to

from

ROK

the

soldiers

Suwon Airfield and

57

In Washington, on June 29, reports reaching the Joint Chiefs of Staff

direct
in

from

the

Far East were so threatening

that Secretary Johnson,

who kept

touch with the situation, advised the President at noon that further United

States action might be necessary.

"Blair House Group" for 5:00

P.M.

President

Truman

called a meeting of the

58

At the meeting, Johnson introduced a proposed directive

to

MacArthur.

After some discussion, the approved directive, which was received by the Far

57

Schnabel, p. 74; Appleman, p. 45.

^^Collins, p. 19: Smith, p. 86; Ache son, p. 411. Truman characterized
also by Chairman
this meeting as a National Security Coimcil meeting, attended
Secretary
Symington of the National Security Resources Board and Executive
Smith,
244-45;
p. 86.
Lay ofVe NSC staff; see Truman, II, 341; Paige, pp.
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East Commander on June 30, Tokyo time, authorized him

Army

service forces in South

essential services;

(2)

Korea

to

to (1)

employ U.

S.

maintain communications and other

employ Army combat and service troops

to

ensure the

retention of a port and air base in the general area of Pusan-Chinhae;

(3)

employ

naval and air forces against military target/s in North Korea but to stay well
clear of the frontiers of Manchuria and the Soviet Union;

(4)

defend Formosa

through naval and air action against invasion by the Chinese Communists and,
conversely, prevent Chinese Nationalists from using Formosa
operations against the Chinese mainland;

munitions

at his disposal

(5)

as a base of

send to Korea any supplies and

and submit estimates for amounts and types of aid

required outside his control.

It

also assigned the Seventh Fleet to MacArthur's

operational control, and indicated that naval

commanders

support and reinforce him as necessary and practicable.

in the Pacific

would

The directive ended

with a statement that the instructions did not constitute a decision to engage in

war with
was
"If

the Soviet Union

full realization of the

if

Soviet forces intervened in Korea, but that there

risks involved in the decisions with respect to Korea.

Soviet forces actively oppose our operations in Korea, your forces should

defend themselves, should take no action to aggravate the situation and you
should report the situation to Washington.

See Appleman, p. 46; Schnabel, pp. 76-77; Collins, pp. 19-20.
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While discussing Johnson's proposal, Truman

paragraph
to go to

that

I

wanted

felt that the

of the draft directive "permitted an implication that

war against

the Soviet Union. "

fmal

we were planning

The President "stated categorically

did not wish to see even the slightest implication of such a plan.
to take

38th parallel.

committed

in

develop. "^^

every step necessary

But

I

Korea

to

I

push the North Koreans back behind the

wanted to be sure that we would not become so deeply
that

we could not

take care of such other situations as might

The President also pointed out

that "operations above the 38th

parallel should be designed only to destroy military supplies, for

I

wanted

it

clearly understood that our operations in Korea were designed to restore peace

there and to restore the border.

be restricted in

its

"

Acheson stated

that the Air

Force should not

tasks by a rigid application of the 38th parallel as a re-

straining line, but he wanted to be sure that precautions would be taken to keep
the air elements

from going beyond

the boundaries of Korea.

su^ested what MacArthur should do

in

Acheson also

case of Soviet intervention.

The

President accepted this suggestion.

Acheson reviewed the reply from the Soviet Union concerning America's
appeal for Soviet help to restore Korean peace.

^^Truman, H,
^^Ibid.

341.

The American Ambassador

in

58

Moscow had been read
Gromyko

the following statement by Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister

earlier in the day, June 29:
In connection with the statement of the

Government of
America transmitted by you on June 27,
Soviet Government has instructed me to state the following:

the United States of
the

In accordance with facts verified by the Soviet
1.
Government, the events taldng place in Korea were provoked
by an attack by forces of the South Korean authorities on border
regions of North Korea. Therefore the responsibility for these
events rests upon the South Korean authorities and upon those

who stand behind their back.
As is known, the Soviet Government v/ithdrew its
2.
troops from Korea earlier than the Government of the United
States and thereby confirmed its traditional

principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. And now
as well the Soviet Government adheres to the principle of the

impermissibility of interference by foreign powers in the
internal affairs of Korea.
3.
It is not true that the Soviet Government refused to
participate in meetings of the Security Council. In spite of its
full willingness, the Soviet Government had not been able to
take part in the meetings of the Security Council in as much as,
because of the position of the Government of the United States,
China, a permanent member of the Security Council, has not
been admitted to the Council which has made it impossible for
the Security Council to take decisions having legal force.

Acheson expressed the

belief that a statement which had been released

in Peking, talcen together with the

Russian reply, seemed to indicate that while

the Chinese

Communists might intervene,

said, "That

means

the Russians would not.

Truman

that the Soviets are going to let the Chinese and the North

62
State Dept. Bulletin (Jul 10, 1950), p. 48.
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Koreans do their

fighting for them. "63

^cheson suggested, and Truman

approved, the public release, on June 29, of
America's note to the U.

S. S.

R.

and the latter 's reply.
Shortly after the meeting on June 29, Acheson
returned to the Wliite

House.

Among

other things, he and the President discussed
an offer by

President Chiang Kai-shek to contribute 33,000 Nationalist
ground troops

Korean

the
told

Acheson

to see as

the

action, to be transported and supplied by the United
States.
that his first reaction

many

Korean

of the

members

was

to accept this offer

it

because he wanted

on the ground that these troops

would be much more useful defending Formosa than Korea.
asked the Secretary

Truman

of the United Nations as possible take part in

Acheson argued against

action.

to

to bring up the

matter the next day

at a

The President
meeting with the

Defense Secretary and the Joint Chiefs.

63

Smith, p. 88.
64

Truman, H,

342; Acheson, p. 412; State Dept. Bulletin {Jul 10, 1950),

pp. 47-48.

65

Truman,

11,

342; Acheson, p. 412.
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General MacArthur's Recommendations and the Commitment
of U. S. Ground Combat Forces to Ko rea

A message from

General MacArthur concerning the result

of his

personal visit to Korea reached Washington an hour before midnight on June

29.^^

It

stated:

I have today inspected the South Korea battle area from
Suwon to the Han River. My purpose was to reconnoiter at
first hand the conditions as they exist and to determine the
most effective way to further support our mission.
The South Korean forces are in confusion, have not

seriously fought, and lack leadership. Organized and equipped
as a light force for maintenance of interior order, they were
unprepared for attack by armor and air. Conversely, they
are incapable of gaining the initiative over such a force as

embodied in the North Korean Army.
The Korean Army had made no preparations for a defense
in depth, for echelons of supply or for a supply system. No
plans had been made, or if made, not executed for the

that

destruction of supplies or material in event of a retrograde
movement. As a result, they have either lost or abandoned
their supplies and heavier equipment and have absolutely no

means

of

intercommunication.

In

most cases,

the individual

soldier, in his flight to the south, has retained his rifle or

They are gradually being gathered up in rear areas
carbine
and given some semblance of organization by an advanced group
of my officers I have sent over for this purpose. Without
artillery, mortars and anti-tank gims, they can only hope to
retard the enemy through the fullest utilization of natural
.

obstacles and under the guidance of example of leadership of
high quality.

The

civilian populace is tranquil, orderly and prosperous,

according to their scale of living. They have retained a high
degree of national spirit and firm belief in the Americans. The
roads leading south from Seoul are crowded with refugees
resufing to accept the Communist rule.

66
Sclinabel, p. 78.
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South Korean military strength is estimated at not more
than 25,000 effectives. North Korean military forces are as
previously reported, backed by considerable strength in armor
and a well-trained, well-directed and aggressive air force
equipped with Russian planes. It is now obvious that this force
has been built as an element of comm.unist military aggression.
I am doing everything possible to establish and maintain a
flow of supplies through the air-head at SUWON and in the southern

port of PUSAN. The air-head is most vital, but is subject to
constant air-attack. Since air-cover must be maintained over
all aircraft transporting supplies, equipment and personnel, this
requirement operates to contain a large portion of my fighter
strength. North Korean air, operating from near-by bases, has
been savage in its attacks in. Suwon area.
It is essential that the enemy advance be held or its impetus
will threaten the overrimning of all Korea. Every effort is being
made to establish a Han River line but the result is highly
problematical. The defense of this line and the Suwon- Seoul
corridor is essential to the retention of the only air -head in
central Korea.
The Korean Army is entirely incapable of counter- action
and there is grave danger of a further breakthrough. If the enemy
advance continues much further it will seriously threaten the fall
of the Republic.

The only assurance for the holding

of the present lins

,

and

the ability to regain later the lost ground is through the introduction
of

US Ground Combat Forces

into the

Korean

battle area.

To

continue to utilize the Forces of our air and navy without an effective
ground element cannot be decisive.
If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a United
States Regimental

Combat Team

to the

reinforcement

of the vital

area discussed and to provide for a possible build-up to a twodivision strength from the troops in Japan for an early counteroffensive.

Unless provision is made for the full utilization of the ArmyNavy- Air team in this shattered area, our mission will be
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needlessly costly in life, money and prestige.
might even be doomed to failure.

Army

it

it

Chief of Staff Collins received this message, number C 56942, about

midnight, June 29-30, Washington time.
situation

At worst

"I

was so concerned by

depicted and the urgency of MacArthur's request that

the critical

I

arranged for

a teleconference with General MacArthur at about 3:00 A. M. Washington time,

June 30 (5:00 P. M.

The

State

,

Tokyo time)," Collins

Department was advised

plans for the teleconference.
State

Present

later wrote.

of

General MacArthur's report and the

at the teleconference to

represent the

Department were Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Husk,

and the Korean Desk Officer, Neil W. Bond.
started at 3:40 A. M.

The teleconference

actually

Collins informed MacArthur:

of the Army No. 1]
Authorization proposed in your C 56942 will require
Presidential decision which will take several hours for consideration. Meanwhile, you are authorized in accordance with Par. 2B,
JCS 84631, to move one RCT [Regimental Combat Team] immediately
to Pusan base area. This will be amplified in our telecon

DA-1 [Department

scheduled for 30080 Z.

67Rad, C 56942 CINCFE to JCS, 30 Jim 50, in Schnabel, pp. 77-78. Also
Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York: Knopf,
a Borzoi Book, 1956), pp. 332-33; Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York;
McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 334.
^^Collins, p. 20.
^^Ibid.

,

p. 21.

2
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Mac Arthur answered:
FEC-1 [Far East Command, No.
U. S.

1]

Your authorization, while establishing basic principle
ground combat troops may be used in Korea, does not

that

give

sufficient latitude for efficient operation in present situation.
does not satisfy the basic requirement contained in my message

It

C 56942. Time is of the essence and a clear-cut decision v/ithout
delay is imperative.
General Collins explained to MacArthur:

DAI was present at White House conference late afternoon
June 29 when decision was made to authorize action covered in
JCS 84631. Tenor of decision clearly indicated to me that the
President would wish carefully

to consider with his top advisers
authorizing introduction of American combat forces into battle
area. Will not authorization given you in DA-1 permit initiation

movement? Prior

to completion of this movement we should
be able to obtain definite decision on your proposal. Does this
meet your requirement for the present ?'''0

of

According

to

General Collins:

DA-2. We took this to mean that
General MacArthur stood by his emphatic plea for a decision

No reply was received

to

"without delay. " After discussing this conclusion with the staff

members and

State

Department representatives present,

I

sent:

DA-9 Ref FEC-1.
proceed immediately through Secretary of the Army
your proposal to move one RCT
forward combat area. Will advise you soon as possible,
I

will

to request Presidential approval
into

perh^s

within half hour.

70
Ibid.

,

pp. 2G-22.
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Ibid., p. 22.

'^^
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General Mac Arthur did not acknowledge the receipt
time was critical,

"

of

DA-9.

"Since

recallred General Collins,

did not attempt to secure the concurrence of the other
members of the JCS. I stepped from the conference room, while
I

the staff continued the telecon with items of less importance,
and called Secretary Pace at his home. I gave him the gist of

General MacArthur's report and his urgent request

at the

recommended that approval for dispatch of a
regimental combat team to the Korean battle area be secured
from the President at once. Secretary Pace agreed.

telecon.

The Secretary

I

of the

Army

telephoned

MacArthur's request, the President told Pace

Truman
to

at 5:00 A.

M.

On learning

inform MacArthur immediately
170

that the use of one regimental

combat team was approved.

It

was only a few

minutes before Pace telephoned Collins to confirm Presidential approval.

before the teleconference was concluded General Collins was able to

Thus

tell

MacArthur:

DA-10
Your recommendation to move one Regimental Combat
Team to combat area is approved. You will be advised later
as to further build-up.

Acheson was

told in the

morning by Rusk

of

what had happened.

Ache son

"The request from the front and the President's reponse came as no

recalled:

surprise to me.

" 75

72Ibid.
7Q

Truman,
74
'

74

II,

342-43.

Collins, pp. 22-23.

^Acheson,

p. 412.
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Truman ordered
at 8:30 A.

M.

.

June 30.

a meeting of the Blair House
Group at the White House

He informed

his advisers that he had already
granted

authority for the use of one regimental
combat team in the battle area and that

he now desired their advice on the
additional troops to be employed.
if it

would not be worth while

to accept the

"I

asked

Chinese offer, especially since

Chiang Kai-shek said he could have his
thirty-three thousand men ready for
sailing within five days.

Time was

all -important.

Acheson opposed the acceptance

"76

of Chiang's offer "on the

ground that the

net result might well be the reverse of helpful
by bringing Chinese Commimist
intervention, either in
"if

Korea or Formosa or

Chinese troops from Formosa appeared

both. "77

in

Korea

Acheson suggested

tlie

Communists

[Peking] might decide to enter that conflict in order to
inflict

that

in Peiping

damage on

the

Generalissimo's troops there and thus reduce his ability to defend himself

whenever they might decide

The Chiefs

little

Syngman Rhee's army against

"^^Truman, H, 343.
77

78

Acheson,

Formosa. "^^

of Staff sided with Acheson, pointing out that even Chiang's

best troops would have very
"as

to try an invasion of

p. 412.

Truman, H, 343.

modern equipment and would be as helpless
the North

Korean armor.

Furthermore, the

1
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transportation could better be used for America's own troops and supplies.
In his

memoirs, President Truman recounted how he came

to the final

decision:
I was
enemy with

concerned about our

still

ability to stand off the

the small forces available to us, but after

some

I accepted the position taken by practically
everyone else at this meeting; namely, that the Chinese offer
ought to be politely declined. I then decided that General
MacArthur should be given full authority to use the ground
forces under his command.

further discussion

On Admiral Sherman's recommendation. President Truman
a naval blockade of North Korea.

also approved

8

Immediately after the meeting, the JCS informed General MacArthur:
"Restriction on use of

granted to utilize

Army

Forces.

Army Forces

.

.

are hereby removed and authority

available to you. "^^

xhe authority now granted

could go beyond the use of two divisions that MacArthur originally recommended.

A

briefing

was held

at the

to explain the decisions that

White House for congressional leaders

had been newly taken.

approval, Republican Senator Kenneth

S.

Wherry

of

In the

midst of general

Nebraska, minority floor

'^^Acheson, p. 412; Truman, H, 343.

^^Truman, E, 343.
^^Collins, p. 23.

^^Rad, JCS 84718 JCS to CINCFE, 30 Jun 50,
also Collins, p. 23.

at 11

in Schnabel, p. 79;

A.M.
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leader, questioned the legal authority of the executive to send ground troops
into

combat without consulting the Congress.

Senator Alexander Smith

suggested a congressional resolution approving the President's action.

Truman

said that he would consider Smith's suggestion and asked Acheson to prepare

a recommendation.

A

statement by the President was later released to the public, on June

30, 1950:

House

At a meeting with congressional leaders at the White
this morning, the President, together with the Secretary

of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of

reviewed with them the latest developments of the
situation in Korea.
The congressional leaders were given a full review

Staff,

of

the intensified military activities.
In keeping with the United Nations Security Council's

request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the
North Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea, the
President announced that he had authorized the United States
Air Force to conduct missions on specific military targets
in Northern Korea wherever militarily necessary, and had
ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast.
General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain
supporting ground units.

By Friday, June
military terms.

84

30, the United States

was

According to Pace, the decision

Acheson,

p. 413; Paige, pp. 262-63.

^Hearings, Pt.

5,

3372.

fully

to

committed

in

Korea

employ Army units

in

68
"logically followed" the decisions taken earlier in the

made

for us" by subsequent events.

But

in

week and had been "practically

a broader historical setting,

it

was

a sudden change of policy in less than one week between the North Korean attack
on June 25, and the dispatch of U.
to that

S.

Army

troops to Korea on June 30.

week. United States policy was firmly committed against becoming involved

in any kind of

war

in

Korea.

While American occupation forces were

still

1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, having seen a report

Albert C.
State

Prior

Wedemeyer

ia

September, addressed a

stationed in South

in

made by Lieutenant General

memorandum

George C. Marshall on September 25, 1947,

Korea

stating,

to

Secretary of

"from the standpoint

of military security, the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining

the present troops and bases in Korea. "

Underlying their reasons was a pre-

occupation with a strategy to deal with a possible larger war

world

in the future.

A

portion of the

memorandum

in

Asia and in the

follows:

Far East, our present
military
liability
and could not be
would
be
a
forces in Korea
maintained there without substantial reinforcement prior to
the initiation of hostilities. Moreover, any offensive operation
the United States might wish to conduct on the Asiatic continent
most probably would by-pass the Korean peninsula.
In the event of hostilities in the

^^Interview, Oct 24, 1955, see Paige, p. 261.
86
Collins, p. 41.
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If, on the other hand, an enemy were able to
establish and
maintain strong air and naval bases in the Koreaa peninsula, he
might be able to interfere with United States communications and
operations in East China, Manchuria, the Yellow Sea, Sea of
Japan and adjacent islands. Such interference would require an
enemy to maintain substantial air and naval forces in an area
where they would be subject to neutralization by air action.
Neutralization by air action would be more feasible and less
costly than large-scale ground operations.

In the light of the present severe shortage of military

manpower, the corps of two division, totaling some 45,000 men,
now maintained in south Korea, could well be used elsewhere, the
withdrawal of these forces from Korea would not impair the
military position of the Far East Command unless, in consequence,
the Soviets establish military strength in south Korea capable of
mounting an assault on Japan.

When

the United States

^"^

Government decided

American occupation forces from South Korea,

in April, 1948, to

its official position

withdraw

was: "The

United States should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation
that an action taken by any faction in

Korea or by any other power

be considered a 'casus

United States.

As
Korea

belli' for the

the United States

was completing

its

in

Korea could

"^^^

withdrawal of troops from South

in June, 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained a majority view which

stated:

From

the strategic viewpoint, the position of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff regarding Korea, summarized briefly,

Truman, H,

p. 325.

Collins, p. 29.

is that

70

Korea is of little strategic value to the United States and that
any commitment to United States use of military force in Korea
would be ill-advised and impracticable in view of the potentialities
of the over-all world situation and of our heaxy international
obligations as

compared with our current military

The Joint Chiefs were so much preoccupied with
situation that there

was not even

a

war plan

for

strength,

the over -all world

Korea on June

25, 1950,

when

the

on

North Koreans attacked.

Assessment

Why was

there a sudden change of policy in late June, 1950?

General Collins gave three reasons which emphasized the nature

In retrospect

of the attack

requiring America's military response in Korea rather than because of any change
of

Korea's strategic value.
First of all, I believe our political and military leaders
surprised
and deeply shocked by the bald actuality of the
were
apparently we could not believe that
North Korean attack.
such a small puppet state as North Korea would blatantly defy
the United States and the United Nations. Our prestige in Asia
and that of the United Nations were suddenly at stake, and we
.

.

.

reacted accordingly.
We received a second shock when
evident that the

ROK Army's

it

became quicldy

capacity to stop the attack had been
ROK x\rmy would not hold

that the

grossly exaggerated.
long enough for a broadly based United Nations force to be
assembled. It was also obvious that with an overwhelming
victory in sight the North Koreans would pay no attention to
mere political pressure from the United Nations. The United
.

.

.

89
Ibid.

,

p.

30.

^^See Louis Johnson's testimony

in

Hearin gs, Pt. 4, 2671.
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States

was

the only

member

country with forces immediately
we did not interpose at once,
South Korea would be overrun.
The third shock was the conviction in the minds of the
President and his principal State and Defense advisers, who
available for intervention.

If

were assembled at the three Blair House conferences following
the North Korean attack, that it was the Soviet Union, not m.erely
a Communist puppet, that was challenging the United States and
the United Nations. The Soviet Union having been checked in its
program of imperialist expansion in Iran in 1946, in Greece from
1947 to 1949, and in Berlin in 1949, had unquestionably shifted
its probings for weaJaiess to the Far East.
Ho Chi Minh was
relentlessly pressing the French in Indo-Chma, whom we were
then supporting with military aid. If South Korea were to fall
into

Commimism, Indo-Clmia

and, probably, Indonesia would

follow, and the whole balance of pov/er in the Far East would be

Such an upset would be a direct threat, not only to
Japan, but also the United States and to the whole concept of
international peace imder the Charter of the United Nations.

upset.

Actually, through the indication of intelligence reports about North Korea's

military build-up and their major troop
the United States

South Korea.

It

was aware
was

movement

of the possibility of a

at critical 38th parallel areas,

North Korean attack upon

the evaluation of the intelligence that misled

leaders to believe that the attack would not take place in 1950.

was

the timing of the attack.

Intelligence evaluation

American

The real "shock"

was based on

a concept of

larger geographical theater and involved more enemies thou simply North Korean

Communists.
elsewhere

The assumption was

in the

world, would

Collins, pp. 41-44.

all

that

Commimist moves

in Asia,

Europe, or

be coordinated and directed by the Kremlin.
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The judgment was made

that in 1950 Southeast Asia would tal^e
precedence over

Korea as far as Soviet ambitions
itself guerrilla activities

in the

Far East were concerned.

and psychological warfare were thought

In

Korea

to be

more

likely than a military attack by North Korea.

However, the "shock" or surprise would not have been so severe
United States had prepared for the contingency of a North Korean attack.
fact

In

America had not planned

tlie

East,

for a limited

war

in

Korea, prior

traditional concept of a total war, or at least a
it

Korea.

in the

would certainly be unimportant for the United States to try

Korean peninsula would seriously threaten

the

In

to Juiic 25, 1950.

major war

But, in a conflict which involved Korea alone, the

if

Far

to defend

fall of the entire

the security of Japan.

Japan, along

with the Ryukyus, the Philippines and the Aleutians, were regarded by the United
States to be within its defense line in the western Pacific.
of the

Korean War, Truman, Acheson and General Collins

aware

of the strategic value of

order to keep

at least the

Korea

in relation to Japan.

In the first

all

few days

became keenly

To intervene

southern half of the Korean peninsula in

in

neutral or

friendly hands would thus enhance America's national security interest in the

Far East.

See MacArthur.'s public interview on March I, 1949, cited in Acheson,
p. 357; and Secretary of State Ache son's speech at the National Press Club in
Washington on Jan. 12, 1950, Dept. of State Bulletin (Jan. 23, 1950), p. 116.
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Nevertheless, the security consideration was only one among many

elements of the Korean decision.
position in the cold

war by firm

Another goal was to protect U.

action in Korea.

S.

prestige mid

The North Korean attack was

seen by America's decision-makers as a "Russian maneuver," instigated and
inspired by the Kremlin.

The North Korean armed forces had been organized,

trained, equipped and supervised by the Soviets right

Russian occupation of North Korea.
North Korea

in

December

had included 40

the beginning of the

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from

1948, the Soviet Union continued to supervise North

Korean forces and made large shipments
Korea, particularly

from

of

in the spring of 1950.

YAK fighters

arms and military

supplies to North

By Jime, 1950 these sinews

planes, 70 attack bombers, 60

YAK

of

trainers, 10

reconnaissance planes, 150 Russian-built T-34 tanks and heavy artillery.

When

the North

the Soviet Union which

Koreans attacked, American leaders believed

was behind the move

to

probe a soft spot and

will of anti- Communist countries to resist open

forces.

If

that the United States

Korea.

was

it

was

to test the

Korea would weaken

of the free world, especially in

view

of the fact

the principal sponsor and supporter of the Republic of

As Louis Halle observes, such consequences would have

^'^See

that

qo

armed aggression by Communist

the United States failed to act, the loss of South

America's position as the leader

war

Appleman, pp. 7-12.

lost the trust of
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all

those from Japan to Germany, who relied on the protection
of

States to face

Communist threat and pressures.

may

It

the

United

also be interpreted,

as discussed by Robert Osgood, that Americans generally assumed,
until oiter

Korean War and the Sino-Soviet

the

was

"essentially a

split in the late 1950's, that the cold

zero-sum contest between

the two

aggression by any small communist state woiild

toward the communist bloc.

superpowers

shift the

war

md that

world balance

of

an

power

This view of American security would be accepted

"

as long as America's efforts to counter aggression were successful at a tolerable
cost.

To prevent

a third world

war was

gave for America's action in Korea.
the

Kremlin are engaged

over the world.

"

Truman

believed:

monstrous conspiracy

to

'^The

of the

have led to general war.

most dangerous m.ove"

Now

the

Korea was part

Commimist

Communists

in

all

the Berlin blockade as

threat to world peace, which could

the "aggression against

Communists had yet made.

Korea" was
In

"the boldest and

Truman's v/ords:

of a greater plan for conquering all of Asia. "

time to meet Communist threat should be

Truman

stamp out freedom

He cited ^he attack against Greece and

two previous examples

attack on

in a

the explanation that President

'^in

the beginning. "

And

"The

The best

the best

way

to

^'^Halle, p. 208.

Robert E. Osgood and others, America and the World (Baltimore: Jolms
Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 8. Hereafter cited as Osgood (1970).
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to

If

"meet the threat of aggression

is for the

peace-loving nations to act together.

they did not act together, they were "likely to be picked

Truman wanted

to learn a lesson

from

off,

one by one.

the history of the 1930's:

countries had acted together, to crush the aggression of the

"if tlie

dictators

"

"

free
ajid if

they had acted in the beginning, when the aggression was small— there probably

would have been no World War H. "^^
with other countries associated
attack, in

Korea

in

order

to

mth

In this

it in

way, the United States, together

the United Nations, acted to

prevent World

War

in.

Because Korea was seen by the United States

Commimist threat

in

was accompanied by

Asia and

in the

meet the

in a larger context of a

world, the decision to intervene in Korea

the decision to neutralize the

Formosa

Strait and to increase

military aid to the Philippines and the French in Indochina against the Communists
in all these areas.

Might the United States have overreacted, especially with regard to

Formosa? One

of the basic intentions of the

to the localization of the

Korean

Formosan decision was

fighting, even though this

to contribute

American move was

immediately denounced by Peking as "aggression against the territory
In

view of the readiness

of the

of China. "

Chinese Communist forces to conquer Formosa

See President Truman's radio address on April 11, 1051, Hearings, Pt.
Even though the occasion was related to the relief of the
5, 3547-52.
command of General MacArthur, Truman discussed Korea from June 1950 onward.
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whose defense by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist troops was
result of such a war,

if

relatively weak, the

not prevented, might be the loss of a strategically

important area into hostile hands on the flank

of

Korean

assumption here was that the Chinese Communists,

if

fighting.

in

America's

possession of Formosa,

would cooperate and coordinate with the North Korean Communists against U.

S.

action in Korea.
In addition to the military concern

some element
Korean War,

of

domestic politics.

the

to Chiang Kai-shek.

What they
97

Formosan decision might have

For six months prior

the conservative Republicans in

a tougher policy in the Far East.

commitment

,

to the outbrealc of the

Congress had been urging loudly

really

demanded was an

all-out

As Tang Tsou contends, "domestic

politics

and the necessity to win wholehearted Republican support for the State Depart-

ment's policy
its position

in

Korea made

on Formosa. "^^

it

highly desirable for the administration to reverse

Edward Friedman argues

Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on Formosa,

would silence Republicans

in

^'^See Jolin

Truman might

believe that this

wanted and budget-minded conservatives

The reasoning here was

that

if

Truman were

thought to be

W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and

Korean War (Cambridge, Mass.: Bellmap Press,
^^Tsou,

by sending the

Congress and would help win approval for a $50

billion military budget that the military

would not approve.

that

p. 560.

1959), p. 64.

the
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soft on

Communism
As

his other policy and political interests
would suffer.

far as the Korean decision itself

was concerned,

a failure to aid

South Korea would probably be attacked by
congressional Republicans as a
parallel to the "loss of China. " Whether this

by America's policy-m.akers

is not clear

was given an

from the available record.

event, the effect of the Korean decision together with the
to

explicit consideration

In any

Formosan decision was

produce immediate, though temporary, bipartisan cooperation and
unity on

Far Eastern

affairs.

Another explanation of the Korean decision was to preserve the United
Nations as a viable international organization.

made

to take military action in

to place such action in the

adoption of the
States

was

UN

Korea, the United States simultaneously tried

framework

technically America's action

As soon as the decision was

of the United Nations, even though

was carried out

slightly in advance of the formal

Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950.

The United

fortunate to find the Soviet delegate absent again from the Security

Council.

Thus the new resolution, which clearly gave America's military

response

in

Korea

legal and

moral sanctions

99

,

was not obstructed by

Soviet

See Edward Friedman, "Problems in Dealmg With an Irrational
Power: America Declares War on China, " in America's Asia, Dissenting
Essay s on Asian-American Relations ed. by Edward Freidman and Mark
Selden (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), p. 224. Hereafter cited as
Friedman (1971). cf. Rees, p. 31.
,

100

,

cf.

Paige, p. 304.
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veto.

Still,

the initiative at the United Nations indicated U. S. willingness to

subject its Korean policy to divergent and possibly constraining influences

from the United Nations, while hoping,
relatively

new

at the

same time,

to strengthen the

v/orld organization as a peace-keeping body.

The United

States had involved the United Nations intimately in the establishment of the

Republic of Korea and in Korean affairs in general.

Now here was

a clear-cut

case of the resort to force to obtain political objectives, which ran counter

one of the major goals of the United Nations.
acted alone in Korea.

former League

was concerned.

This would have

to

The United States could have

left the

United Nations as weak as the

of Nations, as far as maintaining international peace and security

But by acting through the United Nations, America could

give the international organization a chance to develop as a viable peace-

keeping body and advance

its

prestige and effectiveness.

Closely connected with the United Nations was the consideration of the
collective security system.

Collective security

to involve the will of the peace-loving,

was commonly understood

democratic commimity

punish aggression in behalf of the United Nations.
tendencies

of idealism in foreign policy.

In

was Secretary Ache son's explanation during

in

more
the

It

fitted

of nations to

America's

practical terms, however,

Mac Arthur

hearings:

The basis upon which wo are building our security,
addition to the strength of our own Armed Forces, is

collective security, which is based on arrangements such as

^^^Robert E, Osgood, Limite d War (Chicago: Univ.
1957), p. 192. Hereafter cited as Osgood (1957).

of

Chicago Press,
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the North Atlantic Treaty and the Rio Treaty,
Those are essential to us. They are the most fundamental forces in the security of the United States. Therefore,

transcendent importance that in our policies in all
parts of the world, where danger of war may be created,
we work absolutely hand in hand with our allies. '^^^
is of

it

The defense

of South

Korea would reassure

United States would defend the alliance at

America's
attack in

NATO

allies that the

all costs.

allies, on their part, supported U. S. policy of repelling the

Korea through the United Nations, thus upholding

Many

collective security.

allies not only voted for the

UN

the principle of

Security Council

resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950, but also immediately

offered to

provide various military assistance, however small or token, to the Republic
of

Korea through
In

the United Nations.

summary, there were

was intended

to achieve:

interest in the Far East;

cold war;

(3)

at least four goals that the

(1)

enhancement

(2)

protection of U.

prevention of World

War

of

America's national security
S.

prestige and position in the

HI; (4) preservation of the United

Nations as a viable world body and maintenance of

system.

In other

•^^^

in

tlie

colle ctive security/

words, these were the major reasons why America under-

Hearmgs

,

Pt. 3, 1764.

Also Goldman, p. 155; Davis S. McLellan, The Cold
Transition (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 23. Hereafter cited as

^^^Rees,

War

Korean decision

McLeiian

(10G6).

p.

31.

.
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took military intervention in K<;>rea in response to the North Korean attack.
It

should be pointed out that the availability of U.

in

nearby Japan for immediate employment provided the means

S.

air, sea and

ground forces

to achieve the

above-mentioned goals
Before the decision was made

to intervene, first with U.S.

Navy and

Air Forces, then with American ground combat troops, the policy-makers

in

Washington had relied on General MacArthur's communications, including his
assessments, personal observation and recommendations, as the most
important source of information for dealing with the rapidly developing
military situation.

Although the commitment of ground combat forces was

originally MacArthur's recommendation, he did not play any significant role
in the choice of political

He was given

and military objectives for America's action

the mission of clearing South

which was subject

The choice

to his

Korea

more basic mission

of

North

in

Korea.

Korean forces,

of the defense of Japai^.

of policy objectives and their related course of action

throughout the critical week of June 24-30 relied heavily upon Secretary of
State Acheson's

recommendations.

The military leaders

Department were consulted but do not seem
regard

to policy objectives.

have taken the

Defense

initiative with

Their major contribution was that they

necessary to extend air and sea operations

was made

to

in the

to defend South Korea.

to

felt it

North Korea, after the decision

Truman was,

of course, the only person

81

whose decisions became

final.

He did not hesitate

to decide quicldy

and

firmly on Acheson's recommendations to deal with Korea's crisis situation.

America's immediate military objective

was made

to intervene,

Korea's border
sense

liiat it

parallel.

was

to repel the

at the 38th parallel.

in

aggression and to restore South

This was a limited objective

did not seek the total defeat of the

The United States had desired

enemy above

to

war with

the Soviet Union.

in the

the 38th

that this kind of limited fighting

would not provoke Soviet and Chinese intervention
to a general

Korea, when the decision

in

Korea nor would

lead

it

Consequently precautions were

tal<:en

keep American air and naval forces from going beyond the boundaries

Korea

of

in the north.

Within a period of less than a week, the decision was made to commit
U.

S.

ground troops

to fight for the defense of South

makers consider any alternatives

to this

records do not indicate the consideration
stage of the decision-making process.

When

Korea.

Did the policy-

course of action? The available
of m.ultiple alternatives at

Why? One

hypothesis

the decisioa-maldng process

each

is:

must be compressed

into a short time period and the situation is a crisis thrust
upon the decision makers from outside, single alternatives

rather than multiple alternatives will be considered.
One possible consequence of the single iiltcmative process
.

.

premium on leadership and on the
adequacy of probability calculations. Another may be to
provide a way of simplif ying a situation to the point where

may be

to put a great

82
action is possible, thus avoiding the complexities of
estimate involved in discussing multiple alternatives.

Irving Janis writes:

According to Paige's analysis of the documents and
interviews bearing on the decision to enter the Korean War
in Jime 1950, the President set the tone at all the meetings
with his advisers, strongly shaping the group consensus as
each successive step was taken to deepen America's involvement in North Korea. The President's vociferous advocacy
of a hard military line during the initial meetings of the
advisory group indicates that he had no hesitation about
setting the norm in favor of one particular alternative.

Perhaps the short time period

of the

Korean crisis

in late June and

special leadership style in dealing with his advisory group, had

Truman's

much

to do

with the decision-making process of considering only a single alternative

course of action.

What other

alternatives might there have been to consider? In

United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955

,

written by William Reitzel, Morton

A. Kaplan and Constance G. Coblenz, two other possible alternatives are
discussed, in addition to the considerations which favor the actual course of
action.

One

is

no intervention

in

Korea, the other

is to act without bringing

Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The United States
Decision to Resist AggTession in Korea, " in Foreign Policy Decision-Making
ed. by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton M. Sapin (New York:
Free Press, 1962), p. 246.

,

^^^Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthinl<: (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin,
same
1972), p. 71. For specific examples along this line of thought, see the
page.
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in the United Nations.

Alexander L. George,

decision, raises three questions.

One

American involvement

alternative to

them

of

in a

in evaluating the

is:

Korean

"Was there a military

ground war

in

Korea? Could

the

United States have accepted the military loss of South Korea
and attempted to

minimize

its

In his study

demoralizing consequences upon the free world by other means?'

George finds

proposed either that U.

S.

that there is

no indication that any policy-mal^er

ground forces not be committed

they be used only to stabilize a line or hold a bridgehead.
indication that

tlie

at all,

"Nor

or that
is

there any

possibility of accepting the military loss of the South

Korean peninsula was considered, together with an exploration

of alternative

politcal and military policies for minimizing the demoralizing consequences
of such a

course upon the free world.

In any event, as far as

"'^^'^

America's policy-makers

concerned, the only contingency that would stop U.
in

Korea was Russia's

Far East, even

1

to

S.

at that

military intervention

intervention, which could lead to a major

World War

in.

In that case,

time were

war

in the

Korea would not be the

A/?

William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz,
1945-1955 (Washington: Brookings Institute,

United States Foreign Policy:
195G), pp. 263-68.
107

Alexander L. George, "American Policy-Maldng and the North
Korean AggTession, " World Politics, VII (Jan. 1955), pp. 222-24. Reprinted
in Korea and the Theory of Limited War, ed. by Allen Guttmann (Boston:

lle^~mi),

pp. 71.5-777
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right place for the United States to fight
a major war.

judged that the Soviet Union would not intervene

in

It

was calculated and

Korea against Americ^m

forces nor would they push the Korean crisis
into a general war with the
United States.
in

Nevertheless, the uncertainty of Soviet reaction,
not only

Korea, but also elsewhere in the world, prompted
the United States to

engage only

in a limited

war

in

Korea.

It

was limited

in three aspects.

(l)The objective was limited: to restore South Korea's
border at the 38th
parallel without seeking to defeat the

theatre of

war was restricted

Communist China might be
no

to

enemy

totally above that line.

(2)

The

Korea: although the Soviet Union or

the supplier of North Korea's

war materiels.

U. S. air and sea operations would be permitted beyond the
boundaries

of North Korea.
to one.

No

(3)

initiative

The number

of the

Union for the responsibility

No charge was made against

of the

fight a limited

Communist forces who had made

the Soviet

North Korean attack.

Thus the United States decided

armed

originally limited

or provocation would be made which might induce

Soviet or Chinese intervention.

United Nations, to

enemy forces was

to intervene in

war against only

Korea through

the North

the

Korean

the attack on South Korea, so that the

attack would be repelled and the border of the 38th parallel restored

to the Republic of Korea.

CHAPTER

III

BATTLE FRUSTRATIONS AND MILITARY PL/J^NmC
American Ground Troops
of the United Nations

On

in Action

and the Establishment
under the United States

Command

July 3, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson

recommended

that

the President should not ask for a congressional resolution of approval, but,

resting on his constitutional authority as

Commander

in

Chief of the

armed

forces, send troops to repel the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea.

A Department

of State

Memorandum

of Jiily 3, 1950,

was extensively

circulated,

setting out the basis for such authority of the President in legal theory and

historical precedent.

Acheson later argued

that though congressional approval would have done

no harm, the process of gaining
July

it

might well have done a great deal.

— and especially the first part of — was a time
it

As American troops were committed
to battle, they and their Korean allies under brutal punishment
staggered back down the peninsula until they m^aintained only
a precarious hold on the coastal perimeter around Pusan. An
of anguishing anxiety.

incredulous country and world held its breath and read the
mounting casualties suffered by these gallant troops, most of
them without combat experience. In the confusion of the retreat

Acheson, p. 414.
2

See House Report 2495, 81st Cong.

of State Bulletin (Jul 31, 1950), pp. 173-78.

,

2nd Sess.

,

pp. 61-68; also Dept.

even their divisional commander, Major
General William
F. Dean, was captured. Congressional
hearings on a resolution of approval at such a time, opening
the possibility of
endless criticism, would hardly be calculated
to support the
shaken morale of the troops or the unity that,
for the moment
prevailed at home. The harm it could do
seemed to me far
to outweigh the little good that might
ultimately accrue.^

On June

30, 1950, General

MacArthur had ordered the 24th Division

under General Dean from Japan to Korea.

MacArthur also ordered a small

task force under Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith
from the same division
flown into Korea ahead of the main body to engage the
North Korean
quickly as possible, sacrificing security for speed. ^
into action against the

North Korean forces on July

5

Army

as

"Task Force Smith" went
near Osan.

It

was a

gallant but relatively futile action, suffering heavy losses. ^

By July

7,

General MacArthur had more than doubled his original

estimate of American strength that would be required to hold the North Koreans.

He told

the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he would

now need

four or four and a half

full-strength di\isions supported by an airborne regimental cornbat team and

3

Acheson, p. 415. For a view which contends that Congress should
have been consulted, see Emmet Jolm Hughes, The L iving Presidency (New
York: Coward, McCann an.d Geoghegan, 1973), pp. 245-47. For additional
discussion of the question of the President's constitutional pov/er to send troops
abroad in 1950 and 1951 without congressional approval, see Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr. The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973),
pp. 130-140.
,

4

Schnabel, p. 80.
Collins, pp. 43-45.
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an armored group.

Two days

his July 7 estimate.

He radioed

On

July 10, President

its

members

Truman

MacArthur nearly doubled

that the situation in

Korea was

critical.

were designated and they flew

of the situation.

to

also visted
In

Korea

Generals

Tokyo, arriving on

They held discussions with General MacArthur and his

July 13.

^

directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send two of

Far East for a first-hand estimate

to the

Collins and Vandenberg

to

later, on July 9,

staff.

Collins

briefly.

answering Collins' questions, MacArthur stated that

it

was impossible

say when he would be able to pass from stabilizing the battle -front to the

counteroffensive.

He hoped

American divisions were
to cut the

enemy

to stop the

in action

North Korean (NK) advance when three

and then to launch an amphibious operation

lines of communication and routes of withdrawal.

He would

follow the amphibious maneuver with an overland pursuit of the withdrawing

North Koreans.

He said

that he

meant

to destroy all the

merely drive them back across the 38th parallel,

that

NK forces

in the aftermath of

operations, the problem would be to "compose and unite Korea,

might be necessary
time.

to

occupy

all of

total of eight infantry divisions

6
Ibid.

,

"

and that

Korea, though this was specuiative

His troop requirement in the Far East

would be a

and not

Command under

and an additional

pp. 77-78; Schnabel, pp. 83-85.

it

at the

this situation

Army

headquarters.
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Furthermore, the Japanese Police Force should be converted

into a

con-

stabulary of four divisions, with American equipment to provide security
for

Japan.

7

Generals Collins and Vandenberg returned
and at once briefed the Joint Chiefs of
reported to the President.
the U. S. Eighth

Army

Staff

Washington on July

14,

and the Secretary of Defense and

Collins stated his agreement with

Korea and the

in

to

ROK Army

Mac Arthur

would be able

bridgehead covering Pusan, but he urged prompt reinforcements.

that

to hold a
^

At the United Nations, after the Security Council adopted the resolution
of

June 27, recommending that "the members of the United Nations furnish

such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the

armed

attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,"

Australia, Canada,

New

Zealand, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom

offered various forms of military assistance to operate on behalf of the

Security Council in support of the Republic of Korea, along with America's
full

military

commitment

in

Korea by June

national force could be organized in the

30, 1950.^

name

Now

that an inter-

of the United Nations,

how

should this force be directed and controlled?

7

Collins, pp. 82-83; Schnabel, p. 107.

^Collins, p. 85.

^UN

Security Council, Official Records

17, pp. 3-6; see also

Truman,

II,

340, 342.

,

475th Mtg.

,

30 Jun 1950, No.
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Qq July

3, the

Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve
Lie,

circulated a proposal to the delegations of the
United States, the United

Kingdom and France, and

the President of the Security Council (Mr.

Arne

Sunde of Norway), which suggested that the Government
of the United States

assume
in

the responsibility for directing the

Korea, with the help

of a

armed forces

"Committee on Coordination

Korea." The proposed committee, consisting

New

of

Member

nations

of Assistance for

of Australia, Fra^ice, India,

Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States,
would

stimulate and coordinate offers of assistance and promote contmuing
United

Nations participation

The exact extent

On July

in,

and supervision

of its control

4, the

was

Department

left

of,

the military action in Korea.

undertermined

in the proposal.

of State sought the views of the Joijit

Chiefs of Staff who opposed formuag such a committee.

pointed out that to place a United Nations committee

The Joint Chiefs

in the

chain of

command

could seriously interfere with the strategic and tactical control of operations

by General MacArthur and his commanders
the field.

of

army, navy and

The Joint Chiefs wanted a command arrangement

in

air forces in

which the

United States, as executive agent for the United Nations, would direct the

10

Trygve Lie,
pp. 333-34.

la the

Cause

of

Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1954)
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Korean operation, with no positive contact between

the field

commander and

the

United Nations.

Thus, the proposal was rejected by the United States.
resolution

was developed. Wlien

Kingdom and France introduced a
Truman, 12 recommending
United States.

It

the Security Council

met on July

7, the

United

draft resolution, which had been agreed to by

the establishment of a unified

was adopted by

Instead, a revised

command under

the

a vote of 7 - 0, with 3 abstentions (Egypt,

India, Yugoslavia), and the U. S. S. R. again absent

from

the meeting.

The

full

text of the resolution of July 7, 1950, follows:

The Security Council,
Having determined that ihe armed attack upon the Republic
of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the
peace,
Having recommended that Members of the United Nations
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be
necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international
peace and security in the area,

Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which
1.
Governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to

its

resolutions 82 (1950) and 83 (1950) of 25 and 27 June 1950 to
assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed
attack and thus to restore international peace and security in
the area;

Notes that Members of the United Nations have trans2.
mitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic
of

Korea;
3.

''"'^Collins, p.

^^Truman,

II,

Recommends

that all

34; Schnabel, pp. 100-01.

347.

Members

providing military
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forces and other assistance pursuant to the af Dresaid Security
Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance
available to a unified

command under

the United States of

America;
Requests the United States to designate the commander

4.

of such forces;

Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to
5.
use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against
North Korean forces concurrently with the f].ags of the various
nations participating;

Requests the United States to provide the Security
6.
Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action
taken under the unified command.

The next day, Truman named Mac Arthur as
Nations forces.

On July

14,

Syngman Rhee placed

Korea under MacArthur's command.

On July

orders establishing the United Nations
in Toledo,

Japan.

With few exceptions,

Command, was

the

all

staff

MacArthur issued

1950,

members

with general headquarters
of the

Far East Command

In effect, the

staff.

of such United

forces of the Republic of

Command (UNC)

were assigned comparable duties on the UNC
Nations

24,

commander

the

GHQ, United

GHQ, Far East Command, with an expanded mission.-

Late in July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed MacArthur
report every two weeks on the actions of his forces.

submit the report through the Secretary of Defense

to

send them a

The JCS would,

in turn,

Department

of State

to the

for presentation to the United Nations Security Council by the American dele-

^^UN Security Council,

Official

Rec ords,

Fifth Yr.

Decisions of the Security Council 1950 (8/1588) pp. 5-6.
Schnabel, p. 103.

,

Resolutions and
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gation at Lake Success,

consulted in advance

if

New York. MacArthur was
political considerations

assured that he would be

made

it

necessary

at

any time

for the Joint Chiefs to alter his reports.

MacArthur later

testified at the Senate

Committees hearings about his

channel of control:

... my
nominal.

connection with the United Nations was largely

There were provisions made

that the entire control

my command and everything I did came from our ounti Chiefs
of Staff and my channel of communication was defined
as the
Army Chief of Staff.
The controls over me were exactly
the same as though the forces under me were all American.
All of my communications v/ere to the American high
command
of

.

.

here. 16
Essentially this

was

of an international force

the

was

problem

of

how

a general of one nation in

to be held accountable to the United Nations.

his first duty and loyalty be to his

own government or

The United States insisted

American general

international force in

Nations.
stituted

that an

Should

to the United Nations?

in

command

Korea must be directly responsible

Government and, through

command

of such an

to the United States

his government, be responsible indirectly to the United

This arrangement was accepted partly because American forces con-

more

than 90 per cent of the total non-Korean force.

States retained

much freedom

15
Ibid^

16

Hearings, Pt.

1,

10.

Thus the United

of action for strategic and tactical control in the
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field,

even though

it

was

legally United Nations action.

would be the resolutions and decisions

of the

UN

The only constraint

Security Council.

America's Attitude toward Peaceful Settlemen t
"
and Setbacks on the Battlcfront in July 195(5
While the British Government put British warships
at

MacArthur's disposal as the quickest method

in

Japanese waters

of furnishing help to Korea,

immediately after the June 27 resolution of the Security Council,
initiated

moves

to bring about a "peaceful settlement" there.

the British urged the United States to

Commimist Chinese representation
Korea.

it

also

In early July,

make concessions on Formosa or

in the

United Nations for a cease fire in

Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin wrote a letter to the American

Government saying

that the

Kremlin really wished to restore

the status quo

ante in Korea, but he believed they would link a change in the U.

on Formosa with

it.

UN Korean

resolutions.

Western solidarity by playing down those parts
of June 27 that did not

not "please" either

of

Truman or Acheson. Acheson

'•'^Acheson, p. 416.

18

3.

Acheson,

p. 418.

UN

of the

One should avoid risking
President Truman's state-

bear directly on Korea.

a "frank" reply, dated July 10, which, "indicating

1950, No. 17, p.

position

S.

That position, he said, did not have the backing

states that supported the

ments

-''^

This message did

drafted and
its joint

Truman approved

authorship," made

Security Council, Official Records

,

30 Jun
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four points:

We would not agree to a forced trade of Formosa
Communists for their withdrawal from Korea.
Our policy aimed at as early and complete a liquidation
2.
of the Korean aggression as was militarily possible, without
concessions that would whet Communist appetites and bring on
1.

to the

other aggressions elsewhere.
3. It also aimed at the peaceful disposition of the Formosan
question, either in a peace treaty with Japan or through the United
Nations.
questions regarding Formosa or the representation
of China in the United Nations were to be considered there, we
4.

If

regarded it essential that they be considered on their merits
and not under the duress and blackmail then being employed.
India also

made an attempt

was even less acceptable

to the

at peaceful settlement in

United States.

Meanwhile, within the Department of
developed concerning postaggression policy.

Korea but

its

proposal

20

State, a difference of opinion

According

The Far Eastern Division, under

to

Acheson:

Dean.

Rusk and John

Allison, strongly urged that a crossing of the 38th parallel

should not be precluded. Only events could clarify whether
it should be crossed, but in their view peace and stability
would not exist in Korea while the country was divided.
Paul Nitze's Policy Planning Staff, influenced by George
Kennan's views, took the opposite position and urged that
General Mac Arthur shotdd be directed to announce, as UN
Commander, that his troops would not cross the parallel
in pursuit if the North Korean forces withdrew to the north
of

it.

21

Ibid.

See ibid.

,

pp. 419-20.

Ibid., p. 451.
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Truman agreed
until the

that nothing should be said about postaggression policy

course of the fighting was much clearer than

it

was

in

mid-July but

on July 16th, he asked the National Security Couacil to prepare
substantive

recommendations for him.

Acheson urged Truman

to

ask Congress for an immediate increase

in

military strength and preparedness not only to deal with the aggression in
Korea
but also to increase

aggression.

removal

common

On July

19, the

of the limitation

defense,

mth

other free nations, against further

President sent a report to Congress requesting the

on the size of the armed forces, urging legislation to

authorize the establishment of priorities and allocations of raw materials, and

asldng for additional appropriations for defense.
Legislation was passed, on August

8,

1950, which suspended for four

years the statutory limits on the manpower ceilings of the three services.
August, measures were taken to double the size of the armed forces.

September 27, the Secretary

of

Defense authorized the

strength during Fiscal Year 1951 to 1,263,000.

^^
^^

Army

In

On

to increase its

Keeping step with the increase

Ibid.

Ibid.

,

pp. 420-21;

24

Truman,

II,

348.

Paul Y. Hamm.ond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament, " in Warner R.
Schilling, Paul Y. Hammon, and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense
Budgets (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1962), p. 351.
25

Acheson,

p. 421.
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ill

manpower, substantial increases

in logistical support for the

Army were

authorized and steps were taken to translate these authorizations into
materiel.
In July, President

Truman had

signed Fiscal Year 1950-51 appropriations

for mutual defense assistance of $1.2 billion and another $4 billion
supplemental

appropriation in September.
In addition to the pending regular defense appropriation of $13. 5 billion.

President Truman asked for a supplementary budget of $10 billion on July 19,
1950.

The original defense budget passed Congress

by the President on September

28
6.'^°

and v/as signed

The supplementary budget was raised

Truman with

$11. 6 billion by President

in late July

to

an additional request on August 4;

Congress approved on September 27 the sum

of $12. 6 billion.^^

On December

1,

1950, a second supplemental defense budget of nearly $17 billion was submitted
to

Congress and approved on January

6,

1951.

The

Fiscal. 1951

budget was
OA

ultimately to authorize a total of $48. 2 billion for the military establishment.

Thus, following the outbreak of the Korean

War and

the critical military situation

26

Schnabel, p. 221.
In June 1950, the strength of the active
at about 591,000 and included 10 combat divisions. See Ibid
p. 43.
.

27

See

The request for

Hammond
28

from

in Schilling, et al

Acheson gave the

,

29

Ibid .;

Hammond

^^Hammond

in July, 1950.

aa $14. 6 billion which was an increase
See Acheson, p. 421.

final figure

the requested $13.5 billion.

stood

,

supplement was made
p. 356 and Acheson, p. 421.

this $4 billion

Army

in Schilling, et al .

in Schilling, et al .

,

,

pp. 351-53.

pp. 355-57; 351.
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Korea during

the

summer

was started and

the

momentum would

in

of 1950,

America's massive military build-up
continue to rise through the next two years,

not only for the requirements of Korea but also in preparations for dealing with
a possible Soviet threat elsewhere in the world, especially in Europe.
In

order

enveloped
of

all of

slow the advance of the North Korean forces before they

to

Korea, General MacArthur decided to use a desperate strategy

committing American forces piecemeal to gain time.

groimd units

into action against the

completely combat ready.

from Japan

to fight in the

He had

send his

to

North Koreans before his units were

Thus, the 24th Infantry Division was rushed
period of July 5

- 22,

1950.

It

succeeded

to

Korea

in delaying

for two and a half weeks, the greatly superior North Korean forces of two
divisions, thereby gaining the precious time required to bring essential re-

inforcements from Japan and the United States.

mission was very high.

Yongdong on July

22,

it

When

it

was relieved by

could muster only 8,660

12, 197, a loss of almost 30 per cent.

60 to 70 per cent.

Losses

But the price

it

paid for this

the 1st Cavalry Division at

men

of its initial strength of

Equipment losses were estimated

in senior officers of field

at

grade were unusually

severe, and its commanding general, William F. Dean, was missing

in action.

Wliat the 24th Division suffered were characterized by General Collins as

humiliations.

^\mtney,
32

pp. 334-35.

Collins, pp. 65-66; Appleman, pp. 179-80.
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Even

so, General

Mac Arthur cabled Washington on

Operation planned mid-September
of a two-division corps in rear
of

July 23:

amphibious londin-

is

enemy

lines for purpose

of''

envelopmg and destroying enemy forces in
conjunction v/ith
attack from south by Eighth Army.
Although the exact date
of D-day IS partially dependent
upon enemy reaction during
the month of August, I am firmly
convinced

that an early and
Strong effort behind his front will sever
his main lines of
communication and enable us to deliver a decisive
and crushinblow. Any material delay in such an
operation may lose this
opportunity. The alternative is a frontal
attack which caia only
result
a protracted and expensive campaign to
slowly drive
the enemy north of the 38th Parallel. ^3

m

General MacArthur had earlier agreed that the
enemy attack on Pusan

would have

to be stopped before the counter offensive

the Joint Chiefs called
in the light of

still

him

was launched.

Consequently,

to a teleconference on July 24 to inquire
whether,

developments on the front of the Eighth and

ROK Armies,

planning on mid-September for the amphibious assault.

he was

MacArthur replied

confidently that "barring unforeseen circumstances,
and with complete provision
of requested replacements,
to launch the

movement

in

if

the full Marine division is provided, the chances

September would be excellent. "^4

The North Korean troops pushed

on.

In late July they

Cavalry Division from Yongdong and back on Kumchon.
Dividion was also withdrawing steadily.

General MacArthur made a personal

33

Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to
also Whitney, pp. 343-44.

The U.

S.

The situation became so

visit to the

DA

forced the 1st

(for

Schnabcl, p. 142; Collins, pp. 117-18.

critical that

Korean front on July 27 and

JCS) 23 Jul 50

34

25th lufantry

in Schnabcl, p.

142;
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emphasized that withdrawals must cease,

from Korea.

command

Two days

of the U. S.

later, General

Army

that there would be no evacuation

Walton H. Walker, who had assumed

troops in Korea on July 13, issued an
order to

hold the line, which was characterized
as a "stand or die" order.

According

to

Appleman,

The movement around the left flank of Eighth
Army in
late
July had been the most brilliantly
conceived and executed
of the North Korean tactical operations
south of the Han
River. It had held v/ithin it the possibilities
of victory— of
driving U. N. forces from the peninsula. It
had compelled

Eighth Army to reinforce its units in the
southwest at the
expense of the central front, and to redeploy the
U.N. forces
along a shorter line behind the Nald;ong River,
in what came
to be called the Pusan Perimeter.
Never afterward were
.

.

.

conditions as critical for the Eighth Army as in the
closing
days of Jidy and the first days of August 1950.^6

On August
enemy and

1,

General Walker ordered his entire force to break contact
with the

to pull

back behind the Naktong River, there

Under these circumstances, the Joint Chiefs on

to

o

make

a final stand. ^7

July 31 had proposed,

with Truman's approval, that four National Guard divisions and two
National

Guard regimental combat teams be called
September

35

38
1.

On July

into active

31, too, according to Acheson, "planners in the

See Appleman, pp. 205-09.

36
Ibid.

37

,

p.

Federal service, effective

247.

Schnabel, p. 145.

38
Collins, pp. 98-99;

Truman,

II,

348.
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Pentagon" made proposals of a far-reaching nature:

The recommendation was

that the

UN Supreme Com.mander

should be directed to cross the parallel, defeat the enemy's
forces, and occupy the country, provided the follov/ing

assumptions held:
That the United States would mobilize sufficient
1.
resources to attain the objective and strengthen its military
position in all other areas of strategic importance.
That the Soviet Union would not intervene in Korea
2.
or elsewhere.
That the President would proclaim, the Congress
3.
endorse, and the United Nations adopt as our war aim a
united, free, and independent Korea, and that the United
States and other nations would maintain their troops in Korea
under the UN Command as occupying forces as long as
needed. ^9

At this point, this recommendation was an "intellectual exercise.
Nevertheless,

it

""^^

can be seen that the thinking of the Pentagon began

Although the overall policy of a limited war would

still

to

change.

be niaintained,

especially with respect to the Soviet Union, the original military objective
of restoring the

border

at the 38th parallel

would be replaced by that

crossing the parallel, defeating the enemy's forces and occupying

Korea imder a contemplated new authorization from
is not clear

of

all of

the United Nations.

It

whether this recommendation had encountered some opposition

within the Pentagon, as there were two conflicting views within the State

Department on the question

39

Acheson,
40ibid.

p. 451.

of crossing the parallel.
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Thej;l_aimi^

the Inchon LancUng and the
Consider ntinn
of Crossing the 38th PaTallel
AuPii£2^n

in the early

of

weeks

of

August 1950, the

American reinforcements arrived

United States and Hawaii. ^1

Korea totaled more than
this time

was

men.

in five infantry divisions

mately 45.000 men.

Pusan after

at

On August

67, 000

first of three large contingents

4,

sailing directly

American ground combat

The principal

ROK

from

the

units in

combat strength

at

recently filled to a strength of approxi-

'Thus on 4 August, the United Nations
combat forces

outnumbered the enemy

at the front approximately 92, 000
to 70, 000. "^2

President Truman later wrote:

By early August our forces there

[in Korea] had
ground strength of sixtjr-five thousand men,
sufficient to hold the Pusan beachhead
and enough to give
encouragement to offensive planning, and on August lO^the
Secretary of Defense informed me that it was planned
to
send nearly two more divisions to Korea before
September
25. Naval and air forces had been similarly increased
and further build-ups were in preparation.'^'^

been built up

to a

41

Carl Berger, The Korea Knot Rev. ed. (Philadelphia:
Univ.
Penn. Press, 19G4), pp. 115-16; see also Rees,
p. 44.
,

of

42

Appleman, p. 264. Not all of the men were deployed at the front.
Appleman writes: "By 22 July the U. N. forces in Korea equaled those of the
North Koreans, and in the closing days of the month the United Nations
gained
a numerical superiority, which constantly increased until near the end of
the
year. " p. 265.
43

Truman, U, 358.
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Soon elements of four United States divisions, a Marine brigade,
and

ROK
dug

divisions were deployed in a protective arc around Pusan.

in to create the

famed Pusan Perimeter.

of shuttling his units

from one

five

These forces

General Walker, using the tactics

critical point to another, succeeded in blunting the

repeated North Korean attacks on his lines. '^^

Now

that the North

Koreans could be halted after the touch-and-go

fighting

along the Pusan Perimeter, General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs began
to

plan on the specific amphibious landing behind the enemy lines.
of Staff sent two of its

members, General

Collins as

Admiral Sherman as Chief of Naval Operations,

Army

The Joint Chiefs

Chief of Staff and

to confer with

MacArthur

in

Tokyo, on August 21-23, 1950, partly because MacArthur had not kept the Joint
Chiefs fully informed of the development of his plans.
visited

Korea on August 22 and were convinced

that

Collins and

Sherman also

Americans and South Koreans

alike v/ould hold on to their bridgehead around Pusan.

The main briefing and conference on
August 23

at

MacArthur's headquarters.

the amphibious assault took place on

Principal participants in the conference

included Generals MacArthur, Collins, Almond, Hickey and Wright of the

'^^Berger, p. 116; see also Rees, pp. 52-53.

^^Schnabel, p. 148; Collins, p. 121.
^^Collins, pp. 108-10.

Army
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and Admirals Sherman, Joy, Struble,
and Doyle of the Navy.
planned operation was
15, 1950.

CHROmXE;

the landing site:

The name

Inchon; D-Day:

of the

September

Doyle and his Naval and Marine planners
first presented a thorough

analysis of the naval phases of the landing
operation.

great difficulties and the risks involved.

mud

flats

the

The tides and the seaward approach

Inchon constituted enormous physical obstacles.

have deposited great

They emphasized

Over the centuries heavy

on the shore of Inchon.

On

to

tides

the ebb, the mudflats

stretched as far out as three miles from the shore
line to the sea.

American

landing craft LST's could approach only at flood tide
of thirty feet and would be

stuck in the

mud

as soon as the tide receded, thus making them ideal
targets for

North Korean artillery.

The only approach

to the port of Inchon

was through

the

narrow, twisting, treacherous "Flymg Fish" channel, which was
dominated by
a small island.
island.

The North Koreans could easily mine

In addition,

tlie

landing

was

to

come during

threatened an even chance of a howling storm.

'^'^

operation was not impossible but that he did not

the channel and fortify the

the typhoon season which

Doyle concluded that the

recommend

General Collins then expressed doubt that the Eighth

it.^^

Army

could

make a

47

See Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y.
Doubleday, 1967), p. 38; Collins, pp. 118-19; Sclmabel, pp. 146-47; Reos, pp. 80-81.
:

^°Schnabel, pp. 149-50; Collins,

p.

123.
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quick junction with the Tenth (X) Corps at Inchon.

Collins suggested that

consideration be given to an alternative landing at Kunsan, nearly 100 miles
south of Inchon, which had few of Inchon's physical drawbacks.

Admiral Sherman

seconded Collins' suggestion.
It

was General MacArthur's turn

to speak.

He said

that the bulk of the

North Korean forces were committed around Walker's defense perimeter.

enemy had

failed to prepare Inchon properly for defense.

you have made as
element
the
to

MacArthur recognized

Navy and Marine Corps had pointed

overcome them.

enemy's

line of

"The very arguments

to the impracticability involved will tend to ensure for

of surprise, " he said.

out, but he

Since the Seoul-Inchon area

all of the

me

the

hazards that

had confidence

was

The

in their ability

the one vital spot in the

communications, MacArthur insisted that only by seizing Seoul

and Inchon could he achieve a quick and decisive victory over the North Koreans.

He also pointed out the tremendous

political and psychological advantages to be

gained by retaking the Korean capital from the invaders.

Kunsan,

it

that Inchon

would be largely ineffective and indecisive.

would not

Collins

fail, that

to the landing at

MacArthur reiterated

Inchon would succeed and save 100, 000 lives.

was favorably impressed by MacArthur's

had some reservations.

As

presentation, but

^^Whitney, pp. 348-50; Collins, pp. 125-26; Schnabel,
126.

still

Sherman was struck by MacArthur's confidence and

^^Collins, pp. 123-24,

^-^ColliJis, p.

50

p.

150.
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optimism. 52 Collins and Sherman also discussed
with MacArthur the possible
follow.up of a successful landing at Inchon.

They agreed with

the General that

he should be authorized to continue the attack across
the 38th parallel to destroy
the North

Korean forces, which otherwise would be a recurrent
threat

to the

independence of South Korea.

Upon their return

members

to

Washington, Collins and Sherman briefed the other

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense,
and the President.

After examining the plans carefully, the Joint Chiefs on August 28 sent
MacArthur
a conditional approval of his plans as follows:

We

concur

in

making preparations for and executing a

movement by amphibious forces on the west coast of
Korea, either at Inchon in the event the enemy defenses in the
turning

vicinity of Inchon prove ineffective, or at a favorable beach
south of Inchon if one can be located. We further concur in

preparations,

if desired by CINCFE, for an envelopment by
amphibious forces in the vicinity of Kunsan. We imderstand
that alternative plans are being prepared in order to best

exploit the situation as

The Joint Chiefs also

told

it

develops.

MacArthur: 'We desire such information as becomes

available with respect to conditions in the possible objective areas and timely

information as to your intentions and plans for offensive operations. "^^ On

52

Ibid.

,

p.

127; Rees, p. 83; Ridgway, p. 39.

^^Collins, p. 144.

^%id.
55

,

p.

127.

Schnabel, p. 151.
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August 30, Mac Arthur issued his operations order for the Inchon
landing.
While the military were planning on counteroffensives
civilian officials in the State

There were two

in

Korea, the

Department were debating the long-range policy.

conflicting views.

"One was that under no circumstances should

General MacArthur's forces cross the 38th parallel.

The other denied

this and

advocated (or some proponents did) going wherever necessary to destroy the
invader's force and restore security in the area. "^^

George Kennan wrote a memorandum
action in

it

Korea was

was not

right; the aggression

to

Acheson.

It

said that America's

must be defeated and discredited.

But

essential to the United States or within U. S. capabilities to establish

an anti-Soviet regime in

all of

Kennan maintained

Korea.

not maintain their independence against both Russian

While Japanese influence might be preferable
of view, the

power

to exert

it

did not

now

to the

exist.

that the

Koreans could

and Japanese pressures.

Russian from America's point

Hence

it

exclude the possibility of a period of Russian domination.

would be unrealistic

to

The memorandum did not

mention any possibility of Chinese domination.

The

State

Department also asked Ambassador Austin

17, a "trial balloon"

by a speech in the

UN

Security Council.

while the fighting in Korea was a reality and the

^6

Acheson,

UN

to put up on

Austin said that

forces were growing stronger,

p. 445.

Kennan probably meant that Japan did not have
military, or even economic power, to exert influence on Korea.
^"^Ibid.

,

August

p. 446.

its

own
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"we must consider the aims for which
the United Nations

is fighting.

We must

ask ourselves questions regarding the
kind of peace that the outcome of the
conflict should bring. -

He suggested consideration not only

of the objective of

the ending of the breach of the peace,
but also the fact that "the General

Assembly

for three years has sought the
establishment by the Korean people of a free,
unified and independent nation. " Austin
added:

This question has already been decided by
General
(H), 195 (HI) and 293 (IV) adopted
in 1947, 1948 and 1949.
Korea's prospects would be
dark if any action of the United Nations were to
condemn it
to exist indefinitly as half slave and half
free, or even onethird slave and two-thirds free. The United
Nations has

Assembly resolutions 112
.

.

.

consistently worked for a unified country, an
independent
The United Nations will not want to turn from that
objective now.

Korea.

Ambassador Austin's remarks were made
tive,

in the

presence of the Soviet representa-

Jacob Malik, who had ended his boycotting and returned

over the Security Council meetings

in

to attend

and preside

August.

Earlier, on August 4, the Soviet Union had proposed to the Security

Council, "to invite the representative of the People's Republic of China and also
to

hear representatives of the Korean people"

the

Korean question.

UN

Malik also proposed

Sccui'ity Council, Official

No. 30, pp. 4-8.

in the

"to put an

course of the discussion

of

end to the hostilities in

Records, 5th Yr. 488th Mtg, 17 Aug 1950,
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Korea and

same time

at the

On August
Foreign Minister

withdraw foreign troops from Korea. "^^

20, three days after
of the

Nations, his first in

Ambassador Austin's speech, Chou

En-lai,

People's Republic of China, sent a cable to the United

more than

He stated

but on Korea.

to

six weeks, focusing this time not on

Taiwan

in part:

Korea

China's neighboring country; the Chiaese
people cannot but be more concerned about the solution of
is

Korean question.

The question of Korea must and can
be settled peacefully.
The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China fully supports all
the

.

.

.

the proposals concerning the peaceful regulation of the

Korean question submitted on 4 August in the United
Nations Security Council by Mr. Yakov Malik on behalf
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Government. ^''^

On August

22, the Soviet representative, Malik,

on Ambassador Austin's speech

of

made some comments

August 17 in the Security Council.

Malik said,

in part:

What

is the

United States representative now proposing

to us ?

is

^"

Official

Referring to these [General Assemblj'^] resolutions, he
proposing, in the first place, to continue the war and to

Records

,

483rd Mtg.

,

No. 24, pp. 1-2.

Whiting, China Cros ses the Yalu (New York: Macmillan,
1960), p. 79. Chou's first cable was sent on July 6, 1950 to the UN Secretary
General for transmission to the members of the Security Council. In it he had
denounced both the Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950 and President

^^Allen

S.

of Jime 27, 1950, particularly with respect to
the full text, see UN Security Council, Officials Records 5th

Truman's statement

For
Supplement for June -August, 1950, document S/1583, pp. 71-72.
,

UN
Aug, 1950,

Security Council, Offic ial Records

p.

139.

,

5th Yr.

,

Formosa.
Year (1950),

Suppls. for June-
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extend United States aggression against the Korean people;
in the second place, he is harking back to these resolutions,
which means a return to the days of the terrorist Syngman Rhee
regime, to the establishment of the domination of the United
States monopolies in Korea, to the conversion not only of
South Korea, but of Korea as a whole, into a colony of United
States imperialism.
This would inevitably lead to the
further aggravation of the Korean question. From this point
of view it is the duty of the Security Coimcil to take urgent
measures to put an end to hostilities in Korea, and to proceed
immediately to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. ^2
.

.

Malik reiterated his earlier proposal
in the "internal"

Korean

August 4

of

conflict and to

to

hear both parties involved

demand immediate withdrawal

of all

foreign troops from Korea when hostilities were put to an end there.

There was no indication

Korea even though

the Soviet Union

war

future attempt to carry the

Korea.
in

of Soviet intention to intervene militarily in

into

seemed

to

be aware of America's possible

North Korea

to achieve the unification of

should also be noted that at this point the overall military situation

It

Korea was

still in

Thus there might be

favor of the North Koreans.

ground for the Russians to threaten

The Soviet proposal

of

to intervene in

Korea

little

militarily.

August 4 was rejected by the

Security Council

on September 5 by eight votes to one, with two abstentions.

Ache son did not get
until after

to read Kennan's aforementioned

memorandum

August 21, when he returned from a week's holiday.

^^ Official Records
63,
'Ibid^, pp.

Acheson,

,

15-16.
p. 445.

489th Mtg.

,

No. 31,

p.

14.

Acheson

"
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thought Kennan's conclusions were "disturbing," "emotional" and "moralistic."
'Ideas such as these could only be kept in mind as warnings not to be drawn into

quicksands.

more

All this

was good, even

if

purely negative, advice. "^^ Ache son was

inclined toward the conclusion that "no arbitrary prohibition against crossing

the parallel should be imposed.
felt that

stop. "

As a boundary

it

had no political validity.

"

He

troops could not be expected "to march up to a surveyor's line and
"Until the actual military situation developed further, no one could say

where the necessity for

flexibility in tactics

strategic purpose began. " Acheson

ended and embarkation upon a new

was less sure

of what to do next, "after

knocking out the invasion and as much of the invasion force as seemed practical.

"^

Cross the
38th Parallel, September 1950

The Making

By September

1,

of the Polic y to

1950, the National Security Coimcil had completed a study

concerning long-range policy toward Korea, which was forwarded to the Depart-

ments

of State

and Defense for comment.

Chiefs for recommendation.

The central idea

^

^Ibid.

,

p. 446.

^^Ibid.

,

p. 445.

it

to the Joint

fi7

of this study

^"^CoUtns, p. 144.

Secretary Johnson sent

was

that the United States

was

in

no position

Ill
to

commit

itself definitely to

any single course of action.

There were too many

unknowns, namely, what Russia or China might do and
whether the United States
could coun.t on the United Nations, even on those
allies, to

members considered

to be

back up an American policy that might bring on a general
war.

Without United Nations support, MacArthur should not be perm.itted
to cross the
38th parallel.

Although this National Security Council study agreed that the

resolutions of the
the parallel,

it

UN

Security Council provided a sound legal basis for crossing

felt that the

local tactical reasons.

the withdrawal of

If

NK units

United Nations forces should not do so for merely

they were required to cross into North Korea to compel

from South Korea or

should be given special authority,
that

no

UN

NK

forces, MacArthur

and there should be a clear understanding

force would cross the northern boundary of Korea into Manchuria or

the U. S. S. R.
in the

to destroy

and that as a matter of policy only Korean units should operate

,

border region.

Further,

if

either Russian or Chinese forces had already

entered Korea or had announced that they intended to enter, no matter how well
the tactical situation might otherwise favor crossing the parallel at the time,

General MacArthur should refrain from moving above the

68
Ibid.

;

Schnabel, p. 178.

^^Collins, p. 145.

line.

This did not
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mean, however, that he should discontinue
Korea.

air and naval operations in North

'^^

The study believed

that any crossing of the 38th parallel by

would evoke certain reactions for the Soviet Union.
the Chinese to occupy North Korea, even to
of fomenting

war between

MacArthur

The Russians might encourage

commit troops

the United States and China.

into battle in the hope

In the event that the

Chinese Communists alone intervened, the study recommended that MacArthur
continue the fighting as long as he had a reasonable chance of successful resist-

ance against a Chinese attack, and that MacArthur should be authorized to
initiate appropriate air

and naval action against China.

The United Slates should

then seek United Nations condemnation of the Chinese as aggressors.

major Russian imits entered
anywhere

in

'^'^

If

the fighting at any stage either openly or covertly

Korea, the United Nations forces should go on the defensive

at once,

Washington for

make no move

that

instructions.

Exactly what MacArthur would be told once he had reported

would aggravate the situation, and report

Washington was not yet decided.

But

it

was

to

definite that the United States did

not want its resources tied up in Korea, an area regarded as of

importance,

general war came.'^^

if

it

,

p.

178; Collins, p. 145.

^^Schnabel, pp. 178-79; Collins,

little

strategic

was surmised that the military

70
'"Schnabel, p. 179.
'^^Ibid.

p.

to

145.

sihiation
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eventually would be stabilized along the 38th parallel, and

it

was suggested

the United Nations, instead of crossing, should offer surrender

North Koreans as soon as victory

of the United Nations forces

terms

that

to the

seemed assured.

73

Obviously this National Security Council study was originally made without consulting the Joint Chiefs.
to

The most important question

in the study

cross or not to cross the 38th parallel for ground operations.

Security Council study

was

in

was:

The National

favor of no crossing, unless there was United

Nations support.

Here the major concern was not

by any crossing.

Before the United Nations forces approached the parallel, any

indication of Soviet or Chinese intention to enter

clude

UN

crossing.

to

Korea should immediately pre-

However, Chinese entry alone

treated as less threatening.

provoke Russian intervention

in

some instances would be

MacArthur should then continue

to fight as long as

he had a reasonable chance of successful resistance against a Chinese attack.
It is

not clear whether this applied to Chinese attack south of the 38th parallel

or after MacArthur 's forces crossed the parallel.
at any stage should

make

the

UN

Soviet military intervention

forces go on the defensive at once, according to

the study.

'^^Collins, p. 145; Schnabel, p. 179.

In

August the President had

strengthened the National Security Council with a "Senior Staff" composed of
some of the "ablest" men from State, Defense, Treasury, JCS, the National
the CIA. Sec Millis, Arms and the State,
Security Resources Board, and
p. 281.
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The study also seemed
to

compel the withdrawal

of

to suggest that to

NK

units

cross the 38th parallel

from South Korea or

NK

to destroy

might have better justification than merely for local tactical reasons.
general the study wanted to

would not lead

to a

make sure

that the

problem

general war with the Soviet Union.

in

order

forces

But

in

of the 38th parallel

Thus the policy

of using

only Korean units in the border region and of prohibiting any crossing of the

northern boundary of Korea into U.

S.

S.R. or Manchuria was recommended for

such circumstances.
This National Security Council document received a cold review by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 7.'^^

The Chiefs disagreed with the assump-

tion that the military situation would or should be stabilized

parallel.

They argued

along the 38th

that a limited advance to the parallel would solve

nothing, militarily or politically, since this would leave

Korea divided by an

arbitrary boundary difficult to defend but easy for North Korean guerrillas to
infiltrate.

On

the other h^jDd, a successful drive to the north could

under a single government acceptable

to the United Nations and could secure a

defensible natural frontier along the Yalu and

74
75

Schnabei, p. 179.
Ibid.

;

Collins, p. 145.

'^^Collins, pp. 145-46.

make Korea

Tumen

Rivers.

7fi

The Joint Chiefs of

Staff stated that they

that the initial objective to be obtained

forces.

"^"^

In

be placed on

was

agreed with General MacArlhur

the destruction of the North

Korean

order to accomplish this mission, no prior
restrictions shoidd

Mac Arthur's crossing

The chief contra argument

that the

the parallel

if it

became necessary

JCS considered was

to

do so.

that an extension of

operations to the north would provide additional excuse
for Soviet recalcitrance
in the

United Nations and could lead to the active intervention of
the Soviets or

the Chinese

Communists.

strength of the

NK Army

The Joint Chiefs
would be broken

anticipated, however, that the

in South

Korea and

main

that operations

north of the parallel would be chiefly of a mopping-up nature, which should
be

conducted by South Korean troops.

'^^

The Joint Chiefs

stated:

We believe that after the strength of the North Korean
forces has been broken, which is anticipated will occur south
of 38 degrees North, that subsequently operations must taJ^e
place both north and south of the 38th Parallel. Such operations
should be conducted by South Korean feces since it is assumed
that the actions will be of a guerrilla character.

MacArthur has plans for increasing the strength
Korean forces so that they should be adequate at
cope with this situation.

'^'^Schnabel, p.

General
of the South

the time to

'^^

179.

'^^Collins, p. 146

79

"^^Memo,
Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, 7 Sep 50, sub: U.S. Courses of
Action With Respect to Korea; in Schnabel, pp. 179-80.
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The JCS also touched on
stated that they and

the subject of the posthostilities period.

Mac Arthur agreed

that the occupation by

UN

They

forces should

be limited to the principal cities south of the 38th parallel and should be

terminated as soon as possible.

Further, U.S. troops should be taken out of

Korea as early as

The Chiefs also pointed

safe to do so.

out that

MacArthur

and Rhee had agreed that the Government of the Republic of Korea should be
reestablished in Seoul as soon as

it

could be done.

Rhee was

reentry into the capital, to grant a general amnesty to

all

willing, upon

except war criminals

and to call for a general election to set up a single government for

Korea.
final

80

The Joint Chiefs recommended

review of the study before

it

was returned

Council and submitted to the President.

approved by the Secretary

As

to

of

that their views be

UN

embodied

in a

to the National Security

The JCS recommendations were

Defense.

Acheson's position with regard

agreed that the

all of

to the 38th parallel,

he finally

Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950, was sufficient

to authorize military operations north as well as south of the parallel to repel

the invasion and defeat the invaders and that MacArthur should be authorized
to conduct

them, provided that neither the Russians nor the Chinese entered

Schnabel, p. 180.
Collins, p. 146.
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the conflict or aiinoimced their iatention of doing so.

According to Collins, most of the Joint Chiefs' views, along \nth the
cautions of the National Security Council's staff, were included in the final

paper.

83

at Inchon

Truman
made

it

recalled that the decision to launch the amphibious landing

necessary

to

consider "on a high policy level v/hat our sub-

sequent course of action should be. "

This was done

which finally resulted
September 11, 1950.

in National Security CouDcil discussions
in a policy

statement that

I

approved on

The National Security Council recommended

that om-

course of action would be influenced by three factors: action
by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, consultation
with friendly members of the United Nations, and the risk of
general war.

General Mac Arthur was to conduct tiie necessary military
operations either to force the North Koreans behind the 38th
parallel or to destroy their forces. If there was no indication
or threat of entry of Soviet or Chinese Communist elements in
force, the National Security Council recommended that General
MacArthur was to extend his operations north of the parallel and
to make plans for the occupation of North Korea. However, no

ground operations were
in the event of Soviet or

In order that

to take place

north of the 38lh parallel

Chinese Communist entry.

MacArthur might have advance notice,

^'^

the Joint Cliiefs on

were
September 15 sent him those provisions of the new national policy which
to be talcen
applicable to operations above the 38th parallel and actions

Acheson,

p. 452.

^Collins, p. 146.
l4

Trum.an,

II,

359.

if

Russia
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or Communist China intervened.
only.

It

This message was for MacArthur's information

informed him, among other details:
(a) Final decision cannot be made at this time inasmuch
as the course of action best advancing United States national
interest must be determined in the light of
(1)

Action by the Soviet Union and the Chinese

(2)

In consultation with friendly

Communists;

members

of the

United Nations; and
(3) An appraisal of the risk of general war;
(b) The United Nations forces have a legal basis for
conducting operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel to
compel withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the line
or to defend against these forces.
(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff were authorized to direct
General MacArthur to plan for the possible occupation of North
Korea but to execute such plans only with the approval of the
President.
(d) General MacArthur should undertal^e no ground
operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel m event of occupation
of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces. In this
event, air and naval operrations north of the parallel should not
be discontinued; and
(e) In the event of employment of major Chinese Communist
units south of the thirty-eighth parallel, the United States would
(1) not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with

Communist China;

(2)

authorize General MacAnhur to continue
?,s it offered a reasonable chance of

military action as long

successful resistance.'^"
In spite of his

immediate concern with the outcome

-{September 15 was D-Day for Operation

of Inchon landing

CHROMITE), MacArthur wanted

to

know

""^Schnabel, p. 180.

S^Hearings, Pt. 1, 718, from item 33, on p. 41 of the paraphrased
messages furnished by JCS to Congressional Committees (Armed Services and
ForeigTi Relations).
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more about

the national policy on Korea.

by courier the entire text

of the

An Analysis

He asked the Joint Chiefs

approved policy paper.

to

forward

This was done. 87

of the Policy Statement of

September

11, 195Q

The policy statement, which was approved
by Truman on September
1950,

seemed

to

have been a compromise bet^veen the
original study made by the

National Security Council on Sept.

1

and the views of the Joint Chiefs of

the latter reviewed the study and added
their recommendations on Sept.
is

11,

Staff as

7.

It

not clear what role Acheson had played in
the compromise, except that he

agreed

to the final statement.

The weight

of the origii^al study favored stabili'/ing

the military situation along the 38th parallel,
thus avoiding any possible complication of Soviet entry.

The Jomt Chiefs had wanted not only

but also to drive to the Yalu
that if there

was no

to unify the

whole country.

to

cross the parallel,

The compromise was

indication or threat of Soviet or Chinese military intervention,

MacArthur could extend his operations north
occupation of North Korea,

it

was decided

of the 38th parallel.

that such plans should be

they would be executed only with the approval of the President.
influenced by MacArthur 's views, were
objective:

the destruction of the North

As

now arguing

^'^Schnabel, p. 180; Collins, p. 146.

made but

The Joint Chiefs,

strongly for a

Korean forces.

to the

new

military

Without trying to spell

120
out clearly the possible implication of this

with the plans of the occupation
accepted

it

of

new

objective, such as its relationship

North Korea, the

final policy statement

as the purpose of allowing MacArthur to operate across the 38th

parallel.

Should the United Nations be consulted?

The

final policy statement

rested its case of the crossing on the legal interpretation of the

Council resolution of June 27, 1950.

UN

Security

Therefore there was no intention to

seek new support from the United Nations for the crossing.

Thus America's policy decision
Sept.

to

cross the 38th parallel was made on

11 for the purpose of destroying the North

Korean forces, under the

condition of no indication of Soviet or Chinese entry into North Korea.

not clear in the policy statement

how

It

was

far north MacArthur would be allowed to

operate, except that he would be directed by the Joint Chiefs to plan for the

possible occupation of North Korea.

It is

also significant to note that operations

north of the 38th parallel would be conducted not by South Korean forces alone,
as was originally expected by the Joint Chiefs in their argument of Sept.

Apparently the Joint Chiefs were using this argument merely

to

7.

secure the

approval of the objective of crossing the parallel to destroy the North Korean
forces without causing too

Korea.

To be

much damage

to the principle of a limited

war

in

sure, crossing the parallel would result in a less limited war as

88

See Acheson, p. 452.
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far as the area of groimd operations

was concerned.

But the priority of avoiding

a general war with the Soviet Union or the Chinese
Communists over Korea was
still

maintained in the policy statement of September
11, 1950.

CHAPTER
INCHON AND

U. S.

IV

CROSSING INTO NORTH KOREA

Inchon Landing and the Authorization of Ground
Operations North of the 38th Parallel

On September

8,

1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave

green light for the landing
informed.

at

Mac Arthur

the final

Inchon on September 15, aad the President was so

^

On September

Truman accepted

it

12, Secretary

and made

it

Johnson submitted his resignation.

effective as of

September

19.

President

General George C.

Marshall became the new Secretary of Defense on September 21.^
Operation
at the scene.

CHROMITE

went

Inchon was quickly taken by the

Major General Edward M. Almond, due
September

18,

armies began

Kimpo
to fall

to break through the

turned into a rout.

airfield

X

Corps, under the

to lack of strong

was cleared

for use.

Army

X

of

22, the NK.

in the south

Pusan Perimeter and advance northward.
Elements of the

command

enemy resistance. On

On September

back everywhere, and the Eighth

The

NK

was

able

withdrawal

Corps and the Eighth Army made a junction

•^Schnabel, p. 154; Collins, p. 128.
2

MacArthur was personally

off successfully.

Schnabel, p. 181.

^Collins, pp. 132-40; Schnabel, pp. 173-77.
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on September 26 near Osan.

had arrested control
capital

was

of Seoul

liberated.

By
from

tlien,

the

the

Marine-Army team

enemy.

By September

The next day, only two weeks

of the

X

Corps

28, the South

Korean

after the Inchon landing, in

a ceremony in Seoul, General MacArthur officially returned the capital city to

Rhee.^
After the policy statement on Korea had been approved by
11, the Joint Chiefs

to

were

anticipating instructions

prepare a new directive for MacArthur

perhaps due

new

to the resignation of

directive

Inchon.

On

was

to

from

Truman on

Sept.

the Secretary of Defense

implement the new policy.

However,

Johnson and his replacement by Marshall, the

not drafted until ten days after

American forces stormed

Sept. 25 the Joint Chiefs forwarded to Secretary of Defense Marshall

for approval a directive to be sent to

They told him

that v/hile they

MacArthur for future operations

in

Korea.

had dealt chiefly with military matters, the

implications of the proposed order affected other agencies of the United States

Government; and they suggested that the Secretary obtain the concurrence
these other agencies.

Secretary Marshall sent the draft directive to the State

Department, which approved
Seoul to the

ROK

of

Government

it

but added

oi

Rhee.

some

instructions on the return of

Because

of the

Collins, pp. 132-40; Sclinabel, pp. 173-77.

importance of this
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directive, Marshall secured the approval of

On September
It

stipulated that

it

Truman.^

27, the Joint Chiefs transmitted the directive to

was being furnished

to provide

him with "amplifying

as to further military action to be taken by you in Korea.

"

may require

to

be final

modification in accordance with developments.

MacArthur was ordered

"to

make

instructions

The Joint Chiefs

warned him: "These instructions, however, cannot be considered
since they

MacArthur.

"

special efforts to determine whether there is

a Chinese Communist or Soviet threat to the attainment of your objective, which
will be reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a matter of urgency. "^

For the

first time,

MacArthur had a written directive

to destroy

North

Korean forces:

Your military

objective is the destruction of the North

Korean Armed Forces.

In attaining this objective you are
authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious
and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38th
Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation
there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or
Chinese Communist Forces, no announcement of intended
entry, nor a threat ' to counter our operations militarily in
North Korea. Under no circumstances, however, will your

forces cross the Manchurian or USSli borders of Korea and,
as a matter of policy, no non-Korean Ground Forces will be
used in the northeast provinces bordering tlie Soviet Union
or in the area along the Manchurian border. Furthermore,
support of your operations north or south of the 38th Parallel
will not include Air or Naval action against Manchuria or
against

USSR

territory.

^See Sclmabel, pp. 180-82; Collins, pp. 146-47.

^RAD, JCS 92801, JCS (Personal)
p. 182.

for MacArthur, 27 Sep 50; in Schnabel,
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la the event of the open or covert employment
of major
Soviet units south of the 38th Parallel, you will
assume the

defense,

make no move to aggravate the situation and report
You should take the same action in the event

to Washington.

your forces are operating north of the 38th Parallel, and
major Soviet units are openly employed. You will not discontinue
Air and Naval operations north of the 38th Parallel merely
because the presence of Soviet or Chmese Communist troops is
detected in a target area, but if the Soviet Union or Chinese
Communists should announce in advance their intention to

reoccupy North Korea and give warning, either explicitly or
implicitly, that their forces should not be attacked, you should
refer the matter immediately to Washington.
In the event of the open or covert employment of m.ajor
Chinese Communist units south of the 38th Parallel, you should
continue the action as long as action by your forces offers a
reasonable chance of successful resistance. In the event of an
attempt to employ small Soviet or Chinese Communist units
covertly south of the 38th Parallel, you should continue the
action.^

General MacArtliur was directed

command

to

use

to turn "the inevitable bitterness and

all ioformxation

at his

resentment of the war -victimized

Korean people" away from the United Nations and
Korean and Russian, and, "depending on

media

to direct

it

toward the Communists,

the role they play, " the Chinese

Communists.

When organized armed

resistance by North Korean forces
has been brought substantially to an end, you should direct the
ROK forces to tal^e the lead in disarming remaining North Korean
units and enforcing the terms of surrender. Guerrilla activities
should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of

Korea, with

'Ibid.

Ibid.

minimum

participation by United Nations contingents.

^
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Circumstances obtaining at the time will
determine ^le
character of and necessity for occupation
of North Korea
Your
plans for such occupation will be
forwarded for approval to the
Jomt Chiefs of Staff. You mil also submit
your plan for future
operations north of the 38th Parallel to the
Joint
Chiefs of

Staff for approval. 8

MacArthur was advised

that the United States

was formulating

regarding "Armistice terms to be offered by you
to the North Koreans

instructions

m

the

event of sudden collapse of North Korean forces and
Course of Action to be
followed and activities to be undertaken during the
post-hostilities period.

"

The

directive then continued:

As soon as

the military situation permits, you should

facilitate the restoration of the

Govemment

of the Republic of
Although the Government of
the Republic of Korea has been generally recognized (except
by

Korea with

its capital in Seoul.

the Soviet bloc) as

tlie only legal government in Korea, its
sovereignty north of the 38th Parallel has not been generolly
recognized. The Republic of Korea and its Armed Forces
should be expected to cooperate in such military operations and

military occupation as are conducted by United Nations forces
north of the 38th Parallel, but political questions such as the

formal extension of sovereignty over North Korea should await
action by the United Nations to complete the unification of the
country.

Four significant points m^ay be mentioned with regard
Sept. 27.

The purpose

(1)

attaining the

Ibid.

^Ibid.

new military

.

p.

183.

of crossing the 38th parallel

to this directive of

was clearly

stated as

objective of "the destruction of the North Korean

Armed
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Forces.

"

(2)

This new objective was

still

subordinate to the higher policy of

avoiding general war with the Soviet Union or with Communist China over
Korea.

However, the United States was prepared
of the 38th parallel,

if

there was "a reasonable chance of successful resistance.

This phrase was ambiguous.
full

to fight against Chinese forces south

Did

it

mean avoidance

occupation of the south by Chinese armies?

the south?

In any event the

judgment was

Or

left to

of defeat?

Prevention of

ejection of these units

MacArthur

to

make.

from
The

(3)

granting to MacArthur of the authority to cross the parallel was facilitated by
the fact that up to this date of Sept. 27, there had been no indication of Soviet or

Chinese intention

Korea

to enter

North Korea.

Perhaps the encouraging reports from

after the Inchon landing also facilitated the implementation of the policy

decision of Sept. 11.

(4)

The military necessity

of crossing the parallel to

destroy the North Korean forces took precedence over the political question of
sovereignty over North Korea or the plans for occupation of North Korea.

new

decision by the United Nations would

As MacArthur planned

come

in South

later.

was aware

the advance into North Korea, he

the fact that although three -fourths of the

Any

NK Army

of

was destroyed or captured

Korea, thousands of North Koreans, including a number of the senior

commaaders and

staff officers,

were able

to slip

away through

the moimtains

or along the east coast road, escaping north of the 38th pariillei.

Collins, p. 155; Schnabel, p. 190.

"
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General Almond's X Corps had not been able fully to
provide the anvil against which General Walker's Eighth Army
and the ROK Army were to hammer the NK Army to destruction.

The

X

Corps did

simply

all that actually

could be expected of

it,

but

it

co'old not extend its lines to

cover all escape routes west
of the Taebaek Mountains and found it impossible to cover the
trails through the mountains or the east coast road.
In

accordance with the JCS directive

of

September 27, On September 28

General MacArthur submitted to the Joint Chiefs his plan

Korea:

my

"If

the North

proclamation

to

Korean Armed Forces do not surrender

be issued on

1

accomplish the military objective

MacArthur had been authorized

parallel through

Eighth Army.

"

of destroying

Presumably,

at

Hungnam.

"^^

ROK

them by entry

He would send

the Eighth

to capture

Army

Pyongyang.

this juncture

would require the

North Korea.
13

He

across the

Almond's

X

Corps

X
the

to attack

Macz\rthur promised Washington that

troops for operations above the line Chongju-Yongwon-

"Tenatative date for the attack of Eighth Army,

^"^^Collins, p.

into

to

Wonsan, thereafter "making juncture with

west along the Wonsan -Pyongyang road.
he would use only

accordance with

such a surrender proclamation.

Kaesong and Sariwon

Corps v/ould land amphibiously

in

North

October 1950, dispositions will be made

to issue

outlined his plan of action briefly.

38tli

of action in

"

MacArthur

155.

^^Schnabel, p. 188.
"'"^Collins, p.

^'^The

more

157.

detailed line would be Chongju-Kunuri-Yongwon-Hamhimg-

Hungnam, see Schnabel,

p. 216.

"

'
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reported, "will not be earlier than 15 October and not later than 30 October.

You

will be provided detailed plans later. "

indication of "present entry into North

Communist Forces.

He also reported

Korea by major

that there

was no

Soviet or Chinese

"'-^

General Collins later wrote:
This time, perhaps somewhat overawed by the success
of Inchon, some aspects of which we had questioned, the Joint
Chiefs did not wait for receipt of the details. We approved
the plan as outlined and on September 29 forwarded it to the
Secretary of Defense for final action, urging quick approval,
since it was possible that some ROK forces might even then
be crossing the 38th Parallel.

On September

to discuss the developing

had gone

UN

to

New York

Truman

28,

Korean

called Acheson to Washington

situation with

from New York

him and Marshall. Acheson

to present both the "Uniting for

Peace" proposal to the

General Assembly and America's "one package" plan to the North Atlantic

ministers.

1 7
^

On September

movement

map

in

29, after lunch in Blair House,

MacArthur's proposed

North Korea was described by an officer with the aid

of Korea.

of a large

Acheson's assessment of MacArthur's plan was given later

in

the followdng way:

^^Rad, C 64805,

CINCFE

to

JCS, 28 Sep 50;

in

Schnabel, p. 188.

^^Collins, p. 158.
^

'^Acheson, p. 452.

Acheson, pp. 448-50.

For the explanation

of the "Uniting for

Peace,

"

see

130

The plan seemed excellently contrived to create a
strong military position from which to exploit the possibilities
of the North Korean defeat --either to insure the South
by a
strong defensive line against a renewal of the attack or, if the
South Koreans were strong enough and the Chinese did not

move toward the UN goal of a united, free, and
independent Korea. With these thoughts in mmd General
Marshall and I recommended, and the President approved, the
plan of operation.
intervene, to

The

Joint Chiefs immediately radioed

MacArthur on September

29, to carry out

his plan on schedule.

Meanwhile, news reports

at this

time were saying that General Walker

had informed reporters that his forces were going

to halt along the 38th

parallel for regrouping and presumably to await permission to cross.

Although

these reports were unconfirmed, Marshall sent a personal message to

Mac-

Arthur on September 28:
in the

"Announcement.

United Nations where evident desire

.

is

.

may

precipitate

embarrassment

not to be confronted with the

necessity of a vote on passage of the 38th parallel.

"

Concemmg

this crossing,

Marshall stated, "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically
to

proceed north of the 38th parallel. "-

Acheson,

p. 453.

•^Schnabel, p. 191.

^^Rad, JCS 92895, Secy Defense (Personal)
in Schnabel, p. 183; also Collins, p. 148.

to

MacArthur, 29 Sept 50,
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MacArthur replied

to

Marshall on September 30:

am

cautioning Walker against any involvement connected
with the use of the term 38th parallel, which line is not a factor
I

employment of our forces. The logistical supply
main problem which limits our immediate
exploiting the defeat of the enemy forces, our own

In the military

of our units is the

advance. In
troops may cross the parallel at any time in exploratory probing
or exploiting local tactical conditions. My overall strategic plan
in North Korea is known to you. I regard all of Korea open for
our military operations unless and until the enemy capitulates. '^^
In another

message on September

statLig his intentions to issue on

October

30,

2,

MacArthur wired Secretary Marshall
a dramatic announcement about the

38th parallel following his proclamation of terms of surrender on October
I

plan to issue and

make

1:

public the following general

directive to all elements of the United Nations

Command

at

1200

receive your instructions

hours, Monday, 2 October, unless I
to the contrary.
"Under the provisions of the United Nations Security
Council Resolution of 27 June, the field of our military
operations is limited only by military exigencies and the

The so-called 38th
in the military
factor
is
not
a
accordingly,
Parallel,
employment of our forces. To accomplish the enemy's
international boundaries of Korea.

complete defeat, your troops may cross the border at
any time, either in exploratory probing or exploiting
local tactical conditions. If the enemy fails to accept
the terms of surrender set forth in my message to him

October, our forces, in due process of campaign
will seek out and destroy the enemy's armed forces in
"22
whatever part of Korea they may be located.
of

1

21

WTiitney, p. 398; see also Schnabel, pp. 183-84.

^^Appleman,
fn 15 (2);

Truman,

p. 608; also

II,

361.

Whitney,

p. 399.

See also Schnabel,

p.

183,

132

On
Staff:

the

same

"We desire

day, MacArthur received a reply from the Joint Chiefs
of

that

you proceed with your operations without any further

explanation or aimouncement and let action determine the matter.

ment desires

to avoid having to

make an

Our govern-

issue of the 38th Parallel until

accomplished our mission. " 23 Truman was advised on October

1

we have

of this

exchange.

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution
October 7, 1950 and Communist China's

of

Threat of Intervention

From
made

in

the available record

Washington

to draft a

the General Assembly.

been growing
[of State]

in the

it

is not clear v/hen

new United Nations

According

to

Acheson,

and how the decision was

resolution to be proposed to

"It

represented a view that had

Far Eastern and United Nations divisions

of the

Department

during August and was given a strong push by the success at Inchon.

Collins' account emphasized public opinion and

sources of influence for the drafting of a new

" 25

Truman's desire as the major

UN

resolution in late September:

Public opinion and political considerations had to be
v/eighcd by the President and his advisers. ... By and large,
news commentators, columnists, and editorial writers indicated

9*^

Whitney, p. 399.
94

Schnabel, p. 183, fn

Ache son,

p. 454.

15(2).
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a strong public opinion in favor of continuing military
operations
to eliminate the Communist satellite state of North
Korea and
thus, hopefully, prevent a recurrence of the Korean
war.
World opinion also had to be considered, especially as
reflected in the United Nations, under whose aegis the war
was
being fought. United Nations sanction for crossing the 38th
Parallel was highly desirable. The State Department was
satisfied that the United Nations resolutions of June 27 and July
7 provided adequate authorization, but President Truman insisted
on a more specific new authorization. 26
It

seemed certain

that the initial motive for a

new UN

provide clear authorization to conduct military operations

Truman wrote

in his

memoirs: "This resolution,

authorization for the United Nations

But military operations
itself.

They had

to be

in

commander

if

in

resolution

adopted, would be a clear

to operate in

North Korea.

The United

Korea had been a long-term aim

of the United

been through peaceful and political negotiations.
unification.

Now

the North

it

could be used to unify Korea

if

Collins, pp. 148-49.
p. 362.

had always

Previous efforts had

all failed

Korean forces were

suffering

defeat and were retreating in the aftermath of the Inchon landing.

Truman,

"^'^

North Korea could not be stated as a goal by

Nations since 1947, even though the means employed to achieve

Korean

to

North Korea.

connected with a more acceptable cause.

States found that unification of

to bring about

was

Perhaps force

Russia or Communist China would not intervene.

See also Rees, p. 101.

134

Therefore

would do no harm

it

to restate the

in a

new UN

aim

of the United Nations forces, while the

resolution without explicitly stipulating that

justification for

could he go?

would allow

long-range goal of Korean unification

intention

v/ithout

was as

now became

in

North Korea.

How

far north as the capability of the

provoking the Soviets or the Chinese to come

later recalled the thinking about the

UN

the

new resolution could supply

MacArthur's military operations

The

it

proposal, while admitting

UN

in.

its

war

implicit
far north

forces

Acheson
"naive view

of the probabilities" in retrospect:

Behind this proposal lay the belief that effort to carry
out the 1947 resolution had been blocked by Soviet military
power. Soviet forces, however, had been withdrawn and the
substituted North Korean troops defeated and scattered. No
opposing military force rem.ained in the North to frustrate UN
efforts, and the chances were believed good that neither Russian
nor Chinese troops would mtervene if only Korean soldiery
attempted to establish whatever degree of order was possible in
the rugged country of the extreme north, where even the
Japanese had had only nominal sovereignty. If the Koreans
encountered too heavy resistance, they could fall back to the
strong position across the neck.

Even though
the resolution,

dom

it

the United States

was introduced

was mainly responsible

to the

UN

for the drafting of

General Assembly by the United King-

on September 30, co-sponsored by Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the Netherlands,

Norway, Paldstan and the Philippines.

Acheson,

p. 454.

These sponsors were selected with a view
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to broadening the basis of support and emphasizing the
United Nations character
of the

proposed action. ^9

The Security Council was avoided because

the Soviet representative,

Malik, who had returned to and attended Council meetings since August and
who

possessed the Soviet veto power, "would obviously prevent the adoption

tliere of

any plan to assure peace unpalatable to the North Koreans.

"-^^

Acheson had also proposed the "Uniting for Peace'' plan

make further UN

decisions possible by action in the General- Assembly,

to

if

That was why

any Security Council

decision with regards to the Korean aggression should be blocked by a Soviet
veto.

According

to the United Nations Charter, the Security Council

was

the

principal instrument for carrying out the purpose of maintaining international

peace.

But should

it

be paralyzed by a veto, Acheson proposed that the duty and

responsibility be taken up by the General Assembly.

was

finally adopted in a

the General

General Assembly resolution on Nov.

Assembly was

to take action on the

Korean

earlier by its adoption of the resolution of October

Goodrich,

p.

129, fn 6.

'Acheson, p. 448,
Ibid.

,

His "Uniting for Peace" plan

pp. 448-50.

7.

3,

1950.

Actually

situation about one

month
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The General Assembly referred the Korean
question
In the

to its First

Committee.

course of discussing the eight-power resolution
which the United Kingdom

had introduced, American Ambassador Austin made
the following remarks,

among

other points, on September 30, in support of
I

quickly.

it:

shall speak briefly, because events require us
to act
.

.

.

Today, the forces of the United Nations stand on the
threshold of military victory. The operations authorized
by the
Security Council have been conducted with vigor and skill.
The
price paid had been high. The sacrifice in anxiety, sorrow,
wounded, and dead must be abundantly requited. A living
political, social, and spiritual monument to the achievement
of
the first enforcement of the United Nations peace -malting
function must be erected.

The opportunities for nev/ acts of aggression, of course,
should be removed. Faithful adherence to the United Nations
objective of restoring international peace and security in the area
counsels the taking of appropriate steps to eliminate the power
and ability of the North Korean aggressor to launch future attacks.
The aggressor's forces should not be permitted to have refuge
behind an imaginary line because that would recreate the threat
to the peace of Korea and of the world.
The political aspect of the problem identified with the
38th parallel becomes a matter of major concern for the United
Nations. The question of whether this artificial barrier shall
remain removed and whether the country shall be united now
must be determined by the United Nations.
The artificial barrier which has divided North and South
Korea has no basis for existence either in law or in reason.
Neither the United Nations, its Commission on Korea, nor the
Republic of Korea recognizes such a line. Now, the North
Koreans, by armed attack upon the Republic of Korea, have denied
tlie reality of any such line.
Whatever ephemeral separation of Korea there was for
purposes relating to the surrender of the Japanese was so
volatile that nobody recognizes it. Let us not, at this critical
hour and on this grave event, erect such a boundary. Rather,
let us set up standards and means, principles and policies,
according to the Charter, by which all Koreans can hereafter
.

.

.

137
live in

On

this

same

peace among themselves and with their neighbors.

."^^
.

.

day, Sept. 30, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai declared in

an official speech to the Central People's Government Council

in

Peking:

The Chinese people enthusiastically love peace, but
in order to defend peace, they never have been and never will
be afraid to oppose aggressive war. The Chinese people
absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they
supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded
by the imperialists. WTioever attempts to exclude the nearly
500 million Chinese people from the U.N. and whoever ignores
and violates the interests of this one -fourth of mankind and
fancies mainly to solve arbitrarily any Far Eastern problems
directly concerned with China, will certainly break their

skulls.

Chou's warning that China would not tolerate seeing their neighbors
"being savagely invaded by the imperialists'- was the most open threat of

counter -action yet voiced by a Chinese official

in the

event of possible

across the parallel.

His warning was reported in the

Herald Tribune on Oct.

1.

1,

Commander

in Chief,

North Korean

in part:

^^See Dept. of State Bulletin (Oct
^^

Veople's China

p. 108.

and

Tokyo time. General Mac Arthur broadcast and

issued a statement of surrender terms to the

He stated

New York Times

pursuit

35

At noon on October

Forces,

UN

,

9,

1950) pp. 579-80.

vol. H, No. 8, Oct. 16, 1950, p. 9.

Quoted

in Wliiting,

See also Tsou, pp. 572-73.
3^

See Whiting, p. 108.

Also Martin Lichtcrman, "To the
ed. by Harold Stem
Yalu and Back, " in American Civil-Military- Decisions
589.
(University, Alabama: Univ. of Ala Press, 15^63), p.
^^Spanier, p. 86 and p. 286, note 12.

,
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The early and

total defeat and complete destruction
of
your armed forces and war maldng potential is
now inevitable.
In order that the decisions of the United
Nations

may

out v/ith a

minimum

property,

I,

be carried

of further loss of life and destruction
of

as the United Nations

Commander

in Chief, call

upon you and the forces under your command, in
whatever part
of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down your
arms and cease
hostilities imder such military supervision as
I may direct.

...

36

Also on October

1,

elements of the

the 38th parallel in probings and

2

MacArthur

On

ROK Army

on the East coast crossed

met with practically no resistance.

reported this rapid advance to the Joint Chiefs.

the

^"^

same day, Russia's representative Andrei Vishinsky presented

a Soviet counter-proposal on Korea to the First Committee of the

Assembly.

It

UN General

called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of all foreign troops,

equality for North and South
until

On October

Korea

in a

new commission

to rule the country

all-Korean elections could be held, and creation of a

UN commission

observe the elections with members from countries bordering Korea.
In the early

Ambassador

morning hours

in Peking, K.

of

October

M. Panikkar, and

crossed the 38th parallel China would send

However,

36
37

38

this action

would not be taken

See State Dept Bulletin (Oct

9,

if

3,

p. 452;

Rees,

p.

'^^

Chou En-lai summoned Indian

told him. that

if

American troops

in troops to help the North

Koreans.

only South Koreans crossed the

1950), p. 586.

Schnabel, p. 195; Truman, H, 361.

Acheson,

to

107; Goodrich, p. 129.
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parallel.

39

Panilckar quicldy transmitted Chou's warning through the British

and the State Department received this information on October

3.

reports were also received from American embassies in Moscow,

Similar

Stockholm,

London and New Delhi.
U. S. intelligence agencies discounted Chou's warning of October 3
(1)

because

ment

it

was passed on through

to British

that, if the

advance";

to Washington; (2)

because

"it

hardly seemed likely

Chinese were serious, they would disclose their intentions

(3)

Thus the U.

Government

the "roundabout" channel: Indiaa Govern-

in

because Panildcar was suspected of having Commimist leanings.

S. intelligence

community generally agreed

that Chou's threat

was

"a bluff, primarily a last-ditch attempt to intimidate the United States, and

probably covered a less drastic plan of action, such as offering sanctuary

to

41
the North Korean leaders. "

39

K. M. Paniklcar, I n Two Chinas (London; G. Allen and Unwin, 1955),
pp. 108-10; Truman, II, 361-62; Acheson, p. 452. During September, through
the Indian Government, the U.S. had sought evidence of Chinese intentions
toward Korea. Before Inchon, Panikkar had reported Chou En-lai as emphasizmg
China's peaceful intentions, in which the Lidian ambassador agreed. See

Acheson,

p. 452.

361-62; Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The
in Korea (Washington: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957), p. 11.

'^^Truman,

Sea

War

41

II,

Collins, p. 173; also Schnabel, p. 198.
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On

the question of channels of communication, David

India might have been chosen by

Rees argues

that

Communist China as a go-between, preferable

to the traditional Swiss and Scandinavians, because

it

was

a fellow Asian

country to the Chinese leaders and "the Chinese revolution stood for the reassertion of Asian interests against the West. "^^ Michael Lindsay suggests
that better relations between China and Great Britain or greater willingness

on the part of the Chinese to talk to

more

UN

officials

might have helped China

in

clearly expressing and communicating effectively intentions and threats.

Of course, the main, problem here was the lack

of direct diplomatic contacts

between China and the United States.

The United Nations Command

intelligence staff also

commented on

the

reported warning from the Chinese Foreign Minister and other recent public
statements, "Even though the utterances.

.

are a form of propaganda they

ignored since they emit from presumably responsible leaders in

cannot be fully

the Chinese and North

Korean Communist Governments.

a potential of reinforcement by
Earlier, on August

had reported,

officer,

.

^^Rees,

p.

".

.

1,

.

CCF

The enemy retains

[Chinese Communist Forces] troops. "^^

Major General Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2
sources have reported troop movements from

111.

^^Michael Lindsay, China and the Cold

War

(Melbourne: Melbourne Univ.

Press, 1955), pp. 17-18.
"^^DIS,

199-200.

GHQ, UNC, 2946,

3

Oct and 2947, 4 Oct 50,

in Schnabel, pp.
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Central China to Manchuria for sometime
to entering the

Korean theater.

"

which suggest movements preliminary

Willoughby put the number of regular Chinese

troops in Manchuria at about 246,000 men, organized into nine armies
totaling
thirty-seven divisions.

Eighty thousand

men were reported assembling near

An-tung, just across the Yalu River from Korea.

On receiving Chou's warning, Acheson
this

same time making

combined Sino-Soviet

thought that since Vishinsl^ was at

a proposal in the United Nations, "it

effort

was being made

Chou's words weie a warning, not

to

to save the

was obvious

that a

North Korean regime.

be disregarded, but, on the other hand, not
An

an authoritative statement of policy.

more

in the

did not think that Paniklcar's statement could be taken as that of

"an impartial observer,
of the

more than

Thus, Chou's warning was regarded as

nature of diplomatic maneuver than a statement of genuine intentions.

Truman

game

"

"

since the Indian

Ambassador had

Chinese Commimists fairly regularly.

a relay of

Communist propaganda.

"

"

"It

DIS,

4.

Moreover, a key vote on the

Thus, Truman concluded,

GHQ, FEC, No.

Ache son,

p. 452.

2913, 31

Aug

past "played the

might very well be no

eight-power draft resolution in the First Committee of the

was due on October

in the

"it

50, p.

UN

General Assembly

appeared quitely

[sic] likely

1-d, see Sclmabel, p. 179.
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that

Chou En-lai's 'message' was

by threats of intervention

On October

"'^^'^

in

Korea.

4 the eight-power draft resolution

Committee and then submitted
America's

allies

a bald attempt to blackmail the United
Nations

to the plenary

was passed by

the First

meetings of the General Assembly.

end friends generally supported the resolution.

The Indian

delegate, Sir Benegal Rau, objected to the assumptions
implied in the resolution
that the United Nations forces would be authorized
by the resolution to enter

North Korea and to remain there
stability achieved.

might be
conflict.

to

until the imification of

He said that the Indian Government feared

prolong North Korean resistance, and even

that the residt

to extend the

area of

'^^

The Joint Chiefs sent a copy
October

Korea was completed and

6, at the

considered

it

same time informing him

resolution.

7,

the

the First

UN

that the United States

Government

General Assembly formally adopted, with n;inor

Commattee report which contained

In the adopted resolution, the

to its previous relevant resolutions,

47

MacArthur on

as supporting operations north of the 38th parallel.

On October
amendments,

of the draft resolution to

Truman,

II,

General

namely, those

the eight-power draft

Assembly made reference
of

November

14, 1947;

362.

48

See UN General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Sess.
294th Meeting, Oct. 7, 1950, p. 230.
49

Had, JCS 93555, JCS

to

CINCFE,

6

Oct 50; see Schnabcl,

,

Plenary Mtgs,

p.

194.
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December

12, 1948;

and October 21, 1949; and the Security Council resolutions

of June 25, 1950 and June 27, 1950; and then

Recalling that the essential objective of the resolutions
Assembly referred to above was the establishment
of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea,
of the General

1.

(a)

Recommends

that

All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions

of stability throughout

Korea;

(b) All constituent acts be tal^en, including the holding of
elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the

establishment of a imified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea;
(c) All sections arid representative bodies of the
population of Korea, South and North, be invited to co-operate
with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of
peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of a
unified government;
(d) United Nations forces should not remain in any part
of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the
objectives specified in subparagraphs
(e)

the

All necessary

economic rehabilitation

The General Assembly resolution

Commission for

of

(a)

and

measures be taken
of

October

(b)

to

above;

accomplish

Korea;

7 also set

up the United Nations

the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, to replace the

existing United Nations

Commission on Korea, and

to represent the United

Nations in connection with the unification of Korea and

its

economic rehabilitation.

Resolutions adopted by the General
Assembly during the period 19 Sept. to 15 Dec 1950, Supplement No. 20
(A/1775) pp. 9-10.
Official Records, 5th Sess.

,

144
It

in 1947,

may be

noted that previous resolutions of the

UN

General Assembly

1948 and 1949 did not use the words "the establishment of a unified,

independent and democratic Government of Korea. " The new resolution
inter-

preted their "essential objective" to be so.

The key provision

to justify entering

North Korea was the recommendation, "All appropriate steps be taken
conditions of stability throughout Korea.

On October

9,

to

"

MacArthur broadcast a second surrender demand.

note of the action of the

UN

General Assembly on October

the surrender terms of October

1

ensure

7,

Taldng

MacArthur repeated

and added:

And I call upon all North Koreans to cooperate fully with
the United Nations in establishing a unified independent democratic government of Korea assured that they will be treated
justly and that the United Nations will act to relieve and

rehabilitate all parts [sic,

of] to a unified Korea.
Unless immediate response is made by you in the name
of the North Korean Government I shall at once proceed to take
such military action as may be necessary to enforce the decrees
of the United Nations.

Here MacArthur was publicly linking the UN goal

of a unified, independent

and democratic government of Korea to what might be accomplished through
military action under his
original intention

was

to

command, whereas
use the

UN

the United States Government's

resolution to justify military operations in

North Korea without explicitly linking the two.

Hearings, Pt.

5,

3483; also 3426.

:
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General Walker

of the Eighth

Headquarters on October

7 to start the attack

Korea when ready. Walker ordered

On October
directive to

Army had been

9, too, the Joint

his

men

authorized by MacArthur's

across the 38th parallel into North

to initiate action on October 9.

Chiefs with the approval of Truman, sent a

Mac Arthur:
In light of the possible intervention of Chinese Communist
forces in North Korea the following amplification of our directive
is forwarded for your guidance
"Hereafter in the event of the open or covert

employment aii5rwhere in Korea of major Chinese
Communist units, without prior annoimcement, you
should continue the action as long as, in your judgment,
action by forces now under your control offers a

reasonable chance of success. In any case you will
obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking
any military action against objectives in Chinese
territory.

Evidently the success of Inchon and the adoption of the

UN

General Assembly

resolution of October 7 increased America's confidence regarding possible

Chinese intervention.

The Joint Chiefs

that the United States

was now prepared

anywhere

in

Korea as long

as, in

of Staff's directive on

to fight against

October 9 indicated

Chinese Communist forces

MacArthur's judgment, there was a reasonable

chance of success.

On

the other hand,

Communist China must have decided, by

Schnabel, p. 202; Collins, p. 165.

Truman,

II,

362; also Schnabel, p, 200.

this time, to
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intervene in Korea.

They would declare

that

America's crossing the 38th

parallel threatened China's security.

m Peking,

a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
statement was issued on October

10:

American forces are

attempting to cross
the .r.-^""^
thirty-eighth parallel on a large
scale, the Chinese peoole
cannot stand idly by with regard to
such a serious situation
created by the mvasion of Korea.
.
and to the dangerous trend
towards extending the war. The American
war of invasion in
Korea has been a serious menace to the
security of China from
.T.

.

its

very start.

Ascertaining C hinese Intentions and Capabilities
to Interve ne
and the Advance of the United Nations Forces
in North Korea
In a series of intelligence

the

summaries between October

Far East Command's G-2 reported

8

aad October 14,

that the U. S. S. R. "would find

it

both

convenient and economical to stay out of the conflict and let
the idle millions of

Communist China perform

the task as part of the

master plan

States resources into geographical rat holes of the Orient. "
told Washington officials

tJiat

to drain United

General Willoughby

a build-up of Chinese forces along the Korean-

Manchurian border had been reported by many

of his sources and that, "while

exaggerations and canards are always evident, the potential of massing

at the

Antung and other Manchurian crossings appears conclusive.

to his

"

According

computations, between nine and eighteen of the thirty-eight Chinese divisions

54

quoted in

Rr.dio Peking, Chinese International Ser\dce in English, Oct. 11, 1950;
115. See also Goodrich, p. 139.

VvOiiting, p.
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believed to be in Manchuria were massing
at the border crossings.
continuing reports of Chinese

Communist troops crossing

into

Yet,

Korea

in early

October were discounted by the Far East Command's
G-2 since "no conclusive
evidence" existed; and the recent Chinese threat
to enter North Korea

if

American

forces crossed the 38th parallel was characterized
as "probably in a category of
diplomatic blackmail. "^^

One

intelligence report reaching

Truman on October

12 stated that

Chinese military forces, while lacking the necessary air
and naval support,
could intervene effectively but "not necessarily decisively. "
Further, in spite
of

Chou En-lai's statements and troop movements

to

Manchuria, there were no

convincing indications of Chinese Communist intentions to resort to
full-scale
intervention in Korea.

were not expected

The general conclusion

to enter

the Chinese

was

that the Chinese

North Korea to oppose the United Nations Command,

at least not in the foreseeable future.
clusion:

of the report

Several reasons were given for this con-

Communists undoubtedly feared

the consequences of v/ar

with the United States; anti-Communist forces would be encouraged and the

regime's very existence would be endangered; the Chinese Communists also

would hesitate

to

endanger their chances for a seat in the United Nations.

More-

over, in the unlikely event that the Chinese entered the war without the benefit
of Soviet naval and air support, they

55

were bound

Schnabcl, p. 200; Collins, p. 174.

to suffer costly losses.

On

the

148

other hand, acceptance of Soviet aid,

if

forthcoming, would make China more

dependent on Russia and would increase Russian control

in

Manchuria.

This

report agreed with many others that, from a military standpoint, the most
favorable time for intervention had passed.

For

all of

intelligence officials concluded that while full-scale
in

Korea had

these reasons, U.

Communist

S.

intervention

regarded as a continuing possibility, such action, barring a

to be

Soviet decision for global war,

was not probable

in 1950.

During this period,

intervention probably would be confined to continued covert assistance to the

North Koreans.

On October

15,

Truman met MacArthur

and Marshall did not attend this conference.
tallied privately.

at

Wake

Island, but

Acheson

Truman and MacArthur

Then a general conference was held.

Among

first

the topics

discussed were Korea, Japan and the Far East, especially rehabilitation for

Korea and a Japanese peace

treatj''.

At one point, Truman asked MacArthur:

'What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference?" According

to the

notes kept by the conferees from Washington and compiled by General Bradley

and later released by the Senate

Armed

Services and Foreign Relations

Committees, MacArthur replied:

Very

^%jt

Had they interfered

in the first or

second

would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful
their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand. The

months
of

little.

in CofS,

also Collins, p. 175.

it

DA

file

323-3, 12 Oct 50, see Schnabel, pp. 201-02;
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Chinese have 300, 000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably
not more than 100,000 to 125,000 are distributed along the
Yalu River. Only 50, 000 to 60,000 could be gotten across the
Yalu River. They have no Air Force. Now that we have bases
for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down
to Pyong^^ang there would be the greatest slaughter.
With the Russians it is a little different. They have an
air force in Siberia and a fairly good one with excellent pilots
equipped with some jets and B-25 and B-29 planes. They can
put 1, 000 planes in the air with some 200 to 300 more from the
Fifth and Seventh Soviet Fleets. They are probably no match
for our Air Force. The Russians have no ground troops available for North Korea. They would have difficulty in putting
troops into the field. It would take 6 weeks to get a division
across and 6 weeks brings the winter. The only other combination would be Russian air support of Chinese ground troops.
Russian air is deployed in a semicircle through Mul<;den and
Harbin, but the coordination between Russian air and the
Chinese ground v/ould be so flimsy that I believe Russian air
v/ould bomb the Chinese as often as they would bomb us.
Groimd support is a very difficult thing to do. Our marines
do it perfectly. They have been trained for it. Our own Air
and Ground Forces are not as good as the marines but they
are effective. Between untrained air and ground forces an
air umbrella is impossible without a lot of joint training.
I believe it just wouldn't work with Chinese Communist ground
,

and Russian air.

According

to

We

are

tlie

best. ^'

General MacArthur, his reply

of China's intervention

was,

to the question of the

chance

in part:

My own

military estimate

was

that with oin- largely

unopposed air forces, with their potential capable of destroying,
at will, bases of attack and lines of supply north as well as
south of the Yalu, no Chinese military commander would
hazard the commitment of large forces upon the devastated

Substance of State ents made ai: Wake Island Conference on October
5.
15, 1950 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p.

m
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Korean peninsula.

The risk

of their utter destruction through

lack of supply would be too great.

On Oetober

19, the State

Department intelligcnee also came

to the

conclusion that Chinese intervention was unlikely, but that Chinese threats
could not be dismissed as

mere

bluff.

The basis

of this intelligence

conclusion cannot be known from the available record.

On October

Truman

20, the Central Intelligence

Agency delivered a memoran-

had reports

the Chinese would

move

dum

to

into

North Korea far enough as to be able to safeguard the Suiho electric

v/hich said that they

tliat

plant and other insttdlations along the Yalu River which provided

them with

power.
that
Consequently, the State Department suggested to the Joint Chiefs

Mac Arthur be

such
instructed to disavow publicly any intention of destroying

hydroelectric power facilities along the Manchurian border.

by MacArthur would have the dual purpose

An announcement

of allaying Chinese fears of tres-

passing into Manchuria by the United Nations

Command

and of showing the

North Korea was not primarily
re)st of the world that his expedition into

58

MacArthur,

p. 362.

^^Acheson's testimony, Hearings,

^^Truman,

II,

372.

Pt. 3, 1833.
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destructive in purpose.

The Joint Chiefs

felt that

such an announcement

would be militarily undesirable, but they were directed by Triunan
the suggestion to MacArthur.

The Chiefs also

issue the text of the announcement

MacArthur did not

if

told

he wished.

feel that the time

MacArthur

that he could

fii

was propitious

for such an

announcement, especially since the Suiho Hydroelectric Power Plant
Sinuiju

made
was

was not under United Nations

at long

going.

send

to

at

control and no determination could be

range of how much power was being turned out or where

it

MacArthur explained:
however, this power

being utilized in
furtherance of potentially hostile military purposes
through the manufacture of munitions of war or there
is a diversion of it from the minimum peaceful
requirements of the Korean people, most serious
If,

is

doubts would at once arise as to our justification for
maintaining status quo.

Thus, MacArthur did not wish his hands tied

in

such a manner.

Joint Chiefs did not press the matter and the announcement

The

was never

made. ^2

A few
Among

days earlier, on October 17, Truman spoke in San Francisco.

in Korea:
other things, he emphasized America's peaceful intentions

Scbnabel, p. 231.
^^Rad, JCS 94799, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Oct 50, see
MacArthur if he bad any
According to Truman, the JCS was directed to ask
Truman, n, 372.
objection to the issuing of such a statement.

^^Rad, C67154,

CINCFE

to

JCS, 22 Oct 50,

in

Schnabcl, pp. 231-32.

152

Our sole purpose in Korea is to establish peace
and independence. Our troops will stay there only so long
as they are needed by the United Nations for that purpose.
We seek no territory or special privilege. Let this be

—

crystal clear to

all
we have no aggressive designs in
Korea or in any other place in the Far East or elsewhere.
No country in the world which really wants peace has

any reason to fear the United States.

While Truman was speaking, the Eighth
the North

and the

X

Korean

capital of Pyongyang, which

Corps was being waterlifted

of North Korea.

Army

v/as advancing

was taken on October

to land at

Wonsan on

19;

the east coast

^'^

MacArthur also issued U.N. Operations Order No.
17,

toward

4,

on October

which assigned a new objective for the United Nations Forces,

to

capture territory up to a line running from Sonchon on the west coast to

Pyongwon, northwest
to Songjin

of the Changjin Reservoir,

on the Sea of Japan,

the Manchurian border

most

65

and thence via Pungsan

This line was about 40 miles south of

of the

Russian frontier on the east coast.

way but almost 100 miles from

the

Operations Order No. 4 removed the

restrictions on the use of non-Korean, troops north of the Chongju-Kunuri-

Hearings, Ft.

5,

3487; also Dept. of State Bulletin (Oct. 30,

1950), p. 684^

64
65

Schnabel, pp. 216-18.

detailed line would be Sonchon- Chongsanj anggol-Koindong-Pyongwon-Toksil-li-P'-ingsan-Songjin. See Schnabel, p. 216.

A more
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Yongwon-Hamhimg

line, restrictions that

directive of September 27.
to

press forward

only

ROK

to the

All units, v/ithout regard to their composition,

assigned objective line.

troops would operate.

w^as not far in advance of the

coast

was from 50

it

to 100

JCS

North of this new

Although the western end

line,

were

however,
Sonchon

of this line at

limiting line, in its center and on the east

miles ahead of the JCS line.

General Collins later

"This was the first, but not the last, stretching of MacArthur's orders

wrote:

beyond JCS instructions.
that

had been stipulated by the Joint Chiefs

we

did

in

the Chiefs noted

this— and

I

have no recollection

—we offered no objection. "^^

Thus
forward

If

in

mid-October, 1950, the Joint Chiefs allowed MacArthur

North Korea.

to

press

This move had the potential risk of inducing Chinese

intervention, especially in view of Chou En-lai's warning of October 3; Peldng's

public statement that America's crossing the 38th parallel
security; and Chinese

Communist troop movement

build-up along the Korean-Manchurian border.

to

was

a

menace

Manchuria and

But the U.

its

to China's

military

S. intelligence

estimate

continued to be that Chiaese intervention was not a probability, though a possibility.

An even more important

factor in policy considerations was General MacArthur's

strong conviction, apparently shared by the Joint Chiefs and other policy-makers
in

Washington, as indicated by the directive

of

October

Collins, pp. 175-77; Schnabcl, p. 216.

9, that the

United States
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was no longer

fearful of Chinese intervention.

ward should not be stopped.
in the

Thus MacArthur's advance north-

He even got away with

area farther north than the Joint Chiefs had

directive of September 27.

The original purpose

border region of North Korea had been

the use of

non-Korean troops

initially intended in their

such restrictions in the

of

to reduce the

chances

of

Chinese or

Soviet entry.

Nevertheless, to avoid Chinese entry was

still

desirable

if it

could be

done other than halting MacArthur's drive.- (Soviet iatervention was treated as
less a problem by now.

Thus

)

the

announcement was made by Truman that the

United States had no aggressive designs in Korea or in any other place in the

Far East or elsewhere.
out, to

And

the attempt

disavow publicly any intention

was

also made, though not carried

of destroying hydroelectric

power

facilities

along the Manchurian border.

On October

18

American reconnaissance planes

flying close to the

Yalu

found almost 100 Russian-built fighters lined up on An-tung airfield across the
river in Manchuria.

minimized

tills

that the planes

MacArthur's air commander, General Stratemeyer,

ominous discovery by

telling General

were probably there purposely

menacing statements and threats

of Chinese

felt that this display of strength involved

to avoid

border incidents.

Chinese meant

to

"

Vandenberg

to lend "color

in

Washington

and credence

to

Communist leaders, who probably

no risk

in

view of our apparent desire

Stratemeyer certainly did not believe that the

use these fighters to attack his planes since they had

not
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done so when the observation aircraft, an easy target, had come close.
believe

it

especially significant, " he told Vanderberg, "that,

possible action in Korea were under way,

it

what

were

it

in

later, in

Tokyo, the

termed a "reliable report"

GHQ

any such crossings,

the

Daily

UN Command

to

67
of the border. "

Intelligence

Summary carried

Communist soldiers

that 400,000 Chinese

border -crossing areas, alerted

deployment for

would be highly unlikely that aircraft

would have been positioned to attract attention from south

Ten days

if

"I

cross into North Korea.

To

detect

ordered daily air reconnaissance

flights

no

over the border area.

On October

24, 1950,

commanders

his field

employment

that he

of United Nations

had established a restraining

MacArthur, without consulting his superiors,

was

lifting the restrictions with

forces in North Korea.

respect to the

He said

that initially he

line for United Nations ground forces

other than

Republic of Korea, in viev/ of the possibility of the enemy's capitulation.

now authorized

his field

commanders

commands, as necessary,

in

to

use any and

order to capture

all of

all

ground forces

North Korea.

^however, that United Nations ground forces, other than those
of

told

of the

He

at their

He cautioned,
Republic

by Republic
Korea, should be withdrawn as soon as feasible and be replaced

^"^Rad, A25438, INT-IE,
Sclinabel, pp. 230-31.

^^Schnabel, p. 22, fn 24.

CG, FEAF

to

CS USAF, 20 Oct

50, in

"
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of

Korea

with

all

units.

MacArthur ordered

speed and with

On
to his field

the

same

all

commanders under him

to drive

forward

full utilization of all of their forces.

day, the Joint Chiefs advised MacArthur that his instructions

commanders were

not in consonance with their directive of September

27 which stated that as a matter of policy no non-Korean ground forces would
be used in the area along the Manchurian border or in the northeast province

bordering the Soviet Union.

"While the Joint Chiefs of Staff realize," they told

him, "that you undoubtedly had sound reasons for issuing these instructions
they would like to be informed of them, as your action is a matter of some

concern here.

70

On October

25,

MacArthur replied

reported in his message regarding the

employment
necessity.

of United Nations

He pointed out

sufficient strength and

situation.

regard

saw no

were not

conflict

to the

forces in North Korea were a matter of military

that the Republic of

directive dated September 27.
to

lifting of restrictions with

Korea forces were not

of

sufficiently well led to be able to handle the

More seasoned commanders were necessary. MacArthur

stated that he

—sent

to the Joint Chiefs that the instructions

between the removal

further

of these restrictions

and the

This directive indicated that the instructions

MacArthur could not be considered

final since they

^^Collins' testimony, Hearings, Pt.

2,

1240.

"^^Hearings, Pt. 2, 1240 and Sclmabel, p. 218,

might require

157

modifications in accordance with developments.

MacArthur

felt that

he had

the necessary latitude for modifications in a message from the Secretary of

Defense on September 30 which stated: 'We

waat you to feel unhampered

tactically and strategically to proceed north of the parallel. "

MacArthur also

assured the Joint Chiefs:
I

am

fully cognizant of the basic purjDOse and intent of

your directive, and every possible precaution is being taken
in the premises. The very reverse, however, would be
fostered and tactical hazards might even result from other
action than that which I have directed. This entire subject
was covered in my conference at Wake Island.

The Joint Chiefs

of Staff "at least tacitly accepted

order and made no move to coiuitermand

MacArthur 's reference

Wake

to

Island

it,

was

"

success

at Inchon.

Perhaps

it

in

prove precisely.

72

There

MacArthur's strategy and judgment

Both MacArthur and the Truman admini-

stration looked forward to a quick end to the

North Korean forces.

of his

wrote General Collins later.

difficult to

was, of course, enthusiastic confidence then
in the wal^e of his

MacArthur 's defense

war through

did not occur to

them

the destruction of the

at Wal^e Island that the

exclusive use of South Korean troops in the border region of North Korea might

not be sufficient to achieve the objective.
further by their

'^^

common

Hearings, Pt.

The problem was reduced even

belief that a Chinese intervention

2,

"^^Collins, p. 180.

1240-41; Truman,

II,

was

unlikely.

372; Schnabel, p. 218.

Now,

158
ten days later,

Mac Arthur

found that there was a conflict between the goal of

the destruction of the North Korean troops and the policy of using only Korean

soldiers in the border area to avoid Chinese entry.
tliat

since Chinese entry

was

improbable,

still

precedence over the latter policy.

The Purpose

of

And

He apparently reasoned

former goal should

tlie

talce

the Joint Chiefs accepted his explanation.

Crossing the 38th Parallel:

An Assessment

Why

did the United States decide to cross the 38th parallel?

for the purpose of achieving Korean unification?

between the crossing and the

1950?

Why was

UN

What was

Was

this

the relationship

General Assembly resolution of October

7,

the crossing not stopped by the threat of Chinese intervention?

Wliat role did the success of Inchon play in the decision to cross the parallel?

What was MacArthur's
It is in

influence in the decision?

the historical perspective that the critical significance of

America's decision

to

cross the 38th parallel can be clearly seen, since this

decision utlimately induced Chinese intervention, which then became the
decisive element in the subsequent developments of the Korean War.

One explanation for

the decision has

Inchon landing on September 15.
indication

was

was

much

to do with the

success of the

Immediately after the Inchon operation, the

that the collapse of the North

Korean Army was

at hand.

There

crossing would
a pressing need to exploit the military situation and the

promise a quick and

total victory

over the remjiants

of the retreating

North

"
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Korean troops.
Another explanation

is that the

General Assembly resolution

of

crossing was

October

7,

UN

response to the

in

for the achievement of "the

establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea.

The reasoning here

is that

peace and stability

of the barrier of the 38th parallel.

Communists behind

the crossing and going north.

Eighth

to drive the

The

political goal of

the

removal

North Korean

them free

to rebuild

Korean unification

and

justified

74

true that in terms of the time sequence the main body of the U.

Army

and other non-Korean

parallel after the General

America's policy decision
September

Korea required

the parallel would only leave

re-equip for renewed attack.

It is

Simply

in

UN

forces actually crossed the 38th

Assembly adopted
to

S.

the resolution of October 7,

But

cross the parallel had already been made on

11, with a fev/ qualifications, i.e.

Soviet or Chinese intervention.

And

if

there was no indication of

the authorization to cross the parallel

given General MacArthur on September 27.

crossing had nothing to do with the

,

UN

Moreover, MacArthur's delay

resolution.

It

was his problem

was
in

of

logistical supplies.

73

See Rees, p. 100 and Lichterman in Stein, p. 596.

Also Ambassador Austin's speech of September
30, 1950 at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly.
'^'^See

Millis, p. 276.
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The date

of

September 11

of

America's decision

of

September

to

15; thus the

is significant to

cross the parallel.

outcome

of Inchon

It

understand the

initial

motive

preceded the Inchon landing

was

still

unlmown and uncertain,

especially in view of the daring and gambling character of the landing.

It

cannot be said, then, that as a result of the success of Inchon, America decided
to cross the parallel to exploit the situation.

implementation stage

Inchon had much to do with the

of the policy decision to

cross the parallel, especially

with regard to the qualifying condition of no Chinese intervention.
far as the policy-making process

was concerned,

the

outcome

But, as

of Inchon could

not be a major factor.

On September
and

UN

11 and throughout late August and early September, U.S.

forces in Korea were surrounded by North Korean troops in the tiny

southern

tip of the

peninsula.

vention might just push U.
of Chinese entry

S.

Any limited scale
and

UN

must loom large,

if

of Chinese military inter-

forces out of Korea.

Thus the danger

not larger, than Soviet intervention, in

America's policy-making considerations. When the spectacle happened

at

Inchon, the United States regained the confidence not only to defeat the North

Korean forces

but also to deal with possible Chinese intervention.

atmosphere, Chinese

official threat of military intervention in late

and early October was not taken seriously.

October

In

9 to deal differently with

And Mac Arthur was

tliis

September

instructed on

Chinese entry from Soviet entry.
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The purpose

of crossing the 38th parallel

directive of September 27

from

the Joint Chiefs to

on the policy statement of September 11.

Truman.

The directive

to

was clearly

stated in the

Mac Arthur, which was based

Both documents had the approval of

MacArthur instructed:

Your military

objective is the destruction of the North
In attaining this objective you are

Korean Armed Forces.

authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious
and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38th
Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation
there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or
Chinese Communist Forces, no announcement of intended
entry, nor a threat to counter our opetations militarily in

North Korea.

'^^

The crossing was thus essentially
of "the destruction of the

North Korean

a

move

Armed

to achieve the military objective

Forces.

"

America's military

leaders had been more insistent and consistent about this view than civilian

policy-makers.

One view, similar

Within the State Department, there were two conflicting views.
to the military's, to

which Acheson

finally agreed,

had been

opposed by a second view that under no circumstances should MacArthur 's forces
cross the 38th parallel.

The

staff of the National Security Council

favored, in their study of September

1,

had also

the stabilization of the military situation

along the 38th parallel.

The military leaders had no such disagreement about
the parallel, at least

from

Schnabel, p. 182.

the available record.

the need to cross

General MacArthur had voiced
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such a view as early as mid-July
when he told visiting members of the
Joint
Chiefs in Tokyo, Collins and Vandenberg,
that he intended to destroy

all the

North Korean forces and not merely drive
them back across the 38th parallel.

The planners

in the

Pentagon also made proposals on July

31 that

MacArthur

should be directed to cross the parallel,
defeat the enemy's forces and occpy
the country.

'^^

When

Collins and

the Inchon planning, they

Sherman

visited Tolcyo, August 21-23, 1950, to
discuss

agreed with MacArthur that he should be authorized

to

continue the attack, following a successful landing
at Inchon, across the 38th
parallel to destroy the North Korean troops, which
otherwise would be a

recurrent threat to the independence of South Korea.

'^'^

It

may be

MacArthur had impressed his view favorably upon members
who,

in

said that

of the Joint Chiefs

reviewing the National Security Council study of September

on September 7 that they agreed with MacArthur that the
obtained was the destruction of North Korean forces.

1,

stated

initial objective to

In order to

be

accomplish

this mission,

no prior restrictions should be placed on MacArthur 's crossing

the parallel.

In this instance, the

in the policy

view of the Joint Chiefs was

statement of September 11.

'^^Acheson, p. 451.
'^'^Collins, p.

144.

But

it

finally adopted

would be incorrect

to say that
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the
to

making

And

it.

tion

of this policy

it

was through

was made

to

had been dominated by the military.

the National Security Council
that the final

Truman, who approved

The question

still

Acheson agreed

remains:

recommenda-

'^^
it.

my was there

such a strong desire, on

Sfjptember 11, to pursue and destroy the North
Korean Army, thus requiring
the crossing of the 38th parallel?

At this point the United States had not

contemplated to seek any new

UN

the passion of war,

fruitful to

to

war.

In

it

may be

resolution.

For a better understanding

examine America's traditional

American thought, war could only be

justified

crusade, as a means of punishing the enemy who dared

By

its

nature,

war was thought

by crushing the enemy

to disturb the

peace.

won only

During war the determining objective was

typically to obtain a clear-cut, definitive victory in the

quickly as possible.

approach

when fought as a

to be an all-out struggle that could be

totally. §0

of

most

effective

manner as

Thus foreign policy was largely suspended, and immediate

military considerations were dominant.

Up

to the

Second World War, the United States had fought

the above-mentioned maimer.

The

tradition had been deeply rooted.

of Korea, although a limited objective
of the fear of Soviet or

78

79

all its

was formulated

in the

wars

in

In the case

beginning because

Chinese intervention, soon the view of crossing the 38th

See also Lichterman in Stein, p. 595.
See Rees,

xi;

Osgood (1957),

80

p. 30.

Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York;
Council on Foreign Relations, 1957), p. 44.
^^Osgood

(1957), p. 29.
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parallel to crush the North Korean

discussions.

In

enemy

totally

mid -September, with no clear

began

to

appear

in the policy

indication of Soviet or Chinese

intention to intervene, and with the prospect of rapid military build-up in

America

for strengthening world-wide defense against

Commimist

threats, the

tradition would prevail that a total victory over the North Korean forces could

and should be achieved.

This meant that before the enemy troops

willing to surrender, they had to be pursued and destroyed.

accomplished south
necessity.

of the 38th parallel, then the

its

Korea were

this could not be

crossing became a military

That was why the military were more insistent and consistent about

America's tradition also tended

this step than the civilian policy- makers.

pursue

If

in

wars

in a political

vacuum,

political policy during the war.

82
It

i.e.

,

may be

to dissociate military policy

to

from

said that the initial decision to

cross the 38th parallel was not necessarily nor directly related

to the political

goal of Korean unification.

But why did the United States also press for the adoption

General Assembly resolution of October

7,

of the

UN

1950, which re-stated the political

objective of the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic govern-

ment

of

Korea? Obviously

until after the

the attempt at a

new UN resolution was not made

success of the Inchon landing had become apparent and

See Osgood (1957), pp. 23-32.

the
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policy decision of crossing the 38th parallel
was about to be carried out.

Acheson

later wrote, the

new UN

As

resolution represented a view that "was
given

a strong push by the success at Inchon. "^^

MacArthur was given the authoriza-

tion to cross the parallel on

Three days later

was introduced

UN

to the

September

27.

General Assembly.

Clearly there was an urgent need

for the United States to obtain authorization and support
to conduct military operations in

about to take place, even
stand better.
clear

Truman

if

it,

it

and

the United Nations

only for the peoples of the world to see

jind

under-

later wrote that the resolution, "if adopted, would be a

84
Korea. "°^
The Joint Chiefs of

had voted for

from

North Korea now that the actual crossing was

authorization for the United Nations

MacArthur on October

the draft resolution

6,

commander

Staff sent a draft

after the First

just before the

UN

to operate in

copy of the

Committee

of the

UN

North

resolution to

General Assembly

General Assembly formally adopted

and told him that the United States Government considered

it

as supporting

operations north of the 38th parallel.

To regard

it

as authorization and support was one thing.

a war aim was another.

83

Acheson,

^"^Truman,
85

The

p. 454.

II,

362.

Schnabel, p. 194.

To make

latter case would be equivalent to trying to

it
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achieve Korean unification by force.

That was why the

UN

General Assembly

resolution of October 7 had to be stated "in ambivalent language" to avoid

charge of attempting political unification by military force while
time

it

at the

tlie

same

could provide authorization and support to MacArthur's military

operations across the parallel in North Korea.

Acheson would never admit

was a war aim.

He would contend

86

that the objective in the

that unification

thing the United Nations would fight for.

new UN

resolution

had never been made some-

However,

if,

in the

process

of

destroying Communist resistance unification could also be achieved, that

would be

fine.

87

During the MacArthur hearings, Acheson explained that

if

the Chinese had not entered the war, "force would have been used to round

up those people who were putting on the aggression.
a result of the request of the Koreans, and
that sort of thing.

it

We

were unifying

it

as

would be through elections, and

"^^

This vagueness on the relationship between the military operations

North Korea and the

UN recommendation

of unification represented the

opportunistic aspect of America's policy on Korea.

86
cf.

87

Rees, pp. 101-02.

See Lichterman in Stein, p. 594.

^^Hearings, Pt.

3, 2258.

in

The United States Govern-
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ment did not want
fighting for, yet

to say explicitly that the goal of

Korean unification was worth

America would welcome and desire

through use of force.

Thus, when General MacArthur, who

and less hesitant, clearly declared
forces on October

the results of vinification

9, that

felt less

constrained

surrender demand to North Korean

in his

unless the North Koreans immediately surrendered and

cooperated "fully with the United Nations in establishing a unified independent

democratic government of Korea" he would "at once proceed to take such military
action as

Truman
tion.

89
'

may be necessary

to enforce the

decrees of the United Nations,

" the

administration did not repudiate him and the world believed his assump-

At this point MacArthur's troops crossed the 38th parallel

to

do

just

what he said he would do.

The

initial

decision to cross the parallel was primarily a military move,

dictated by America's traditional approach to war, to crush the North Korean

enemy

totally,

The success

if

there

of Inchon

was no

removed

to

the fear of Chinese intervention and enabled the

Soon after the authorization was given MacArthur

decision to be implemented.
to

indication of Soviet or Chinese intention to enter.

cross the parallel, a new resolution was introduced

to the

UN

justify the crossing and military operations in North Korea.

General Assembly

The adopted

resolution of October 7, 1950 re-stated the political objective of Korean unification

without explicitly maiding

^^cf.

Lichterman

it

a

war aim.

The United States Government was

in Stein, p. 594.
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opportunistic enough to want to see unification as a result of the use of force,
but only

MacArthur unequivocally announced

parallel

was

government

to achieve the

of Korea.

UN

that his military action across the

goal of a unified, independent and democratic

CHAPTER
U.

S.

V

POLICY ON CHBNIESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION
Contacts with the Chinese Comm unist
Forces in North Korea and the Bombing of
the Yalu Bridges

Initial

Following the success of the Inchon landing, the United
States was no
longer fearful of possible Chinese intervention and Chou En-lai's
warning of

October

3

was not taken seriously, as mentioned

earlier.

In addition, both

General MacArthur and the United States Government believed that Chmese
entry was unlikely.

Not only had he crossed the 38th parallel, but MacArthur

pushed forward to the north.
the border region of North

measure was accepted by

As
late

The restrictions on using only Korean troops

Korea were also removed by MacArthur and

the Joint Chiefs of Staff after

in

the

MacArthur explained

it.

the United Nations Forces advanced northward toward the Yalu in

October 1950, they suddenly came into contact with strong enemy resistance

which turned out

to be

Chinese Communist forces.

On October

25, almost

simultaneously in both western and eastern Korea, Chinese prisoners were taken.

General Willougliby reported this fact

to

that he believed organized Chinese units

significance by saying:

Washington on October 28 and said

were

in

Korea.

But he discounted their

170

From a tactical standpoint, with victorious United States
divisions in full deployment, it would appear that the auspicious
time for intervention has long since passed; it is difficult to
believe that such a move, if planned, would have been postponed
to a time when remnant North Korean forces have been reduced
to a low point of effectiveness.

By October

31, General Bradley

that elements of five Chinese

the

Army

had received information which showed

Communist

the Yalu, the largest being a regiment.

^

divisions had been identified south of

On

the

same

day. General Collins told

Policy Coimcil that the reported crossings of the Yalu River might

reflect a face-saving effort since

would not stand

idly

Chou En-lai had declared

that his

by and watch the North Koreans go down

in defeat.

did not think that the Chinese would cross the river in sufficient

a serious beating by MacArthur 's forces.

Command,

Collins

numbers

However, when asked

could become a real threat to the United Nations

government

if

to risk

the Chinese

Collins replied that

they definitely could in spite of their lack of airpower and their weakness in
artillery.

On

the battlefront, the United Nations forces actually suffered serious

setbacks due

to

Chinese attacks.

advance of the Eighth

Army

By October

31,

General Walker ordered the

halted and drew his main forces back across the

Chongchon, holding only a shallow bridgehead above the river.

^DIS,

GHQ, UNC,

^

2971, 28 Oct 50, in Schnabel, pp. 233-34.

in a letter to
^Schnabel, pp. 234-35. For Walker's detailed explanation
General MacArthur, see Schnabel, pp. 235-36.
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On November

2,

General Willoughby reported to Washington that

Chinese Communist soldiers had entered North Korea.

16, 500

The Chinese Communist

government reputedly was labeling these troops "volunteers.
puzzled by the Chinese device of com.mitting "volunteers"

"

Willoughby was

in "special units,"

such as "Volimteer Corps for the Protection of the Hydroelectric Zone," tastead
of in regular organized

regiments of the Chinese Communist Army.

He concluded

by warning:
Although indications so far point to piecemeal commitment for ostensible limited purposes only, it is important not
to lose sight of the maximum potential that is immediately
available to the Chinese Communists. Should the high level
decision for full intervention be made by the Chinese Communists,
they could promptly commit 29 of their 44 divisions presently
deployed along the Yalu and support a major attack with up to
150 aircraft. 2

On

that

same

day,

November

Kong sent Washington a report

that

2, the

American Consul General

Communist China had formally made

decision on October 24 to enter the Korean War.

Communist armies had been

in

Hong
the

An estimated twenty Chinese

sent to Manchuria.^

^Telecon, TT 3968, G-2
Sclmabel,
50; in
pp. 239-40.

DA

(Boiling) with

G-2 FEC (Willoughby),

2

Nov

see Sclmabel, p. 240. Usually
751
there were three or four divisions in a Chinese army. See Appleman, p.
^Intell Rpt, 2

and Schnabel,

p.

179.

Nov

50, in G-2,

DA

files,
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On November

Willoughby reported 316,000 regular Chinese ground

3,

forces and 274,000 Chinese irregulars, or security forces,
in Manchuria.
of the

regulars were believed to be along the Yalu at numerous crossing
sites.

These disclosures had an extremely ominous ring and, together with

news

Most

of the withdrawal of the Eighth

Korea, caused the Joint Chiefs
evaluation.

Korea and

Army

the

before Chinese forces already in

of Staff to call on

General MacArthur for an

They requested his earliest "interim appreciation
its

^

of the situation in

implications in light of what appears to be overt intervention by

Chinese Commimist units.

MacArthur replied on November

"

It is

impossible

at this

the actualities of Chinese

Korea.

time

4,

1950:

to authoritatively appraise

Communist

intervention in North

Various possibilities exist based upon the battle

intelligence

coming

in

from the

First, that the Chinese

front.

Communist Government proposes

to intervene with its full potential military forces, openly pro-

claiming such course at what it might determine as an appropriate
time; second, that it will covertly render military assistance, but
will, so far as possible, conceal the fact for diplomatic reasons;
third, that it is permitting and abetting a flow of m.ore or less
voluntary personnel across the border to strengthen and assist
the North Korean remnants in their struggle to retain a nominal
foothold in Korea; fourth, that such intervention, as exists, has

been in the belief that no UN forces would be committed in the
extreme northern reaches of Korea except those of South Korea.
A realization that such forces were insufficient for the purpose

_

^Telecon,

^Rad,

TT

WAR

3971,

95790,

DA

and GHQ, UNC,

CSUSA

to

CINCFE,

3

3

Nov

Nov

50; see Schnabel, p. 240.

50; in Schnabel, p. 240.

asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to obtain an up-to-date
estimate of the situation from General MacArthur," as this time. See Truman,
n, 373.

Truman

later wrote:

"I
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may

well have furnished the concept of salvaging
something from

the wreckage.

The

first contingency

would represent a momentous
decision of the gravest international importance.
While it is
a distinct possibility, and many foreign experts predict
such
action, there are many fundamental logical reasons
against it
and sufficient evidence has not yet come to hand to warrant
its
immediate acceptance.
The last three contingencies, or a combination thereof,
seem to be most likely conditions at the present moment.
I

recommend

against hasty conclusions which might be

premature and believe that a final appraisement should await
a more complete accumulation of military facts.
Within MacArtliur's Headquarters, the estimate
in

North Korea was raised from

16, 500

on November 2

of

to 34, 000 on

Chinese troops had crossed and were continuing to cross

Manchuria over a number
in

Manchuria, ready

to

of international bridges.

cross into North Korea

if

Chinese forces already

into

November

3.

North Korea from

The number

of

Chinese troops

ordered, was also raised from

316, 000, which Willoughby reported to V/ashington on

November

3, to 415,

000 on

o

the

same

day.

According to James F. Schnabel,

"the

appearance of Chinese military

formations in Korea and evidence that these forces were being augmented rapidly,

caused MacArthur

Truman,
'DIS

to call for an all-out air effort to

II,

smash them.

"

9

On November

373; see also Schnabel, pp. 240-41.

GHQ FEC UNC,

Sclmabel, p. 241.

No. 2977, 3 Nov 50; see Schnabel,

p.

241.
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5.

MacArthur ordered General Stratemeyer

East Air Forces into a two-week effort
allies out of the war.

"Combat crews are

MacArthur instructed Stratemeyer

Dam, and

throw the

From

full

power

to be flown to exliaustion

Korean ends

if

necessary.

"

of all international

the Yalu southward, excepting Rashin,

other hydroelectric plants, the Far East Air Forces were to

"destroy every means of communication and every installation, factory,
village. "

Far

of the

knock the North Koreans and their new

to destroy the

bridges on the Manchurian border.
the Suiho

to

to

MacArthur warned

that there

must be no border

city, aiid

violations and that all

targets close to or on the border must be attacked only under visual bombing
conditions.

Also on November

5,

MacArthur sent a special report

to the

UN

Security

Council, stating that the United Nations Forces "are presently in hostile contact

with Chinese Communist military units,

"

and providing confirmed intelligence

reports on Chinese prisoners of war taken in Korea

and the result of their

interrogation.

On

that

same

day,

MacArthur 's General Headquarters informed Washington

that an official statement of the Chinese

Communist Government on November

4

charged that the United States was bent on conquering not only Korea but also

•^^USAF Historical Study No. 72, United States Air Force Operations in
Air
the Korean Confl ict 1 November 1950 - 30 June 1953 (Washington, D. C.
241.
Sclmabel,
in
p.
Force Historictil Division, 1955 and 1956), p. 22; cited
:

,

^^Hearings, Pt.

5,

3492-93.
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China, as "the Japanese imperialists have done in
the past.
possibly

made

to

"

The statement,

prepare the Chinese people for further moves

that in order to protect China, Chinese military forces

in

Korea, claimed

must now assist North

Korea.

During a routine daily teleconference on November

Army

6,

Mac Arthur

notified

authorities that he intended to have his B-29's take out immediately the

international bridges across the Yalu between Sinuiju and Antrnig.

He hoped, by

destroying these bridges, to prevent or at least slow down the flow of Chinese
military strength into Korea.

Army

staff

Had

this

matter been handled routinely by the

and merely reported through channels, the mission might have been

well under way before the nation's leaders learned about MacArthur's intentions.

However, about three and one -half hours before his planes were due

to

take off, General Stratcmeyer radioed directly to Air Force Headquarters in

12

Telecon, TT 3975, DA and GHQ, UNC, 5 Nov 50; see Sclinabel, p. 241.
This was a joint declaration by all parties participating in the Peking regime. It
asserted that there were no limits to tlie aggressive ambitions of imperialists
and that, in launching the aggressive war against Korea, the Americtin imperialists
certainly did not confine their design to the destruction of the North Korean
government but also wanted to invade China, extend their rule over Asia, and
conquer the whole world. In the joint declaration the conclusion was drawn that
China's security was intimately related to the existence of the North I^Corean
regime, that to save one's neighbor was to save oneself, and that to defend the
fatherland required giving help to the people of Korea. See Tsou, pp. 576-77.
For the full text of the joint declaration, see a reprint in Hsin-hua yueh-pao,
ni. No.

1

13

(Nov 1950).

See also Applcman, p. 7G2.

Schnabel, pp. 241-42.
Ibid.

,

p.

242.

176

Washington the gist of his order from MacArthur.
passed

to

This information was promptly

Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett. ^5

WOiat happened next on

November

6

was

later described by Acheson in the

following way:
Shortly after ten o'clock that morning Robert
Lovett
brought the order to me in the State Department, saying
that
he doubted whether the bombing would importantly
interrupt
traffic across the river and that the danger of
bombing the

Manchurian city of Antung was great. Mr. Rusk, who was with
us, contributed that we were committed not to attack Manchurian
points without consultation .with the British and that their Cabinet

was meeting that morning to reconsider their attitude toward
Chinese Communist Government. We had also asked the UN

the

Security Council for an urgent meeting to consider General
MacArthur's report of Chinese intervention in Korea. Ill-

considered action at this mom.ent could be unfortimate. We agreed
and telephoned General Marshall, who thought that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff should be asked to postpone MacArthur's action until the
President's instructions could be obtained.

Acheson then telephoned Truman
that

MacArthur's reports as

in

Kansas City and explained

late as the day before

ments across the river but had spoken only

of

Truman

this

told

Acheson that he would approve

had contained no hint

bombing mission only

this action necessary.

17

^^Schnabel, pp. 242-43; Acheson, p. 463; Collins,
16

Acheson,

^"^Ibid.

,

p. 463.

pp. 463-64;

move-

Truman, H, 374-75.

p.

if

there was

Subject to this,

the importance of postponing the action until they

why MacArthur suddenly found

of

reserves on the Chinese side.

an immediate and serious threat to the security of the troops.

Truman agreed on

the situation, adding

199.

could find out
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Lovett then met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
who sent a message to

MacArthiir

in

accordance with the President's instructions.

out at 11:40 Washington time,

were scheduled

to call off until further

only an hour and twentj^ minutes before
the B-29's

from Japan.

to tal^e off

The message went

The Joint Chiefs directed MacArthur

orders any bombing of the international bridges.

"Consideration is being urgently given to the Korean situation
at the governmental
level, " they told him.

They also explained:

One factor is the present commitment not to take action
Manchuria without consulting the British. Until further
orders postpone all bombing of targets within five miles of the
Manchurian border. Urgently need your estimate of the situation
and the reason for ordering bombing of Yalu River bridges as
affecting

Indicated.

-^^

General MacArthur immediately replied:

Men and material

in large force

are pouring across all
bridges over the Yalu from Manchuria. This movement not only
jeopardizes but tlireatens the ultimate destruction of the forces
under my command. The actual movement across the river can
be accomplished under cover of darkness and the distance between
the river and our lines is so short that the forces can be deployed
against our troops without being seriously subjected to air
interdiction. The only way to stop this reinforcement of the enemy
is the destruction of these bridges and the subjection of all
in stall at' on s in the north area supporting the enemy advance to the
maximum of our air destruction. Every hour that this is postponed will be paid for dearly in American and other United Nations
blood. The main crossing at Sinuiju was to be hit within the next
few hours and the mission is actually being mounted. Under the
gravest protest that I can make, I am suspending this strike and

^^Truman,

^Rad, JCS
pp. 242-43.

II,

375.

95878,

JCS (Personal

for MacArthur), 6

Nov

50; in Schnabel,

178

carrying out your instructions.
within the scope of the rules of
directions which

I

What I had ordered is entirely
war and the resolutions and
have received from the United Nations and

constitutes no slightest act of belligerency against Chinese
territory, in spite of the outrageous international lawlessness

emanating therefrom.

I

cannot overemphasize the disastrous

effect, both physical and psychological, that will result

the restrictions which you are imposing.

from

trust that the matter
be immediately brought to the attention of the President as I
believe your instructions may well result in a calamiity of
I

major proportion for which I cannot accept the responsibility
without his personal and direct understanding of the situation.
Time is so essential that I request immediate reconsideration
of your decision pending which complete compliance will of
course be given to your order.

General Bradley read this message to President Truman over the telephone.

Even though the President was aware
attack, he thought that since

about

its

of the

dangers involved

Mac Arthur was on

in

such a bombing

the scene and felt so strongly

unusual urgency, the President told Bradley to give Mac Arthur the

"go-ahead.

November

"

Thus the Joint Chiefs sent MacArthur the following message on

6, 1950:

The

situation depicted in your

is considerably chaiiged

message

We

[of

November

from

4]

message

[of

November

6]

that reported in last sentence your

which was our last report from you.

agree that the destruction of the Yalu bridges would contribute

materially to the security of the forces under your command
unless this action resulted in increased Chinese Communist
effort and even Soviet contribution in response to what they might
well construe as an attack on Manchuria. Such a result would
not only endanger your forces but would enlarge the area of
conflict and U. S. involvement to a most dangerous degree.

Truman,

II,

375.
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However, in view of first sentence your
message [of
6] you are authorized to go ahead with
your planned
bombmg in Korea near the frontier including targets
at Sinuiju
and Korean end of Yalu bridges provided
that at time of receipt
of this message you still find such
action essential to safetj' of
your forces. The above does not authorize
the bombing of any
dams or power plants on the Yalu River.
Because of necessity for maintaining optimum

November

position

with United Nations policy and directives and
because

it is vital
in the national interests of the U. S. to
localize the fighting in
Korea it is important that extreme care be talcen to
avoid"

violation Manchurian territory and airspace
and
promptly hostile action from Manchuria.

to report

It is essential that we be kept informed
of important
changes in situation as they occur and that your estimate
as
requested in our [message of Nov. 6] be submitted as soon
as

possible.

The bombing

of the

Yalu bridges was caused by military urgency created

by the strong attacks by Chinese Communist forces upon MacArthur's troops
North Korea.
first

Apparently the Chinese attacks were powerful and harmful.

MacArthur did not report any alarming

want Washington

to

be so concerned that

to destroy the North

operations.

it

situation,

might change his mission

of

advancing

his conduct of

Thus Washington had not shared MacArthur's urgency when he
In addition, the United States

to consulting the British since the contemplated

on the Manchurian border, even though

21lbid.

,

376.

it

Government

bombing might

was not

felt

At

perhaps because he did not

Korean forces or impose new restrictions on

ordered the bombing.

in

felt

first

committed

affect the situation

necessary

to get the United

180

Nations involved.

Above

all.

Washington desired

by trying to avoid any violation

of

which might accidentally happen

MacArthur argued

that the

forces.

As

it

of

Manchurian territory especially from

in a

Korea

the air.

bombing mission near the border.

bombing was within the scope

resolutions and directions.

circumstance

to localize the fighting in

of the United Nations

Actually these resolutions had not provided for
the

Chinese Communist troops fighting in North Korea
against

UN

turned out. the battle urgency prevailed and the bombing
was

permitted without consulting the British.

By

that time,

American

intelligence agencies in Washington had prepared

an estimate of Chinese intentions based on the pooled information from

The estimate concluded

that

all

between 30. 000 and 40. 000 Chinese were now

sources.
in

North Korea and that as many as 700, 000 men, including 350, 000 ground troops,
could be sent into Korea to fight against the United Nations forces.

These Chinese

forces would be capable of halting the United Nations advance either by piecemeal

commitment or by
to

withdraw

a powerful all-out offensive, forcing the United Nations forces

to defensive positions farther south.

The

intelligence report concluded

with a warning:

A

likely and logical development of the present situation

opposing sides will build up their combat power in
successive increments to checkmate the other until forces of
major magnitude are involved. At any point the danger is
present that the situation may get out of control and lead to a
general war.
is that the
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This inteUigence estimate was furnished to

all

high-level planning and policy

groups, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
November
that he

was supplied with such an estimate

6.

22

Truman

at that time. 2^

In retrospect this intelligence estimate should
have received

attention and response, especially since
of the Chinese

it

was

Communists rather than merely trying

(November

attacks on the Eighth

6) in the

Army

Korean

guess their intentions.

to

of its warning.

battlefield, the Chinese

and withdrew mto the

broke

hills to the north in

This disengagement would have effects upon MacArthur's evaluation
intervention and his plans to cope with

MacArthur sent his estimate
the JCS, in tv/o

22

For

at

off their

Korea. 2^
of

Chinese

it.

of the situation, as

messages on November

concluded that he had been confirmed

more immediate

realistically based on the capabaities

But events would soon overtake and alter the perspective
this point

later wrote

had been requested by

In the first of these

7.

in his belief that this

was

messages, he
not a full-scale

Estimate, 6 Nov 50, sub: Chinese Communist Intervention in
Korea, in G-2, DA files; see Schnabel, p. 245.
23

Intell.

Truman,

11,

376-77.

Truman's statement

that:

"It

reported that there

might be as many as two hundred thousand Chinese Communist troops in
Manchuria" was probably incorrect. According to Matthew B. Ridg-vvay,
MacArthur's G-2 had estimated around this time that the Chinese could put
See Ridgway, The Korean War,
200, 000 troops across the Yalu per month
.

p.

60.

24

Collins, p. 189; Appleman, pp. 714-15.
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intervention by the Chinese Communitsts.
real and developing one.

However, the Chinese threat wa
v/as a

That Chinese forces were engaging
his forces wa
was

unquestionable, although their exact
strength was difficult for his
commanders
to

determine.

They were strong enough

Walker's forces
the east.

in the

have seized the

"The principle seems thoroughly established,

declaration of hostilities.

continued

it

initiative

from

west and to have materially slowed Almond's
advances
5S

such forces will be used and augmented
"

at will,

He emphasized

that

"

MacArthur

in

said, "that

probably without any formid
if

the Chinese augmentation

could reach "a point rendering our resumption of
advance impossible

and even forcing a movement

resume

to

retrograde.

in

"

But he affirmed his intentions to

his advance in the west, possibly within ten days, and
to try to seize the

initiative,

provided the enemy flow of reinforcements could be checked.

"Only

through such an offensive effort can any accurate measure be taken of enemy
strength. "

MacArthur went on
I

deem

to say:

it

"essential to execute the

under discussion as the only resource

bombing

left to

me

of the targets

to prevent a

enemy strength to a point threatening the
safety of the command. This interdiction of enemy lines of
advance within Korea is so plainly defensive that it is hard to

potential buildup of

conceive that it would cause an increase in the volume of local
intervention or, of itself, provoke a general war.

The inviolability of Manchuria and Siberia has been a
cardinal obligation of this headquarters from the beginning of
hostilities and all verified hostile action therefrom is promptly

reported.

The destruction

of

hydroelectric installation has never
will continue

been contemplated. Complete daily situation reports
to be furnished you as heretofore.

Truman, H,

377; Sclmabel, p. 245.
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The second message from MacArthur on
November

7

was about

air

operations:

Hosti].e planes are operating from
bases west of the Yalu
River against our forces in North Korea.
These planes are
appearmg in increasing numbers. The distance
from the Yalu to
the mam line of contact is so short
that it is almost impossible
to deal effectively with the hit and run
tactics now being employed
The present restrictions imposed on my area of
operations
provide a complete sanctuary for hostile air
immediately upon
their crossing the Manchuria- North Korean
border. The effect
of this abnormal condition upon the morale
and combat efficiency
of both air and ground troops is major.
Unless corrective- measures are promptly tal<:en this
factor
can assume decisive proportions. Request instructions

for

dealing with this

new and threatening development.

The Joint Chiefs immediately replied

to

MacArthur

26

that "urgent necessity for

corrective measures" was being presented for highest United
States-level
consideration.
Starting on
the

November

Far East Air Force

Hyesanjin.

By

to

the end of

8

and continuing until December

bomb

main Yalu bridges from

all the

November,

6

encouraged MacArthur

were not attempting a full-scale intervention

27

Truman, E, 377; Schnabel,
Sclinabcl, p. 248.

28
Ibid.

,

p. 246.

Sinuiju to

and in damaging most of the others.

Chinese disengagement after November

26

MacArthur sent

the air effort had succeeded, at great cost,

in cutting four of the international bridges

that they

5,

p.

248.

in

Korea while

it

to tliink

also

made

.
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him want

to

resume

offensive advance to take an
"accurate measure" of

enemy

strength, in conjunction with the
bombing of the Yalu bridges to
check their flow
of re inforce ment s

On November

analysis of the Chinese

Communist Forces (CCF)

from 4 armies with

divisions

UN forces;
and

Far East Command intelligence report
carried an

9, the

a strength of 51, 600

men

zone but not in contact with

UN

troops as probably being

North Korea. 29

in

forces.

Korea.

men as

accepted 2 more divisions with 12,600

it

another 2 divisions with 12,600

still

in

men

It

accepted 8

being in contact with
as probably in contact,

as possible being in the

This analysis gave a

On

the

CCF

same

X

Corps

total of 76, 800

CCF

day, MacArthur

Headquarters publicly stated that "strong forces of the
Chinese Communist Army,
estimated

at 60,

000 men, had entered the Korean War, with an
equal number of

reinforcements believed to be on the way.
24, the

Korea

From mid-November

to

November

Far East Command apparently accepted Chinese Communist
strength

at a

maximum

In the

of 70, 051 and a

week preceding

the Department of the

Army

minimum

pq

30

N. Y.
31

32

attack on

CCF

November

24,

of 51, 600

CCF

troops in Korea.

2983, 9 Nov, aud 2988, 14 Nov 50; See Applemaa, pp. 762-63.

Time s, Nov

Appleman,

ma.

UN

Washington accepted the estimate

troops in Korea, and a probable total of 76,800

^^FEC DIS

of 44, 851.

the resumption of the

in

in

p. 763.

10,

1950, cited in Stone, p. 181.
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Re -examination

of MacArthur's Missi on in Koron
and the National Security CounciT Mectino;
of November 9, 1950

On November

the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed MacArthur
that the

8,

eventuality anticipated in their instructions to

North Korea by major.

.

.

Chinese forces,

him

of

September 27,

"entry into

appeared to have been realized.

"

At

least the introduction of Chinese forces to the extent reported
by him would so
signify.

"We believe therefore,

" they

warned him,

"that this

new

situation

indicates your objectives as stated in that message, "the destruction of the
North

Korean armed forces,

"

may have

to be

MacArthur protested vigorously

re-examined.

to the Joint Chiefs on

against any re -examination of his mission.
instructions to

him on October

present situation.

ment anjrwhere

in

They had

Korea

of

"^"^

November

MacArthur pointed out

told him, in the event of the open or covert

major Chinese Communist

a reasonable chance of success.

"In

my

opinion

in his

judgment his forces had
fatal to weal<;en the

to destroy all resisting

forces in Korea and bring that country into a united and free nation,

proclaimed his

'Rad,

employ-

units without prior

would be

it

fundamental and basic policy of the United Nations

lie

that their

10 had exactly defined his course of action in the

announcement, to continue the action as long as

warned.

9

"

MacArthur

faith in the effectiveness of air interdiction by

JCS 96060, JCS

to

CINCFE,

8

Nov

armed

50; in Schnabcl, p. 250.
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telling the Joint Chiefs that he could, with his air
power, keep the

Chinese reinforcements crossing the Yalu low enough
ttiose

Chinese already in Ko rea.

He meant

to enable

numbers

him

to

of

destroy

to launch his attack to destroy those

forces about November 15 and to keep going until he reached the border.

lie

explained:

Any program short

would completely destroy the
of my forces and its psychological consequences would
be inestimable. It would condemn us to an indefinite retention
of our military forces along difficult defense lines in North
Korea and would unquestionably arouse such resentment among
the South Koreans that their forces would collapse or might
even turn against us.
of this

morale

MacArthur further stated

that anyone

had succeeded

in establishing

agreement not

to

who hoped

themselves

in

move southward would be

that the Chinese, once they

North Korea, would abide by any

indulging in wishful tliinldng at its

very worst.

MacArthur also deprecated
widely reported British desire

them a

strip of

North Korea,

"

to

the "Munich attitude" of the British.

"The

appease the Chinese Communists by giving

he said, "finds a most recent precedent

in the

action taken at Munich on 29 September 1938 by Great Britain, France and
Italy.

"^^
.

.

He went further and referred

.

to a State

Department document

criticizing the British appeasement of Hitler to lend emphasis to his statement.

He warned

that any such appeasement of the

^%ad, C

68572,
250-51.
Schnabel, pp.
^^Ibid.

,

p.

^^Whitncy,

CINCFE

251.
p. 411.

to

DA

Communist aggression carried

the

for JCS, sgd MacArthur, 9 Nov 50; in
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germs

of ultimate destruction for the United
Nations.
In this

message

of

November

9,

MacArthur argued

fervently:

To give up a portion of North Korea to the
aggression
Communists would be tlic greatest defeat of the

of the Chinese

free world in recent times. Indeed, to yield
to so immoral a
proposition would banlcrupt our leadership and
influence in
Asia and render untenable our position, both politically
and
militarily.

It would not curb deterioration of the
present
situation into the possibility of a general war,
but would
impose upon us the disadvantage of having inevitably to fight

such a war if it occurs, bereft of the support of countless'
Asiatics who now believe in us and are eager to fight with us.
Such an abandonment of principle would entirely reverse the

tremendous moral and psychological uplift throughout Asia
and perhaps the entire free world, which accompanied the
United Nations decison of June 25th, and leave in its place the
revulsion against the organization bordering on complete
disillusionment and distrust.

From

a military standpoint,

I believe that the United
States should press for a resolution in the United Nations
condemning the Chinese Communists for their defiance of the

United Nations' orders by invading Korea and opening
hostilities against the United Nations' forces, calling upon the

Communists to withdraw forthwith to positions north of the
international border on pain of military sanctions by the United
Nations should they fail to do so. I recommend with all the
earnestness that

possess that there be no weakening at this
critical moment and that we press on to complete victory which
I believe can be achieved if our determination and indomitable
I

will do riot desert us.

See Wliitney, pp.
38

411-12.

Whitney, p. 412; see also Schnabcl, pp. 251-52. Schnabel's version
uses "any" portion, instead of "a" portion in the phrase, "to give up a portion of
North Korea to tJie aggression of the Chinese Communists. ..." According to
Schnabcl, MacArthur also asserted that by moving to halt his forces short of the
Yalu River American authorities "wouid follow clearly in the footsteps of the
British wlio by the appeasement of recognition lost the respect of all the rest
of Asia without gaining that of the Chinese segment. " Sclmabel, p. 251.
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In this

message MacArthur was going beyond

argue on political and moral grounds.
victory over the
in

enemy forces

of

strictly military issues to

His basic assumption was that a complete

Chinese Communists and North Korean remnants

North Korea was imperative for the credibility and
prestige of the United

Nations and America's leadership and influence in Asia.

It

was

the maintenance of the South Koreans' will to continue
to fight.

press on

until

he reached

also required for

He wanted

the border and thus unite the nation.

He was less

concerned about provoking Chinese full-scale intervention by the drive
Yalu.

A

to the

Korea was his aim.

total victory in

Truman

to

directed the National Security Council to meet on November 9 to

consider on an urgent basis what the national policy should be toward Chinese

Communist involvement.

The Joint Chiefs

of Staff

had been instructed

to furnish

their views on what should be done.

On November

1950, the Joint Chiefs forwarded to the Secretary of

9,

Defense for consideration by the National Security Council a lengthy analysis
containing their views and recommendations.
the Chinese troops in

Korea were volunteers,

opinion that such a view
to gain

was

Without accepting the theory that
the Joint Chiefs expressed the

feasible in the event that the Chinese merely wanted

time for the defeated and disorganized remnants

of the

North Korean army.

But they pointed out that intelligence reports did not back up this theory, since
they showed that Chinese

Communist soldiers were entering Korea

both as

individuals and in well-organized, well-led and well-equipped units, probably

189
of division size.

Examining Chinese motives
Nations

Command,

the Joint Chiefs

these had as yet been

in sending military forces
against the United

saw three

made clear by Chinese

possibilities, alftough none of

actions either in Korea or in

Manchuria: the Chinese might wish to protect
the Yalu River and the Changjin-

Pujon Reservoir power complexes and establish
a cordon sanitaire
Korea; they might wish

to continue the active but

drain American resources without expending too

undeclared war

much

of their

in

in

Korea

action,

If

the Chinese

from obtaining

economy would

to

own military

strength; or they could be planning to drive the United
Nations forces

Korea.

North

from

Communists were prevented, through United Nations
electricity

suffer severely.

from

the Yalu

Consequently,

power systems, Manchuria's
if

the Chinese

intervened in Nortli Korea solely to protect the power plants,

Communists had
it

might be well,

the Joint Chiefs suggested to the Secretary of Defense, to announce an unmistakably

clear guarantee

tliat

the United Nations would not infringe on the sovereignty of

Manchuria, would not damage the power plants, and would not interfere with
their operation.

If

the Chinese

Communists rejected such

a guarantee, the

United States could feel fairly certain that they had some other objective in
intervening.

39

Memo, JCS (Bradley) for Secy Defense (Marshall), 9 Nov 50,
Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea; see Schnabel, p. 252.
^^Ibid.

,

p.

253.

subj:
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The Joint Chiefs thought

that

it

was also

might be planning a limited war

of attrition in

United States strength.

is at

that

it

money

"Korea

Korea

war

to tie

down and dissipate

such a distance from the United States

would be expensive for the United States
to conduct an undeclared

a real possibility that the Chine se

in that

m

manpower, materiel, and

area over a long period.

versely, the Chinese, being next door to Korea, would fmd

it

"

Con-

comparatively

inexpensive, with their practically vmlimited manpower and Soviet equipment,
to

carry on such a war indefinitely.

forces in Korea would,

Russia and

of

in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs,

They

felt that, in the

still

be in the interests of
S.

military

considered Korea a "strategically unimportant

event of a global war,

fighting in

the United States off-balance while Russia completed
conquest.

of United States

world communism by imposing a heavy drain on U.

and economic strength.
area" and

The continual involvement

The Joint Chiefs could also visualize

its

Korea would leave

plans for global

quite clearly a situation v/hereby

the United States, through concentrating its strength to defeat the Chinese in

Korea, might, "win the skirmish
if

global

war eventuates.

in

Korea but lose the war against

USSR

^^^^

The Jomt Chiefs did not truly believe

that the Chinese Commujiists

intended to drive the United Nations forces from

all of

Korea.

Wliile

possible that the Chinese did have that intention, the Joint Chiefs

4%id.

the

it

was

felt they

191

could not force MacArthur 's

men

by Soviet naval and airpower.
be evident that World

War

"

off the

If

peninsula "without material
assist,
;cmce

Russia did intervene

to that extent,

it

m had begun and the United States should get

would
its

divisions out of Korea as fast as
possible.
If

the Chinese intervened in full strength,
the Joint Chiefs foresaw three

possible courses of action for United Nations
forces: to continue the action as
planned; to set up a defensive line short of
Korea's northern border; or to

withdraw.

In the first instance,

some augmentation

strength in Korea might be necessary

even

a drive to the Yalu were to succeed,

no more ;Chinese troops entered the

if

and dig

in,

was,

in the

perhaps expedient

voluntarily

in the face of unclarified military and political

But they rejected withdrawal because

would so lower the world wide prestige

it

would be totally unacceptable.

.

.

.

"

compelled to leave Korea involuntarily
lude to global war.

The second course, pause

fighting.

eyes of the Joint Chiefs, perfectly feasible and, indeed,

raised by Chinese entry.

it

if

of United Nations military

"

If

it

problems

"if

conducted

of the United States that

the United Nations forces

were

"could only be accepted as the pre-

With specific reference

to global

war, the Joint Chiefs

maintained that current conditions did not conclusively indicate that global

war was imminent,

Ibid

only that the risk of global

.

43
Ibid.

,

pp. 253-54.

war had been increased.
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The conclusion and

the

recommendations by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff

were:

1.

urgency

Every

effort should be

expended as a matter of
problem of Chinese Communist interKorea by political means, preferably through
the

to settle the

vention in

Umted Nations, to include reassurances to the Chinese
Communists with respect to our intent, direct negotiations

through our Allies and the Interim Committee
[of the UN
General Assembly] with the Chinese Communist
Government,
and by any other available means.

Pending further clarification as to the military
2.
objectives of the Chinese Com.munists and the
extent of their
intended commitments, .the mission assigned to
the

in Chief, United Nations

Command, should be

Commander

kept under

review, but should not be changed.
The United States should develop its plans and malce
3.
its preparations on the basis that the risk of
global war is
increased.'^'*

Whereas MacArthur advocated a military
Chinese Communist intervention,
political

means and

channels.

i.e.

,

solution to the

problem

a total victory, the Joint Chiefs favored

negotiations through the United Nations or other diplomatic

Whereas MacArthur was less concerned about a general war

from his drive

of

to the Yalu, the Joint Chiefs

consequences of even a limited war
Chinese Communists, because

it

in

resulting

had to consider the undesirable

Korea over

a long period against the

would impose a heavy drain on U.

S,

military

and economic strength, while the Soviet Union could preserve and prepare for
global conquest.

The aim

Truman,

II,

of the Joint Chiefs

was not

378; also Schnabel, p. 254.

a victory over the Chinese

Communists

in

Korea, for they were the wrong enemy

overall strategic objective

was

to act

U. S. S.R. in a future global war.

Korea

As

m

at the

wrong place.

The

such a way as to insure victory over the

for the immediate military strategy in

to deal with possible full-scale Chinese intervention, the Joint
Chiefs

preferred to pause and dig in without either withdrawing or advancing.
But because of Chinese disengagement which obscured their objectives
and their intended commitments as far as America was concerned, and because
of

MacArthur's strong argument that his mission

the Joint Chiefs

recommended

in

Korea should not be changed,

to the National Security Coimcil tliat

MacArtlmr's

mission of "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces" should be kept
under review but should not be changed.
Apparently when the Joint Chiefs submitted their recommendations to the
National Security Council, they had already received MacArthur's message of

November

9 insisting' that his

mission in Korea should not be changed. Acheson

wrote later:

by

The Joint Chiefs were intimidated but not convinced
MacArthur]. They believed, as they always

this blast [from

had, that Chinese power,

if

the

Chinese chose

to exert it, could

be defeated militarily in North Korea only by a greatly augmented
and determined American effort and that we had other and more
pressing needs for our forces elsewhere. The goal of a free and
united Korea belong,

if it

were achievable

at all, in the field

Therefore, they recommended— witli
presidential approval through the National Security Council—
that the mission assigned to General MacArthur should be kept
of diplomatic effort.

under review but not changed

^Acheson, pp. 465-66.

at that time.
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The Central
the Russians

Intelligence Agency's estimate of the situation
at this time

were not themselves willing

to go to

war

was

tliat

but that they wanted to

involve the United States as heavily as possible in Asia
so that they might gain

a free hand in Europe.

'^^

Bradley represented the Joint Chiefs

meeting on November

9,

at the l^^ational Security Council

which was attended by the Secretaries

Defense, Bedell Smith (then head of CIA), and other

Truman was

members

of State

and

of the Council.

not present, but was given a report of the proceedings afterward.^''

At this meeting, Bradley explained the views of the Joint Chiefs concerning three possible intentions of the Chinese Communist intervention.

Bradley also said that

in his opinion tlie

United States should be able to hold in

the general area of present positions but that there would be an increasing

question of

how much pressure

Manchurian bases.

the United States could stand without attacldng

The Joint Chiefs, however, were

attack should be a United Nations decision, since

it

of the opinion that such an

exceeded the terms of the

resolution under which United Nations forces were operating.

General Bradley noted that General Mac Arthur seemed

bombing

of the bridges

across the Yalu would stop the flow of Chinese Communist

^^Truman, H, 378.
47
Collins, p. 206;

48

Truman, H,

to think that the

Truman, H,

379.

378.
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troops into Korea.
optimistic.

Bradley himself, however,

tliought that this

was rather

'^^

General Smith of the CIA said that the Yalu River would be
frozen over
within fifteen to thirty days and would be passable, with or
without the bridges.

MarshaU pointed

out at this meeting of the

NSC

eastern front of North Korea was widely dispersed and

represented an added risk.

that the

tliinly

if

to

occupy the whole

there was any line that was better from a

military point of view than the present one.

Bradley replied that from a purely

military point of view the farther back the line was the easier

He added, however,

of U. S. forces

of the South

spread, which

50

Acheson asked Bradley

maintain.

it

would be

that he realized that any baclcward

would lose America support and might adversely

Koreans

Corps on the

Bradley replied that of course MacArthur had

done this in order to carry out his directive that he was
country and hold elections.

X

to fight.

to

movement

affect the will

51

Acheson expressed himself as feeling
interested in the idea of defense in depth.

He

that the Russians

were especially

si:^gested, therefore, that a

buffer area in Northeast Korea be established under a United Nations Commission

49ibid.

50
Ibid.

51

,

Ibid.
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with a constabulary but no

UN armed

forces.

Insofar as the Chinese were

concerned, Acheson saw them as having two
interests: The first was

America

involved, while the lesser interest

was

m the

to

keep

security of the border

and the power plants. ^2 He thought that the United States
ought

to explore

privately the possibility of a twenty-mile demilitarized
zone, ten miles on each
side of the Yalu.

He went on

to say that the trouble with any such proposal,
of

c ourse, would be that the Commu]iists would insist
on all foreign troops leaving-

Korea, and thus abandon Korea to the Communists.

When Acheson summarized
November

9,

the whole discussion of the

NSC meeting on

he pointed out:

not

It was agTeed that General MacArthur's directive should
now be changed and that he should be free to do what he could

in a military way, but without bombing Manchuria. At the same
time, the State Department would seek ways to find out whether
negotiations with the Chinese Communists were possible, although
one problem was that we lacked any direct contacts with the

Peiping [Peking] regime through diplomatic channels.

The NSC also recommended, as a result

of this meeting, that political

action should be started in the United Nations to seek support of an overwhelming

52

During the MacArthur hearings, Acheson testified that on Nov 8, 1950,
"the general view here in Washington stated the Communist objective was to halt
the advance of the UN forces in Korea and to keep a Communist regime in being
on Korean soil. " Hearings Pt. 3, 1834.
,

^'^Truman, H, 379-80.
Ibid., 380.
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majority of

members

from Korea, and

in

demanding the prompt withdrawal

of

Chinese forces

that political channels should
also be used to explore Chinese

intentions.

The most

significant conclusion of this important
meeting of the National

Security Council was that both military and
political means woidd be explored
to

cope with the problem of Chinese intervention.

military victory in Korea,

he would not be denied

do what he could in a military way.

"

If

MacArthur could achieve a

it;

thus "he should be free to

Diplomatically the Chinese Communists

would be asked, through the United Nations,

to

withdraw their forces from Korea

after being given an assurance of non-violation of
Manchuria's integrity.

trouble with this double approach

victory

was

was

The

that, if the opportunity of a military

to be grasped, the continued use of force directed

toward the Yalu

might, at the same time, undermine the trustworthiness of diplomatic
assurances
with regard to Manchuria.

General Collins later wrote:
of this

meeting was that

it

"In retrospect, the

most important outcome

permitted General MacArthur to go ahead with his

plans for an attack, or reconnaissance in force, to the Yalu, a move that v/as
destined to lead to one of the few military defeats in United States history. "^^

55
Collins, p. 207.

56
'

Ibid.

,

p.

208.
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Diplomatic Activities and the Drive
to the Yalu

On November

10, 1950, the United States, together with the
United

France, Cuba, Ecuador and Norway, introduced a joint
resolution

Kingdom,

in the United

Nations Security Council, on the question of Chinese Communist
intervention in

Korea.
the

Earlier, on

UN

November

6, the

United States had called the attention of

Security Council to General MacArthur's special report dated

concerning Chinese intervention.

On November

8, the

November

5

Security Council adopted

a British proposal to invite a representative of the Pekiag Government to be

present during discussion by the Council

Command

Nations

in

Ko rea.

of the

above special report of the United

The Council rejected a Soviet proposal

to extend a

general invitation to the Chinese Communist Government to take part in the
discussion of the entire Korean question in the Security Council.

The draft resolution, sponsored by

the United States and five other nations,

recalling and affirming especially the General Assembly resolution of October
1950, and having noted

from MacArthur's

special report that "Chiaese

military units are deployed for action against the forces of

Korea,

tlie

7,

Communist

United Nations in

"

Calls upon

all

States and authorities, and in particular

those responsible for the action noted above, to refrain from
assisting or encouragiag the North Korean authorities, to prevent
their nationals or indi^dduals or units of their armed forces from
giving assistance to North Korean forces and to cause the
immediate withdrawal of any such natiomils, individuals, or
units which

may

presently be in Korea;

199

^^^^"^s that it is the policy of the United Nations to
hold
the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully
to protect
legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier
zone;
Calls attention to the grave danger which continued
intervention by Chinese forces in Korea would entail for the
maintenance
of such a policy;

Requests the Intermin Committee on Korea and the United
Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
to consider urgently and to assist in the settlement of any
problems
relating to conditions on the Korean frontier in v/hich States or
autliorities on the other side of the frontier have an interest, and

suggests that the United Nations Commission for the Unification
and Rehabilitation of Korea proceed to the area as soon ? s
possible, and, pending its arrival that it utilize the assistance
of such States members of the Commission as now have representatives in the area for this purpose.

This draft resolution was not brought to a vote
situation in

Korea had changed

^"^

until

November

30, after the

radically, at which time the Soviet Union vetoed

the measure.

On November

11,

Chou En-lai cabled

that

Communist China could

not

accept the invitation of the

UN

special report, because

deprived the Chinese representative "of the right to

it

Security Council, in connection with MacArthur's

discuss in the Security Council the most pressing question to the Chinese people,

namely the question

of

armed

intervention in Korea and aggression against China
CO

by the United States Government.

Dept. of State, United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, July 1950February 1951 Publication ^.263, Far Eastern Series 44 (1951), Document 13,
,

pp. 22-23.

Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year,Suppl for Sept through
Dec 1950, Document S/1898, H, p. 114.

^^UN
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On

the

same

day, a statement by the

representative of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China replied

November

special report of

Council on November

statement said,

5,

8 against

"...

to

General MacArthur's

and to Ambassador Austin's charges

Communist Chinese

the United States of

at the Security

intervention in Korea.

America has invaded Chinese

violated Chinese sovereignty and is threatening Chinese security.

"

It

Pelcing's

territory,

pointed

out that in addition to sending an American fleet into the waters of Taiwan, "which

belongs to China.

bombed Chinese

"

TL

S.

aircraft had violated the air borders of China, had

territory, killed Chinese civilians and destroyed Chinese

property in Manchuria in numerous cases

in the last three

months.

The full tale of the crimes committed in North-East
China [Manchuria] by the United States air forces which have
Invaded Korea is given below. Recently the number of air
attacks has been increasing daily. These crimes committed by
the United States armed forces, which are violating the
territorial sovereignty of China and threatening its security,
have alarmed the whole Chinese people. Righteously indignant,
many Chinese citizens are expressing the desire to help the
Korean people and resist American aggression. Facts have
shown that the aim of United States aggression in Korea is not
only Korea itself but also the extension of aggression to China.
The question of the independent existence or the downfall of
Korea has always been closely linked with the security of China.
To help Korea and repel United States aggression means to
protect our own homes and our own country. It is, therefore,
completely natural for the Chinese people to be ready to help
Korea and offer resistance to United States aggression.
In order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean
question it is essential, above all, to withdraw all foreign troops
from Korea. The K:orean question can be solved only by the
people of North and South Korea themselves; this is the only
way in which the Korean problem can be solved peacefully.
.

.

.
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Chinese people ardently love peace, but it will
not be
id to take action against aggressors,
and no aggresso
can intimidate

it.

This statement from Peking was transmitted on November
14 by the Soviet
representative, Malik, to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations and
circulated as Document S/1902.

Security Council meeting of

The major part

November

About this time, the issue

MacArthur had reported

in his

of

it

was

also read at the

16 at the insistence of Malik.

of "hot pursuit" also

message

pf

November

came up.^^ General

7 that

enemy

aircraft

operating from Manchurian fields had dashed into Korean air space to strike

UN

air and ground forces and then flew to safety behind the Manchurian border a

very few minutes away.
efficiency of

action of

UN

It

had had a serious effect upon the morale and combat

air and groimd troops.

The Joint Chiefs recommended corrective

"hot pursuit" to deal with this "threatening" development.

It

was

discussed between the Departments of Defense and State and was favored by
both.

On November

13,

Acheson sent telegrams

to

six of the thirteen nations that had troops in Korea.
to

inform these countries that

permit UN aircraft

to

"it

American ambassadors

The telegram asked them

may become necessary

at an early date to

defend themselves in the air space over the Yalu River to

59
Ibid.

60

Acheson.

,

in

Document S/1902,

See Hearings, Pt.

3,

pp. 115-17.

1722-24, 1912-15, 1927-28; testimony of
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the extent of permitting hot pursuit of
attacking

enemy

aircraft up to 2 or 3

minutes' flying time into Manchurian air space. "
The purpose of this diplomatic

move was
in

not to ask the concurrence of these
governments but to get their reactions

advance of the contemplated measure.

The United States received strongly

negative responses from the six governments, saying
they thought

undesirable, and unwise.

Acheson transmitted the views

the Secretary of Defense on

November

23 and

November

of these

it

was dangerous,

governments

to

Both Departments

24.

then decided to go no further with the suggestion.

Meanwhile, on November 16, Truman issued a statement
note of the resolution which had been introduced to the

November

10 concerning the Chinese

Communist

UN

in

which he took

Security' Council

intervention in Korea.

on

The

statement then said:
United Nations forces now are being attacked from the
safety of a privileged sanctuary. Planes operating from bases
in China cross over into Korea to attack United Nations ground and
air forces and then flee back across the border. Chinese

Communist and North Korean Communist forces are being reinforced, supplied and equipped from bases behind the safety of
the Sino-Korean border.

The pretext which

the Chinese

Communists advance

for

taking offensive action against United Nations forces in Korea
from behind the protection afforded by tlie Sino-Korean border is
their professed belief that these forces intend to carry hostilities

across the frontier into Chinese territory.

^^Ibi<5.,

1928.

Ibid., 1723.

.

.

.
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Siieukinjr for the Uiiilcd States

Government nnd people

'

I

can give assuranec that we support and
are acting; within tlic
limits of United Nations policy in Korea,
and tliat we have never
at any time entertained any intention
to cari^
China.

On November
would

.

18,

.

hostilities into

.''^

MacArthur

notified the Joint Chiefs

launeli its attaek as selieduled on Nove.nlx^r
21.

delay in mounting the offensive

liad

enemy

Joint Cliiefs

He assured

actioru

forces during

tlie

lie

the Eighth

Army

emphasized that the

been caused by logistical
tliat

tliat

difficulties, not

intensified air attacks by his air

the preceding ten-day period had been very successful in
isolating

the battle area, stopping troop reinforcement by the enemy,
and greatly reducing
the flow of

enemy

satisfactory,

supjilies.

^'^

While the supply situation

MacArthur nevertheless proposed

of

UN

forces was un-

to elear the country of

enemy

forces before the Yalu froze and furnished a crossing for overwhelming numbers.

Such was the reasoning.

65

As Achoson looked back, he
as the three weeks from October 20

^^

later wrote, "the critical period slands out
to

November

17.

Then

all the

dangers from

Ilcarings, IH. 5, 3404.

^^-^Rad,

C G9211, CINC UNC

to

DA,

18

Nov

50, see Schnabel, p. 272;

also Ajjploman, p, 771,

65

Achoson, p. '1(57. See Stone, p. 186 for an argument that the chite of
Nov. 15 and then Nov. 24 was chos(Mi to coincide with tlie arrival of Peking's
rcpresentntivc in N.Y. for UN Security Coimcil meetings in eonneetion will) the
"eomplaiiit of armed invasion of Taiwan."
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dispersal of our own forces and intervention by the Chinese
were manifest.

were

all

We

deeply apprehensive."^^ In his memoirs, Acheson
reviewed "the last

clear chance" for America before the disaster

came

in late-

November and early

December:

Our bafflement centered about the two principal enigmas
What were the facts about Chinese military
presence in North Korea and what were their intentions? (The
first would throw light on the second. ) And what was General
Mac Arthur up to in the amazing military maneuver that was
of this situation:

unfolding before unbelieving eyes? Regarding the first, the
forces that had struck the Eighth Army during the last days of
October and the opening days of November had been powerful,
fully equipped, and competent— and yet they seemed to have
vanished from the earth. The most elementary caution would
seem to warn that they might, indeed probably would, reappear
as suddenly and harmfully as they had before.

However, on the morning
and his

staff,

of

November

21, 1950, at a meeting of

Acheson

Acheson noted that on a straight military basis MacArthur was

authorized to pursue the enemy forces north of the 38th parallel and destroy them
as a military force.

mtil

it

If

China intervened MacArthur was to pursue the mission

was evident he could not succeed.

this part of the directive until

situation.

The Secretary

al so

Acheson

felt that

MacArthur had had a chance

Ibid.

,

p. 468.

p. 466.

to

"probe" the

noted the concern which China and Russia might

experience over the use of Korea as a route to Manchuria.

Acheson,

no one should change

But he doubted that
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the

Communists believed

that the United States v/ould use

Their fear might relate, he said,
Japan.

.

.

.

"to

Korea

in that

propaganda on the rearmament

This might lead you to believe that there

than the intelligence reports lead one to believe.

"

is

more

way.

of

sensitivity here

Acheson's concluding

observations at this meeting in the State Department were:

MacArthur

successful in. repelling Chinese interover tension may ease, but if Chinese
Communist forces cannot be destroyed and strong resistance is
met there and we find ourselves with a long struggle on our
hands we must turn to negotiation and their [Chinese] sensitivity
If

vention and

is

ROK takes

becomes even more important.

On

the afternoon of

and the Joint Chiefs

November

of Staff

met

21, Secretary Acheson, General Marshall

at the

Pentagon.

Acheson recalled

later:

After General Ridgway had pointed out the startling
dispositions, I stated our concerns. General MacArthur seemed
to have confused his military directive (to follow and destroy the
remnant of the North Korean Army unless Chinese intervention
evident that he could not succeed in this task)
with his civil affairs directive intended to follow military success
(helping the UN Commission establish a government for a iinited
Korea). At this point our object was not "real estate" but an
in force

army.

made

it

An attempt

to establish a united

Korea by force

of

arms

against a determined Chinese resistance could easily lead into
general hostilities, since both the Chinese and the Russians, as
well as the Japanese, had all regarded Korea as a road to some-

"Dean
Documentation, Princeton Seminar. See David S. McLellan,
Acheson and the Korean War, " Political Science Quarterly (March 1968), pp.
"
30-31. Hereafter cited as McLellan, "Acheson and War, (1968).
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where else rather than an end in itself. Very definitely the
policy of our Government v/as to avoid general war in Asia.
Apparently General MacArthur could not determine the degi-ee
of Chinese intervention without some sort of a "probe" along
his line; therefore we did not oppose that. When I privately
expressed a layman's concern to Generals Marshall and Bradley
over MacArthur's scattering of liis forces, they pomted out
that the Chiefs of Staff, seven thousand miles from the front,
could not direct the theater commander's dispositions.

Robert Lovett, Undersecretary of Defense, reported nothing from

MacArthur
Yalu.

to indicate that he could not accomplish his mission of getting to the

The minutes

satisfaction that

of the

meeting show General Marshall expressing his

Acheson had stated his

forward his planned offensive.

belief that

MacArthur should push

'^^

Following the agreement that "General MacArthur had to have his try,

"

the discussion went on to diplomatic methods of easing the dangerous showdown
that might be

coming by such a method as Bevin favored— a cease-fire and a

demilitarized buffer zone along the Manchurian border— or by falling back to the

neck of Korea, concentrating U.
forces, as

was thought

Acheson "was sure
^

until

he had

felt out

Acheson,

to be

S.

forces, and doing the probing with Korean

Government policy

that General

at the

end of September.

MacArthur would frustrate any such

Chinese strength.

"

Accordingly, Acheson had persuaded

p. 467.

McLellan, "Acheson and

efforts

War ,"

(1968), p. 31.
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the British to hold up any initiative
in the United Nations.

On

'^1

the question of whetiaer the United
Nations should attempt to negotiate

a buffer zone or simply make an announcement
of intent to practice selfrestraint, General

MarshaU preferred

following MacArthur's success.

a political announcement of intent

"The time for making

be after MacArthur had had such a success.
finding a

way

The concept

of terminating

"

political proposals

Acheson stressed the need for

Chinese intervention in the war should

of a buffer zone

based upon

-the

agreed upon, with Acheson envisaging a demarcation

tacitly

by the Chinese and ratified by negotiation.
9, the

it

occur.

high ground along the Yalu was

finally

On November

would

line accepted

'''^

National Security Council had concluded that

General MacArthur's mission in Korea should be kept under review but not

changed

at that

time.

America's leaders

in

Twelve days

later, with continued Chinese disengagement,

Washington accepted MacArthur's offensive attempt

probe and feel out Chinese strength.

to

Other efforts, such as a cease-fire and

a demitilarized buffer zone along the Manchurian border were held up partly

because Acheson "was sure that General MacArthur would frustrate any such
efforts. "

MacArthur's drive

to the

Yalu would not be halted except that a

71

Acheson,
72

p. 467.

MaLellan, "Acheson and War" (1968), pp. 31-32.

208

suggestion,

not an order, be sent

for diplomatic

him

on high terrain south of the river

to stop

maneuver and settlement.

There was an almost complete absence

Army
22-23.

men assumed

front as Walker's

of

enemy

contact on the entire Eighth

their starting positions on

November

General MacArthur, suspicious of this unusual quiet and somewhat

worried over the gap between the
Stratemeyer

to patrol this

X

Corps and the Eighth Army, ordered General

gap with great care.

But American pilots flying from

twelve to sixteen sorties in daylight hours-and a half-dozen sorties at night
located no

enemy forces

Acheson

in the gap.

testified during the

MacArthur hearings

that on

November

24,

We

was

concluded here in Washington that the Chinese objective
to obtain United Nations withdrawal by intimidation and

diplomatic means, but in case of failure of these means there
would be increasing intervention, and it was said that there was
not available evidence sufficient for a conclusion as to whether
the Chinese

Communists were committed

to a full-scale offensive

effort.

Truman
of the

CIA

later wrote that on

stated, "the Chinese

November

24 a national intelligence

Communists would

'at

a

summary

minimum' increase

their

operations in Korea, seek to immobilize our forces, subject them to prolonged
attrition,

and maintain the semblance of a North Korean state

See Schnabel, p. 272.

Hearings, Pt.

3,

1834;

see also Whitney, p. 413.

in being."

The

209
intelligence

summary

to force the

U.N. elements

also stated, "the Chinese possessed sufficient
strength

While the Eighth

to

withdraw to defensive positions.

Army

""^S

started a "general assault" to "end the war" imd

"restore peace and unity to Korea, "76 the Joint Chiefs
sent a message to

MacArthur on November

24.

It

said:

There is a growing concern within the United Nations
over the possibility of bringing on a general conflict should a
major clash develop with Chinese Communist forces as a result
of your forces advancing squarely against the entire boundary
between Korea and Mancliuria.
Proposal in United Nations
may suggest unwelcome restriction on your advance to the north
since some sentiment exists in United Nations for establishing a
demilitarized zone between your forces and the frontier in the
hope of thereby reducing Chinese Communist fear of United
Nations military action against Manchuria.
The consensus of political and military opinion at a
meeting held Thursday with the Secretaries of State and Defense,
.

.

.

.

.

.

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other officials,

was that there
should be no change in your mission, but that immediate action
should be taken at top governmental level to formulate a course of
action which will permit the establishment of a unified Korea and
at the same time reduce risk of more general involvement. On

the assumption that your

coming attack will be successful,
exploratory discussions were had to discover what military
measures, which you might in any event wish to take, might lend
themselves to political action which would reduce the tension with
Peiping and the Soviet Union and maintain a solid United Nations
front.

7^

Truman,

II,

"^"^

381.

76

Pt. 5,

See Gen MacArthur 's special communique, Nov 24, 1950,
3491-92.

in

Hearings,

77

Whitney, pp. 417-18.
2,

1229.

See also Sclinabel, pp. 268-69; Hearings, Pt.
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The Joint Chiefs

told

MacArthur

that the following

measures were considered:

(a) After advancing to or near the Yalu, CINCFE
might
hold his forces in terrain dominating the approaches to the
valley of the Yalu. These forces should be principally ROK
troops. Other United Nations forces shoidd be grouped in
positions in readiness.

This plan would be used only
of

Almond's advance

in the

if

effective

northeast would be fixed at Chongjin.

that the above

would not seriously

mission,

Joint Chiefs explained.

" the

enemy resistance ceased. The

affect the

accomplishment

"It

limit

was thought

of your military

•

United Nations forces would caitinue to make every
effort to spare the hydroelectric installations in North Korea;
(c) The United Nations Unification and Rehabilitation
(b)

Commission would, at a propitious time, enter into negotiations
with appropriate representatives of the Chinese Commmiist
Government in order to insure equitable distribution of hydroelectric power;

Chinese forces did not again attack
in force across the Yalu, elections in Korea could proceed in
accordance with the action by the United Nations; and
(e) The ultimate handling of the extremely sensitive
northeast province would await United Nations procedures.
(d)

In the event the

General MacArthur was told that no decision had yet been made on procedures
for handling

tiie

matter of entering northeastern Korea, since dealings

would be with the U.

78

S. S.

Hearin gs, Pt.

there

81
°
R. and not China.

2,

1229, a paraphrase.

"^^Schnabel, p. 269.

^^Paraphrase of message, item 60, in the "Joint Chiefs of Staff Report
1229.
for Senate Committees on Korean Operations," quoted in Hearings Pt. 2,
,

81

Schnabel, p. 269.
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The Joint Chiefs then reviewed
above.

'While

it

is

own suggested measiu-es as

listed

recognized that from the point of view of the commander

the field this course of action

may be

their

may

leave

much

to

be desired,

other considerations which must be accepted,

..."

it

is felt that

in

there

This course "might

well provide an out for the Chinese Communists to withdraw
into Manchuria

without loss efface.
felt that

..." The

Russian concern was

Russians, too, might be reassured; and

at the root of their

it

pressure on the Chinese

was

to

interfere in Korea.

The Joint Chiefs asked for MacArthur's comments on
include timing and method of announcement

if

he agreed.

the proposals, to

They wanted

sure that the measures did not impede the military operation, yet

to be

felt it

import-

tant that the Chinese and Russians not misinterpret MacArthur's intention as

aggression against their borders.

The message

of

November

24, 1950

concluded:
Since there are many political and military implications
involved in these ideas and since other nations would be involved,
no action along these lines is contemplated until full opportimity
has been given for further consideration of your views, final

decision by the President, and, probably discussion with
certain other countries.

82„
Ibid.

^^Ibid.

,

pp. 269-70.
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As

late as

November

24, 1950

when General MacArthur launched

offensives to reach the northern
border of North Korea the United
States

wanted

to

his

still

reduce the tension with Peking and
Moscow by assuring them that

MacArthur's military action involved no
aggressive intentions against their
borders.

In reti'ospect this

was

unrealistic ally seeking the best of two
worlds.

Instead of examining the possibility that Peking
and
of

Korea as a route

to

Moscow might

Manchuria or elsewhere, the Joint Chiefs

fear the use

felt that the

suggested measure of holding the high terrain along
the Yalu might be sufficient
to relieve their concern.

General MacArthur replied on November 25, arguing
against the
suggested proposals:

The concern underlying the search for the means to
confine the spread of the Korean conflict is fully understood
and shared here, but it is believed that the suggested approach
would not only fail to achieve the desired residt but would be
provocative of the very consequences we seek to avert.
In the first place,

from a military standpoint my personal

reconnaissance of the Yalu River line yesterday demonstrated
conclusively that it would be utterly impossible for us to stop
upon terrain south of the river as suggested and there be in
position to hold under effective control its lines of approach
to North Korea. The terrain ranging from the lowlands in the
west to the rugged central and eastern sectors is not adaptable
to such a

system

were we, for any reason, to
sacrifice the natural defense features of the river line itself,
of defense

features to be found in no other natural defense line in all of
Korea. Nor would it be either militarily or politically
defensible to yield this natural protective barrier safeguarding
the territorial integritj'^ of Korea.

Moreover, any failure on our part to prosecute the
military campaign through to its public and oft-repeated
objective of destroying

all

enemy forces

south of Korea's
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northern boundary as essential to the restoration
of unity and
peace to all of Korea, would be.
regarded by tlie Korean
people as a betrayal of.
the solemn undertaldng
tlie United
Nations entered into on their behalf, and by the
Chinese and all
of the other peoples of Asia as wealmess
reflected from the
.

.

.

.

appeasement

of Communist aggression.
Study of the Soviet and Peiping propaganda line
discloses
little to suggest any major concern over
the potentiality of
United Nations control of the southern banks of the Yalu
River.
Even what has been said concerning the hydroelectric facilities
in North Korea is for the most part a product of
British-American
speculation, finding little reflection in any Soviet or Chinese
utterances. Indeed, our information on these facilities and the
.

disposition abroad of their power output fails to confirm that
dependence upon this source of power is a major factor in the
basic causes giving rise to the Chinese aggressive moves in
Korea. Thus, despite the fact that those hydroelectric facilities

Chongjin brought under control of the X Corps had been closed
down completely for a full month prior to the arrival of our
forces, with much of the vital machinery and other equipment
removed and dispersed and are not yet restored to operation,
no suggestion of complaint has emanated from So\aet or Chinese
sources over the deprivation of power caisequent thereto. In
view of these factual considerations one is brought to the conclusion
that the issue of hydroelectric power rests upon the most tenuous
of grounds. 84
at

Mac Arthur

continued his argument by emphasizing that the entry of the

Chinese Communist forces into the Korean conflict was a risk which the United
States had taken with its eyes wide open

when

it

sent troops into Korea.

"Had

they entered at the time we were beleagaiered behind our Pusan Perimeter

beachhead,
it

is

now

"

that

MacArthur

we hold

said, "the

the initiative.

Wliitney, pp. 418-19.

Schnabel, p. 271.

hazard would have been far more grave than
"^
.

.

QC

.

See also Schnabel, pp. 270-71.
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Our forces are committed to seize the entire border
area,
and indeed in the east have already occupied a sector
of the Yalu
River with no noticeable political or military Soviet or
Chinese
reactions. We have repeatedly and publicly made it
unmistal^ably
clear that we entertain no aggressive designs whatsoever
against
any part of Chinese or Soviet territory. It is my plan, just
as
soon as we are able to consolidate positions along the Yalu River,
'

to replace as far as possible

American forces with those of tlie
Republic of Korea and publicly announce orders affecting:
The return of American forces to Japan; (2) The parole of all
(1)
prisoners -of -war to their homes; (3) The leaving of the imification
of Korea and the restoration of the civil processes of government
to the people, with the advice and assistance of the United Nations
authorities. I believe that the prompt implementation of this plan

as soon as our military objectives have been reached will effectively
appeal to reason in the Chinese mind. If it will not, then tlie
resulting situation is not one which might be influenced by bringing
to a halt our military measures short of present commitments.

By

resolutely meeting those commitments and accomplishing our
military mission as so often publicly delineated, lies the best--

indeed the only--hope that Soviet aad Chinese aggressive designs
may be checked before these countries are committed from which,
for political reasons, they cannot withdraw.

Here again General MacArthur displayed his indifference
of a

war

against the Chinese

objective of destroying all

enemy forces

to

be a threat to their security.

UN
Now

He assumed

that the motive of

forces out of Korea, rather than
that he

Koreans and was approaching the Yalu, he was not afraid

'Whitney, p. 419.

the

south of Korea's northern boundary for

Chinese intervention coidd only be pushing the

them

consequences

Communists while concentrating on achieving

the restoration of unity and peace to all of Korea.

feeling

to the

See also Schnabel, p. 271.

had defeated the North
of

Chinese intervention
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on whatever scale he might encounter

in his offensive efforts.

Major General Charles L. Bolte, Assistant Chief of
G-3, urged

Army

Staff for Operations,

Chief of Staff Collins to subscribe to these views of General

MacArthur and recommended
of the idea of a full force

that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate their approval

advance to the border.

take any such action by the Joint Chiefs.

However, events were

to

over-

^'^

Communist China's Full-scale Coimterattack
"The Eighth Army's attack got
contact for the first two days.

Comminists slashed
strength. "

Then, as dusk

good start with only light enemy
on November 25, the Chinese

fell

into the allied forces without

warning and with overwhelming

These Chinese forces crushed the Eighth Army's right flank and forced

the rest of the

attacked the

off to a

X

Army's
Corps

units to withdraw.

in the

On November

an

entirely

the Joint Chiefs on

new war:

^"^Schnabel, p. 271.

^^Collins, pp. 219-20.

^^Schnabel, p. 274.

Chinese units also

eastern sector and cut the main supply route of

General Almond's Marine troops on November 28.

MacArthur radioed

27,

89

November

28, sayuig that this

was
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All hope of localization of the

Korean

conflict to

enemy

forces composed of North Korean troops with alien token elements
can now be completely abandoned. The Chinese forces are
committed in North Korea in great and ever increasing strength.
No pretext of minor support under the guise of voluntarism or
other subterfuge now has the slightest validity. We face an
entirely

MacArthur estimated

new war.^^

that

Walker and Almond now apparently faced a

total

Chinese

force of about 300,000 in addition to 50,000 North Koreans.^''"

MacArthur explained

to the Joint Chiefs his theory of Chinese strategy

since the Inchon operation, and said, "Their ultimate objective was imdoubtedly

a decisive effort aimed at the complete destruction of United Nations forces in

on

Whitney, p. 421.

See also Collins, p. 220; Schnabel, pp. 274-75.

^•Schnabel, p. 275; Whitney, p. 421. According to Gen. Bradley's
testimony, however, the figure for Chiaese troops in North Korea was put at
200,000. See Hearings Pt. 2, 972-73. Gen. MacArthur, in his special
communique issued on Nov. 28, 1950, stated, "a major segment of the Chinese
continental armed forces in army, corps and divisional organization of an
aggregate strength of over 200,000 men is now arrayed against the United Nations
forces in North Korea. " See Hearings Pt. 5, 3495. Gen. Walker had reported
,

,

MacArthur
all of them apparently Chinese.

on Nov. 28 that the

to

numbered some
Evidently Walker was referring only

enemy

attack force

200, 000,
to his zone

western sector. See Schnabel, p. 274. It is not clear whether
Bradley used the numbet in Walker's report or he meant to say "over 200,000"
" It may
as in MacArthur 's special communique but had omitted the word "over.
to the
of
Nov.
28
be noted that mitney's quotation from MacArthur 's message
JCS does not give the total number of Chinese forces, but merely identifies
of
seven field armies. Earlier, the UN Command had accepted the estimate
less
about 60,000 to 70, 000 Chinese troops in Korea by Nov. 24, which was
Nov. 25
On
769.
than one -fourth the number actually there. See Apple man, p.
of operation in the

Eighth

Army

149,000, an
Montrose and
Lynn
See
estimate of the day before.
D.C.
(Washington,
The Chosin Reservoir Campaign

intelligence put the

enemy strength on

increase of 95, 000 from its
Captain Nicholas A. Canzona,
U. S. Marine Corps, 1957), p. 140.

its front at
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Korea.

92
"

MacArthur continued, "At the present moment

Yalu River
it

is

the freezing of the

increasingly opens up avenues of reinforcements and supply
which

impossible for our air potential to interdict. "^^ MacArthur further
stated:
quite evident that our present strength of force is
not sufficient to meet this undeclared war by the Chinese with
It is

the inherent advantages which accrue thereby to them. The
resulting situation presents an entire new picture which
broadens the potentialities to world-embracing considerations

beyond the sphere of decision by the Theater Commander.

MacArthur went on

to say:

within its capabilities but is
strength. "^^

"This

command has done

now faced with conditions beyond

"The limitless capabilities

of the entire

Soviet logistical support, were arrayed against

"My

everything humanly possible

it.

the defensive with such local adjustments as

control and its

Chinese nation, with

"^^

strategic plan for the immediate future is to pass

its

MacArthur concluded:

from

the offensive to

may be required by

a constantly

"^"^

fluid situation.

^^See Whitney, pp. 421-22.
^

hhid.

,

p. 422.

^^Schnabel, p. 275.
95

See also Collins, p. 220; Whitney, p. 422.

Collins, pp. 220-221.

^^MacArthur,
but referred to

it,

p.

375.

changing

all

Also Truman, H, 384.

MacArthur did not quote

verbs into the past tense.

See also Schnabel,
Bradley's testimony in Hearings, Pt. 2, 973.
^'^Collins, p. 221.

this report directly,

p.

275;

MacArthur,

p.

375;
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MacArthur's military judgment, prior

Communists strength

to

North Korea turned out

in

November
to

24, 1950, on Chinese

be entirely wrong.

He had

not prepared for such a massive and surprise
counterattack as the Chinese

managed

mount upon

to

the

reverses and had to retreat
to defense

Thus he

was an

felt it

UN

forces.

at once.

His forces almost immediately suffered

His drastic decision to shift from offense

indication of the failure of his offensive advance to the Yalu.

necessary

to provide explanations to the Joint Chiefs to justify

his actions.

After the Joint Chiefs received MacArthur's report, General Bradley

telephoned

Truman

at 6:15 A.

M.

,

November

28, to inform

him about MacArthur's

cable on the extent of damage that the Chinese v/ere inflicting on American

troops in Korea.

Truman
same

day.

called a special meeting of the National Security Council on the

Bradley represented the Joint Chiefs before the Council.

summarized

He

the military situation as serious, but not as catastrophic as news-

paper reports indicated.
turned to the defensive.

Bradley said that MacArthur under heavy attack had

The offensive had been

Chinese intervention; now America knew.

to find out the

The extent

of the U. S.

and the nature of new directives must await clarifications.

^^Truman, H, 385.

dimension of

predicament

The 300 aircraft,

219
including 200 bombers, on Manchiirian airfields
constituted a serious threat to

American forces and American planes crowded on Korean
them

invited retaliation

quiescent.

from Chinese and Russian

To bomb

fields.

aircraft.

So far they were

General Vandenberg concurred in not initiating the
bombing.

Secretary of Defense Marshall produced a report by the
three service
secretaries, with which he and the Joint Chiefs agreed,
recommending that the

United States should continue to act as the executive agent of the
United Nations
and, with its support, not be drawn into a separate conflict with

"We

China.

Communist

should not get ourselves involved either individually or with the

United Nations in a general war with China. "^^^ Hence, the United States
should

use

all

means

to

keep the war limited, not strike Chinese territory, and not use

Chinese Nationalist forces (which, the Joint Chiefs noted, might cause withdrawal
of the

much more

effective British forces).

Bradley added that

States allowed itself to be pulled into a general

war with China,

impossible to continue the build-up of forces

Europe.

The military leaders also urged
to

meet increasing needs for

it.

in

p. 469; also

Truman agreed

Truman,

II,

100

Truman, H,

336.

101

Acheson,

p. 469.

102

Truman, n,

the United

would be

a rapid increase in U. S. military power

with this view and with the

99

Acheson,

it

if

386; Schnabel, p. 286.

385-86,
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necessity for sending to Congress a supplement
budget to take care of the

increased costs of greater military readiness.

There was discussion

of the

need and what might be sent him.

number

replacements MacArthur woidd

of

Generals Marshall, Bradley and Collins

pointed out that in Korea MacArthur would have
to get along with the forces he
had.

Troops for replacement of losses would not be ready

nor new divisions

March

until after

1,

until the

new year,

Even then competing demands

1951.

for

the latter would be heavy.

General Collins said that he thought a line could be held

X

Corps

in the east

back to safety.

105

was

in

Korea.

The

precarious position but probably could be pulled

in a

All the military officers

from

the Defense Department

were

distressed at MacArthur's exposed and scattered tactical position.

They would

call his attention to

to interfere

it,

but

it

was

for

him

to solve;

it

would not help

with operations on the spot.

As
Acheson

to

the National Security Council meeting continued

comment on

the situation.

United States was closer than

been a Chinese involvement

it

in

Acheson expressed his views

had yet been

Korea.

It

to a

p. 469;

104

Schnabel, p. 286.

""^Truman,

II,

387; Acheson, p. 469.

^^^Truman,

IJ,

p.

Acheson,

387.

p. 471.

wider

v/ar.

that the

There had always

had been progTessively uncloaked

103

Acheson,

Truman asked

221
until

now America faced a

full-scale attack.

possibility of Soviet support in any one of

Korea not

in isolation but in its

Soviet antagonist.

We

"Behind this was the somber

many forms. We

worldwide setting

had objectives

to

should consider

of our coDfrontation with our

reach and dangers

to avoid. "107

Ache son continued:

... if we openly accused the Soviet Union of aggression,
the United Nations would be demolished. If we came out and
pointed a finger at the Soviet Union, it would serve no purpose,
because we could do nothing about it. To make the accusation,
however, and then to do nothing about it would only wealcen our
world position. If we proposed action against the Kremlin, on
the other hand, we might find ourselves alone, without allies. ^^8

As

to the

Chinese Communists, Acheson said, "The State Department

would take on the task

of uniting the United Nations against the Chinese

munist aggression and branding

it

as such, regardless of a Soviet veto

Comin the

Security Council. "^^^

Acheson

felt that the

comments were very wise.

memorandum

of the three secretaries and the

His reaction was, as he later wrote:

General MacArthur faced a new situation. This time we
should see that he understood his instructions. He seemed to
have been under the misapprehension that he was supposed to
occupy the north and northeastern parts of Korea. We should
tell him plainly that that was not his mission. We wanted to

lO^Ibid,

^^^Truman,

II,

387.

109

Acheson,

p. 471.

,
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terminate that involvement. We could not defeat
the Chinese
in Korea because they could put in more
men than we could

commit

afford to

Acheson maintained

there.

that the imperative step

States could hold and hold

was

to find a line tliat the United

it.

Such proposals as a cease-fire or demilitarized zone
North could be considered, but there was no indication
that any such arrangements could be made. To pull out
of
in the

Korea at this stage v/ould be disastrous for us. Outside of
Korea we should speed building our own military strength
and that of our European allies.
Acheson believed

that

if

the United States

went

into

Manchuria and bombed

the airfields there with any degree of success, "Russia would cheerfully get in
it,

"

and that the Russians were trying to lure America into this bigger-than-

ever trap inside their perimeter and bleed America dry.

Truman

told the

NSC

that he had thought at first that he ought to go

before Congress and address a special session but that he did not now
this

would be

should not

The

"Korea was a United Nations matter, aad our country

right.

make an

tliink

individual approach to

first reaction of

it.

"

-|

America's leaders

1

o

in

Washington

to

massive Chinese

coimterattack was to re-commit the United States to a United Nations approach
to the problem, and to maintain the policy of a limited

110^

.

,

Ibid.

Ibid .

^^^Truman, H, 387-88.
113
Ibid.

,

388.

war

in

Korea, i.e.

.
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not be pulled into a general war with Communist
China.

was

America's perspective

the possibility of a worldwide confrontation with
the Soviet Union, in

which Korea occupied only a minor point, less significant
than Europe.

Thus,

as Acheson wrote, 'We could not defeat the Chinese in
Korea because they
could put in

more men than we could

been realized earlier, would

it

afford to

commit

there. "

If

had

this

have made any difference to America's policy

on Chinese Communist intervention?

Until the Chinese actually launched their

full-scale counteroffensive, the United States

was pursuing an

opportunistic

policy of desiring Korean unification as a result of the use of force, even
after

Chinese units had appeared on the scene and contacted the

America

short while.

on such a large scale.

did not believe that the Chinese
In addition,

UN

forces for a

commitment could be

General MacArthur underestimated Chinese

strength and would, in any event, welcome the opportunity to defeat them in

Korea.

He took advantage

of the ambiguity in

America's policy on Korean

unification and the use of force to urge a quick drive to the Yalu and occupation
of all of

Korea

not stopped

in

in

cooperation with the efforts of the United Nations.

these attempts, but

now

the disaster

and military position of the United States was

The Joint Chiefs, with

MacArthur 's estimate

of the situation

their approval of his plans to pass
told

him

came upon

the

He was

UN

forces

in peril

the approval of

Truman, accepted

and advised him on November 29

from

the offensive to the defensive.

of

They

to put aside any previous directives in conflict with his current plan

224
to defend.

They stated

that strategic and tactical considerations

Concerned with the exposed position

X

coordination between the

X

Corps and

Corps and the Eighth Army,

information regarding these points.
close the gap between

of the

Almond and

^^"^

They suggested

Wall<:er and

were paramount.

the apparent lack of
the Joint Chiefs requested

that

Mac Arthur

form a continuous defense

should
line

across the peninsula.

Also on November 29 the Joint Chiefs sent a message

to

MacArthur

in

reply to his recommendation of using Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa.

MacArthur had cabled on

that day the following substance:

Thirty-three thousand seasoned troops from Formosa
in accordance with the United Nations Security
Council Resolution on June 27 for operations in Korea. The
United States declined this offer from the Chinese Embassy in
Washington because Formosa was threatened with imminent
attack and preservation of the full defensive strength of the
Chinese Government was necessary. The belief that use of
Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would be an excuse for

were offered

formal intervention on behalf of the North Koreans by the
Chinese Communists probably influenced the declination. No
longer valid are either of these reasons for declination. As I
reported yesterday, Chinese Communist intervention in Korea
is already most full and complete, and Formosa was relatively
freed from danger of potential attack with the movement northward in China of the center of gravity of the Chinese forces
following the landing at Inchon.
The only potential source of reinforcement available for
early commitment are the Chinese armies on Formosa. In
approximately 14 days troops from this force could be landed

^l^Collins, p. 222; Bradley's testimony in Hearings, Pt.

^""^Schjtiabel, p.

279.

2,

973.
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in

Korea.

desired, there would undoubtedly be made available a much larger force than originally offered.
I strongly recommend: That you authorize my direct
If

negotiations with

tlie authorities of the Chinese Governm.ent on
order to reinforce our position in Korea, I would
arrange for the movement north of such Chinese units as may
be needed and desirable. These units would be incorporated

Formosa.

in the

The reply from

In

UN command.

the Joint Chiefs on

November

29, on President

Truman's

instructions "after a lengthy conference in which State Department and Defense

Department took part,

" called

MacArthur's attention

implication of his recommendation and reaffirmed U.

United Nations

to the international

S.

Commitment

to collective

action and the desirability of maintaining allied unity in the

United Nations:

Your proposal is being considered. It involves worldwide consequences. We shall have to consider the possibility
that it would disrupt the united position of the nations associated
with us in the United Nations, and leave us isolated. It may
be wholly unacceptable to the commonwealth coimtries to have
their forces employed witli Nationalist Chinese. It might extend
hostilities to Formosa and other areas. Incidentally, our
position of leadership in the Far East is being most seriously
compromised in the United Nations. The utmost care will be
necessary to avoid the disruption
up in that organization.

of the essential Allied line-

'

^^^MacArthur's testimony; see Hearings Pt. 1, 271-72. The reasoning
here was similar to Senator Wm. F. Knowland's telegram to Secy, of State
Ache son on Nov. 6, 1950. See N. Y. Times Nov. 7, 1950, cited in Stone,
,

,

p.

175.

Truman,

II,

385.
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On November

30, 1950,

MacArthur responded

Joint Chiefs of the need to close the gap between the

to the suggestion by the

X

Corps and the Eighth

Army:
Any concept of actual physical combination of the
forces of the Eighth Army and X Corps in a practically
continuous line across the narrow neck of Korea is quite
impracticable due to the length of this line, the numerical
weakness of our forces, and the logistical problems created
by the mountainous divide which splits such a front from
north to south.
second message a few hours' later, MacArthur gloomily predicted

In a

that the Eighth

Army would not

future and would

".

.

.

be able to make a stand in the foreseeable

successively have to replace to the rear.

concluded that the Chinese intended
completely and to secure

all of

"

He had now

to destroy the United Nations forces

Korea.

Misjudgment about Chinese Intervention;
An Assessment

Why

did the United States misjudge Chinese intentions and Chinese

strength, so that the

Korean disaster came upon America

in

December 1950

and January 1951? What were the policy-mal^ers' assumptions regarding
Chinese intervention? What policy did the United States actually pursue toward
the Chinese

Communists on Korea? What went wrong?

^•^^Schnabel, p. 280.

Ibid.
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Chinese intervention

in

Korea went through four

threat of military intervention before
(2)

movement

of

stages:

American forces crossed

UN

the 38th parallel;

troops in late October and early November;

engagement after November

6; (4)

massive counterattack

in later

subsequent total commitment to the defeat of US/UN forces
In retrospect

is

it

crossing the 38th parallel

Truman
the

in

(3)

dis-

November and

Korea.

clear that the Chinese meant their warning about

m

early October'.

discount their tlireat at that time ?

who transmitted

official

Chinese units across the Yalu into North Korea
and powerful

engagements with some

was suspect.

(1)

For one

But why did the United States
thing, the channel of

did not trust Panikkar, the Indian

message.

And

Ambassador

in Peking,

the timing of the October 3 warning

interpreted as diplomatic blackmail, since a

was pending, which was intended

communication

UN

to "authorize"

was

General Assembly resolution

UN forces

These were the reasons that Truman and Ache son

to cross the parallel.

later gava^^^

It

should be

noted that the Chinese did not threaten to intervene in Korea until after the
military situation had clearly shifted against the North Koreans in the wake of
the Inchon

Korean regime was
situation would

forces

if

By

landing.

in

seem

that time

danger.

to

it

was evident

that the existence of the North

For the United States

promise a quick and easy victory over the North Korean

the 38th parallel did not stand in the way.

Truman,

II,

to exploit this military

The sudden success

362; Acheson, p. 452; Hearings, Pt. 3, 1833.

of
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Inchon had changed America's attitude toward Chinese threat of intervention.

No longer was
of

Korea, as

there any fear that Chinese entry might push

US/UN

days of the defense of the Pusan Perimeter.

in the

indicated in the directive of October 9, 1950

from the

forces out

Indeed, as

Joint Chiefs, with

Presidential approval, to MacArthur, the United States was now prepared to
fight against

major Chinese Communist

units anywhere in

Korea as long as

there was, in MacArthur's judgment, a reasonable chance of success.

a sense, Chou's warning of October 3 arrived too late.
the Inchon landing,

it

woidd have certainly been taken

and might have affected America's policy choices.

1

If it

had come before

into serious consideration

90

At first there might be other reasons for the United States
that

it

was more

that they v/ould.

likely that the Chinese

As Acheson

to estimate

Communists would not intervene than

later testified during the

Among

In

MacArthur hearings:

the reasons for believing that they v/ould not

were the amount of well-trained troops which they
would have to commit, the possible weal^ening of the Government in China itself, the lack of real advantage to China itself
in coming in, ... its position internationally, it would

come

in

probably lose ground rather than gain ground

in its international

position. 123

But

in late

October and early November when the

12lTruman,
^^^cf.
p.

II,

UN

forces met with

362.

Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power

136.

123

Hearings, Pt.

3,

2101.

(N. Y.

:

Wiley, 19G0),
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strong resistance from Chinese Communist units and even suffered setbacks,
there v/as no longer any question about Chinese military presence in North

Korea.

What, then, did America's policy-makers assume under the circum-

stances?

Why was

there no stop of MacArthur's advance to the north?

Even though Washington knew the concentrations

of

Manchuria and near the Yalu border, and their capabilities

Korea with

full strength,

Chinese intentions

The United

,

Chinese troops

in

to intervene in

America's strategy was based on a reading

of

while failing to give proper weight to Chinese capabilities.

States would rather believe that Chinese intervention

This thinking was reinforced by Chinese

scale and could not be decisive.

disengagement after November

was on a small

125
6.

In any event,

America could not ascertain

the precise strength and locations of Chinese forces in North Korea despite
air reconnaissance.

Perhaps more importantly

in

terms

of policy consideration

was

the lack

of fear of Chinese intervention, as long as the Soviets did not intervene.

Inchon, MacArthur

was particularly

especially American air power,

confident that

was capable

American military might,

of dealing with the Chinese forces

through the decisive effect of air interdiction and close air support.

-^^'^See

Ridgway,

After

126

This

p. 243.

""^Walter A. Zelman, Chinese Intervention in the Korean War security
/Jso Rees, p. 131.
studies paper (Los Angeles: UCLA, 19G7), pp. 12-13.
,

•^^^Tsou, p. 575; Appleman, p. 765.
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confidence was most explicitly expressed by MacArthur
at

challenged by none of the conferees from the

when

the Chinese units began to appear in North

forces in late October and early
the

Far East Air Force

of the

He also ordered the bombing

war.

power

power

that he

It

was based on

Island and

administration.

Korea and attacked

November MacArthur ordered

to exert its full

Chinese reinforcement.
air

Truman

Wake

order

in

of the

to

Later

the

UN

on November

knock the enemy out

Yalu bridges

to try to stop

this strategy of the effective use of

argued strongly on November

9 that his

mission

in

Korea

should not be changed but that by resuming the attack northward, he
should

and could destroy the remaining enemy forces
finally decided on

in

Korea.

Among

November

9 to allow

in

the ingredients of this decision

concept of Chinese power.

North Korea.

MacArthur

Washington

to attempt military victory

must have been America's

Without Soviet assistance, Chinese Communist

power standing alone was underestimated and not respected

at this time.

America's policy toward the Chinese Communists on Korea

November

9,

while, at the

toward the Yalu.
resolution, on

Communists

to

The reassurances were given by way

November

10, to the

after

UN

to continue to

p. 24;

advance

of introducing a

Security Council urgirgthe Chinese

withdraw also their personnel from Korea and by way

^^'See McLellan (1966),
588.

^^'^

1950 was to offer reassurances respecting Manchurian borders

same time, allowing MacArtliur's forces

5

of

Goodrich, p. 136; and Tsou, pp. 579,
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President Truman's public statement on November
16, saying, "we have

never at any time entertained any intention

On

to

carry hostilities

into China. "

the question of whether MacArthur's forces
should continue to

advance toward the Yalu, since his mission had been kept under
review, the
basic policy decision v/as made on November 21, 1950 that
they should.

This was treated as a military matter for the

theater

commander

How?

to conduct. ^^8

Especially after the spectacular success of Inchon, the Joint Chiefs
hesitated
to

challenge quicldy MacArthur's strategy.

civilian leaders in

dispositions of

direct

him

UN

Though the military and

Washington were "deeply apprehensive" about MacArthur's
forces, they did not feel that they were in a position to

to take a particular

In retrospect,

it

is

course of action other than his own.

easy for other observers to ask the question as to

why MacArthur's forces had not taken

better defensive positions, such as

withdrawing to Korea's narrow "neck,

"

the

problem

at that

time was not seen

presented as how best

to

advance

or even just stopped advancing.

in this perspective.

v/ith least

risks.

But

Rather the issue was

The military leaders

Washington did not come up with any alternative military course

in

that they

could or would impose on MacArthur, except to suggest to him that as his

128

Acheson,
1

p. 468.

29

See Ibid.

,

p. 467.
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forces advanced closer to the Yalu
he should hold the high
for a buffer .one.

The idea

of withdrawing or stopping

terrain to

make way

was never seriously

considered by Washington.
Since the continual advance of
MacArthur's forces to the Y^Uu was

treated as a military question, Acheson
"was unwilling to urge on the President

a military course that his military
advisers would not propose. "l^O
clear what military course Acheson
had thought

of.

Perhaps militarily

^^^^

it

was
wa

too late to change any course of action
witliout involving tactical withdrawal
or

pause, which would then run counter to the
basic policy decision of November

From

21 to advance.

the military point of view, once the 38th
parallel

crossed, there seemsd

to be

no better place

to stop than at the

was

Yalu and as

quickly as possible.

The discussion must inevitably switch back
and risks of America's military drive to the Yalu.

to the political implications

To what

extent were America's

policy decision-makers aware of the military risks of
Chinese intervention?

Wliy had not Chinese intervention been tal^en

more seriously?

In addition to the previous discussion on this subject, the U. S.

intelligence estimate of the Chinese troops in North
24, 1950,

was less than one-fourth

knowledge of

it,

^^^ibid.

,

the

number

Korea prior

actually there.

to

Without America's

by the end of the third week of November, the Xni

p. 468.

November

Army Group
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of the

CCF

Fourth Field

was concentrated
the

CCF

Army

with 18 divisions of infantry (180,000 men),

,

in front of the U.

Third Field

Army

,

S.

Eighth

Army, and

S.

X

Corps.

A

total of

Chinese infantry troops were thus actually deployed

UN

Army Group

front-line strength of about 100, 000 out of a

in

approximately 300, 000

North Korea^^^ against

command numbering

together about 377,000 of which 200, 000 were South Koreans.

It

required a clear indication of large-scale Chinese military presence

Korea

to

narrow

of

with 12 divisions of infantry (120,000 men), was

concentrated in front of the U.

the

IX

the

al-

would have
in

North

convince America that MacArthur's forces had better stop at the

''neck" of

Chinese attacks.

The

Korea where they might be able
But U.

failure of

position and the

S.

to hold in face of possible

leaders did not find any such evidence.

America's intelligence with regard

movement

of

Chinese Communist forces

to the strength, the

in

Korea was due

partly to the "perfect camouflage discipline" of the Chinese.

Appleman, the

CCF march

discipline and performance in

"equaled the best examples of antiquity.

accounted for the secrecy with

131

"

vv^hieh the

See Appleman, pp. 766-69.

According

Korea

This capability

in

at this

to

time

large part

Chinese Commiinisis entered and

Also Rees,

p.

136.

^^^Rees, p. 148. In terms of divisions, Collins writes: "Thus, as the
United Nations forces prepared to renew the attack in late November, the
Eighth Army of four United States divisions, three ROK divisions, and a
British and a Turkish brigade was actually confronted by eighteen divisions
of the CCF XIII Army Group. Similarly, the X Corps of three United States
divisions and two ROK divisions was taking on twelve divisions of the CCF IX

Army

Group.

"

Collins, p. 218.
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and deployed in North Korea.

The

UN

aerial observers did not see

them nor

did the aerial photographs reveal their presence.

On

the part of the Chinese, they did have a need for secrecy.

deployment
power.

of troops

over the Yalu would have exposed them

Secrecy could also obtain the element of surprise

"They really foded us when

it

Senator Leverett Saltonstall
hearings.

comes

of

right

down

to

it,

in

didn't

to

Open

An^ rican

air

case of attacks.

^'^^

they?" asked

Secretary Acheson during the MacArthur

"''^^
'Tes, sir, " replied Ache son..

What was

the effect of America's policy of reassurance to

China that the Chinese frontier with Korea would not be violated?

viewed with suspicion.

The

attitude of the Chinese

United States had been hostile since July

1,

1949,

Communist
It

was

Communists toward the

when Mao Tse-tung proclaimed

his policy of leaning toward one side, the Soviet Union, in a speech on People's

Democratic Dictatorship.
proclaimed

in

''^^

October, 1949

Soon after the People's Republic of China was

Mao went

to

Moscow and concluded

a Treaty of

Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union on February
14, 1950.

Article

I

of the

Treaty provided:

^^^Appleman, pp. 769-70.

Also Rees, pp. 133-34.

^^^See Zelman, p. 14.
^^^ Hearings, Pt. 3, 1835.

Committee on Foreign Relations, The United
Question of llapprochement
States and Commimist China in 1949 and 1950: The
"^^^See U. S. Senate,

and Recognition,

A

11-12.
staff study, (Washington, 1973), pp.
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aU

the

Both High Contracting Parties i-uidertake jointly
to tal^e
necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose
of

preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of
peace on
the part of Japan or any other state which should unite
with
Japan, directly or inchrectly, in acts of aggression. In the
event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked
by
Japan or states allied by it, and thus being involved
a state
of war, the other High Contracting Party will immediately
render military aad other assistance with all the means at its

m

disposal.

The High Contracting Parties also declare their readiness
in the spirit of sincere co-operation to participate in all international actions aimed at ensuring peace and security throughout
the world, and will do all in their power to achieve the spe3diest
implementation of these tasks. ''"'^'^

As Harold Vinacke analyzes

the article, "Since the United States played

the dominant role in the military occupation of Japan, and since Japan had been

completely disarmed and was inacapable of attack, this article necessarily must
be viewed as being actually directed against the United States rather than against
Japan.

That fact, however, was put

in the indirect

language of diplomacy.

At any rate this alliance between the People's R,epublic

of

"

China and the Soviet

Union was a key element in the Communist alignment against the free world.

The

hostile attitude of the Chinese

Communists toward

139

the United States

137
Soviet Monitor, issued by Tass Agency, London, No. 11, 311, Feb.
15, 1950. "Reprinted in John M. Maki, Conflict and Tension in the Far East,
Key Documents, 1894-1960 (Seattle, Univ. of Wasliington Press, 19G1), pp. 172-73.

''^^Harold

M

Vinacke, Far Eastern Politics

Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956), pp. 161-62.
139

Maki,

p. 157.

in the

Postwar Period (N.Y.

;
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received the strongest reinforcement from President Truman's
announcement

on June 27, 1950 to neutralize the Formosa (Taiwan) Strait with the U.
Seventh Fleet.
action in

Korea

They would

link this

move,

in their interpretation, with

America's

to distrust the intentions of the United States in Asia, particularly

with respect to Communist China.

As Ambassador

Wu

Republic of China declared in his address before the

November

S.

28, 1950,

when

the Chinese

Communist

Hsiu-chuan of the People's

UN

Security Council on

units in North

Korea began

their massive counterattack upon MacArthur's forces:

The Chinese people have witnessed with their own eyes
Taiwan fall prey to aggTession and the flames of the United
States war of aggression against Korea leap towards them.
Thus stirred into righteous anger they are volunteering in
great numbers to go to the aid of the Korean people.
In malving Japan its main war base in the East, launching
armed aggression against Korea and Taiwan, carrying out
active intervention against Viet-Nam and tightening its control
over other countries in Asia, the United States Government is
,

.

.

.

systematically building up a military encirclement of the
People's Republic of China, in preparation for further attack
on the People's Republic of China, and to stir up a Third World
War. 140
In a speech on

December

16,

Ambassador

Wu

addressed himself more

specifically to the issue of assurances on non-violation of Manchurian border

with Korea.

Wu

said in part:

I

have heard much empty talk

the effect that the troops

now

in the Security Council to

fighting in

Korea have no

intention

committing aggression against the northeastern [Manchurian]
territory of China. Moreover, it is said that the majority of the
members of the Security Council are ready to put such assurances
of

Meeting, No.
^'^^UN Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, 527th
69, pp. 22-23.
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into a resolution.

It seems that the Chinese
people should now
This is taking the Chinese people for idiots.
It is to be noted that those
countries which wish to assure
us that the United States troops in Korea would not
violate the
territory of China are precisely those which mamtain
that the
United States Seventh Fleet should remain in the Taiwan
Straits
and continue its aggression against China.
... the United States Government has invaded the
territory of China, Taiwan, while its armed forces threaten
to approach the border of China from another direction.
Yet
the United States Government and its accomplices are demanding
that the Chinese people believe in their assurances that the
armed forces which are approaching China's border would not
invade China's territory.

rest assured.

What

the United States had failed to recognize

was

that

MacArthur's

military drive to the Yalu would appear to the Chinese as a serious threat.

As A,Doak Barnett

writes, "Peking genuinely feared

tlie

control of the strategic Korean Peninsula by unfriendly

Louis
of

J.

^"^^

consequences of complete
military forces.

"-'^'^^

Halle also reviews China's and Japan's views of the sensitivity to them

Korea's position.

we Americans had been steeped in Far
Eastern history we would have understood that, by its geogTaphy,
the Korean peninsula had been for centuries, and was bound to
be, a strategic point of the utmost sensitivity, at least as much
Perhaps

if

so as the Rhtneland or the Turkish Straits.

Important Documents Concerning the Question of Taiwan
Foreign Languages Press, Oct, 1955). An extract from the speech

(Peking,
is printed

in Richard Moorsteen and Morton Abramowitz, Remaldng China Policy (Cambridge
Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 90-91.

142

McLeilan, "Ache son and War,

" (1968), p.

18.

Communist China and Asia (New York: Harper,

1960), p. 94.
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... The endless contest between Chinese and Japanese
over the Korean peninsula goes back to the
beginnings of
Japanese history, and it continues today with
the

in the place of the Japanese.

... Of what

Americans

this long history

meant, however, we Americans were unaware
when we made
ourselves the successor power in Japan and, at the
same time
occupied the southern half of Korea. One may
doubt that the
subsequent clash with China over the Korean peninsula,
for
which we were unprepared, was altoge1:]:er accidental. ^'^'^
Just as

passing of

all

the Chinese

America had

Korea

of

into hostile

must have

November, partly

to intervene in June 1950, partly to prevent
the

felt the

hands

for the salce of Japan's securitjs so

same way.when

they intervened in October and

to deny their border to U. S. forces and to protect the
center

Chinese industry in Manchuria, especially since they had the means

to do so.

David McLeUan finds, "The importance of North Korea as a historic
invasion,

route into Manchuria and North China seems to have figured scarcely
"-^'^^

at all in

Acheson's deliberations with his

Ache son

finally realized this point but he did not attempt to stop

staff.

On November

21, 1950,

MacArthur from

driving to the Yalu, partly because he doubted that the Communists believed
that the United States would use

was

the military's view that

of the

Korean frontier.

Korea as an invasion route.

More important

MacArthur 's advance should not be halted short

The Army's

top planning officer in the Pentagon,

-^^%alle, pp. 192-93.

145
'See Osgood (1957), p. 184. For views and speculations on Peldng's
other calculations and reasonings in Korean intervention, see Wliiting, pp. 15162;Rees, p. 113, Tsou, pp. 576-79.

MoLellan, "Acheson and War,

" (1968), p. 21.
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Major General Charles Bolte

,

Korean-Manchurian frontier.
between

officials of the

was strongly opposed

to any buffer zone on the

In preparation for the

meeting of November 21

Departments

Chief of Staff Collins in a

memo

of

Defense and State, Bolte told

Army

that the drive to the border would no doubt

increase the tenseness of the situation to some extent, but he emphasized
the decision to cross the 38th parallel
of

Korea should be cleared

of

was based on

the consideration that all

Communist forces, and

Manchuria should be recognized as an open act

tliat

that an attack

from

of military aggression.

Further,

the United Nations would actually have a better chance of localizing the conflict

by driving

all

Communist forces from North Korea. A show

well discourage further aggression where wealmess

As mentioned
to

earlier

,

the final decision of

push forward while merely suggesting

to

vv^ould

November
him

21

of strength

^^'^

encourage

was

might

to allow

it.

MacArthur

that he might want to stop at

the high terrain south of the Yalu.

Acheson seemed also

to

have been betrayed into discounting Communist

China's capacity for action by his preoccupation with Moscow.

148
It

was

strongly felt that unless the Soviet Union had decided to start a global war,

Chinese intervention

in

Korea was improbable since "mainland China was

dependent on the Russians.

147

Memo, G-3, DA

"

It

was thought

that

if

Moscow

did not want a

USA, 21 Nov 50, sub: Statc-Defhise
A. Sec Sclmabel, pp. 2(37-68.
Annex
High-Level Mtg on Korea, with
for Cof S

148

McLellan, "Acheson and

War

,

" (1968), p.

18.

240

general war; the Chinese, then, would have to show restraint.

Neustadt, pp. 141-42- H. A. DeWeerd, "Strategic Surprise in the
Korean War,'^ Orbis, VL (Fall 19G2), p. 446.

CHAPTER

VI

AMERICA'S REACTIONS TO CfflNESE ATTACKS

Discussions in Washington and Defensive Stand
in

Korea

President Truman held a news conference on November 30, 1950.

Among

other matters, he stated:

Recent developments in Korea confront the world with
crisis. The Chinese Communist leaders have sent
serious
a
their troops from Manchuria to launch a strong and wellorganized attack against the United Nations forces in North
Korea.

.

.

.

The Chinese attack was made
in the

and it
forced withdrawal of

in great force,

It has resulted
still continues.
large parts of the United Nations command. The battlefield
situation is uncertain at this time. We may suffer reverses
as we have suffered them before. But the forces of the United
Nations have no intention of abandoning their mission in

Korea.

^

When Trimian was asked by
the use of the atomic

bomb

a reporter whether there was active consideration of
to

meet

the military situation,

"there has always been active consideration of
day, a separate "clarifying statement"

its

use. "

Truman
Later on,

was issued emphasizing

replied that
in the

that "by law,

atom bomb, and no such
only the President can authorize the use of the

Hearings, Pt.

5,

3496.

same

"
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authorization has been given.
the military
of the

commander

weapon.

If

and when such authorization should be given,

in the field

would have charge

of the tactical delivery

2

The news reports

of the President's press conference immediately aroused

great anxiety and tension among British leaders.

At the end of the afternoon,

British Am.bassador Sir Oliver Franks presented a telegram from Prime

Minister Clement Attlee, who wanted as soon as convenient to discuss with

President Truman three items: the possible extension of the war in the Far
East; raw-material supplies and their effect upon U.

S.

-British joint ability to

play their respective parts; and Western European defense.

The talks were

subsequently arranged to begin on December 4 in Washington.

As a

result of powerful Chinese attacks, MacArthur's forces continued to

retreat and suffered heavy casualties throughout later

December. According
campaign
to

of the

December

X

to Collins, the battle casualties ui

Corps

in

19, totalled

action and 4,779

November and early
tlie

"ill-fated"

North Korea during the period from November 27

approximately 11, 500, of which 705 were lulled

were missing

(the rest

were presumably wounded

in

in action).

2

Acheson, pp. 478-79; Truman, H, 395-96; Dept.
(Dec. 11, 1950), p. 925.

\cheson,

p. 479;

"^Collins, p. 227.

Truman,

11,

396.

of State Bulletin
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This figure did not include those suffered by the Eighth
sector.

Army.

A
It

check was made on December

had lost almost

1 of the

Army

in the

western

2nd Division of the Eighth

000 officers and men, about one third of

5,

authorized strength, in the last few days of November.

its

Heavy casualties and

severe military reverses constituted the necessary background against which

Washington had

to consider

ways

to react to

Chinese attacks throughout

December.

On Dece

Tiber 1, a State -Defense meeting

Ache son pointed out

was convened

that the failure of MacArthur's attack

upon" the United States.

The

first questions

at the Pentagon.

was now "hard

were whether and where

it

was

possible to hold a line, what political measures would help to stabilize the
situation, and

whether or not they should be started

possible to hold a line
to

it.

at this stage.

a whole set of questions arose that

If it

America should begin

examine, such as either extending the conflict or seeking for a way
Here, military and political measures "must march together.

The result

of a "very full and frank" discussion

possible to answer Acheson's questions yet.
confusing.

^Ibid.

,

later:

p. 224.

^Acheson,

p. 472.

was

that

it

to

end

"

was not

The reports were confused and

United Nations forces m.ight have to

Ache son wrote

was not

fall

much

farther back.

As

—
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and X Corps could be
not be able to hold a line at
but be forced into beacliheads at Inchon, Wonsan, and
.

.

.unless the Eighth

imited and regrouped,
all,

Army

we might

Pusan. In such an eventuality, the possibility of holding the
beaclAeads against possible Chinese and Russian bombing
was doubtful. The use of nuclear weapons by us could lead
to incalculable consequences. For the present, and unless
the preservation of our troops required it, the balancing
of the pros and cons of bombing Manchurian territory,
including air and other bases, was against doing so. On
this the Chiefs of Staff and civilian secretaries were
unanimous. 7
'

At this State-Defense meeting on December

1,

two other measures

blockading the China coast and using Nationalist troops from

examined again and ruled out for both a

Formosa— were

tactical and strategic reason.

At best they could be of only peripheral value.
Furthermore, until we laiew whether our forces would have
to be evacuated from Korea or moved about by water, the
Navy's fighting ships and transports should not be sent off
on secondary missions. But even more basically the peripheral
gain from these measures would put us on our own and lose
us

the great advantage of our

Ul^I

position, leadership, and

support. ^

At this meeting

it

was

felt.

Of the various political aids to battle— cease-fire,
demilitarized zones, and so on--the only practicable and
usefid one

seemed

to be holding the United Nations to a

condemnation of the Chinese, useful in itself and as a counteroffensive to Russian resolutions attacking our positions
regarding Formosa.^

Ibid.

^

Ibid.

.

pp. 472-73.

^Ibid.

,

p. 473.

245

On
the

X

this day the Joint Chiefs told

Corps

to the

Mac Arthur

that after his withdrawal of

Hamliimg-IIungnam area, as planned, the operations and

positioning of the Eighth

Army

and the

X

Corps "shoidd be

sufficiently

coordinated to prevent large enemy forces from passing between Uiem or
outflanking either of them. "

The Joint Chiefs authorized Mac Arthur

the entire region northeast of the

narrow waist

to ignore

of the country except for such

operations as v/ere necessary for the military security of his command.

December
in

2

was a busy day

for U. S. foreign policy decision -makers

"Suggestions of approaching the Chinese or the Russians

Washington.

witli

proposals for a cease-fire, either through Sir Senegal Rau or Sir Girja
Bajpai of India or the Russians directly through our embassy, were vetoed.

Toward

the end of the day,

produced.

some

Acheson took them

to "concert"

to

briefing notes and an intelligence paper were

Secretary of Defense Marshall's apartment

recommendations with him.

Marshall raised the dilemma that

evacuation of Korea would pose bet-vveen saving U.

S.

troops and America's

Then with General Bradley they went

national honor.

to the President about

eight o'clock, received Presidential instructions, with which Acheson

to a

group awaiting him

in the State

Department.

^^Collins, p. 228; Schnabel, p. 280.

^Acheson,
^^

p. 473.

Ibid.

,

p. 475.

Ibid.

,

p. 473.

^^

13

relumed
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The

intelligence paper, with the conclusions of which Acheson,
Marshall

and Truman were

all in

agreement, made the following points:
Chinese deployment and action

in Manchuria and Korea
were aimed to make the U. S. -UN position in Korea untenable.
The attitude of the regime and the magnitude of military

preparations in China itself indicated an appreciation of the risk
of general war with the United States that this effort entailed.

was unlikely that the Chinese would have run this risk without
some assurances of support from the Soviet Union. Support

It

would probably include,

ascending order: continued provisions
and perhaps, if necessary, "volimteers";

in

of materiel, teclmicians,

air units and anti-aircraft batteries for defense of targets in
Manchuria should U. S. -UN air attack them; appropriate military

support under the Sino-Soviet treaty in the event of U. S. -UN
operations against other Chinese territory. Furthermore, the
Soviet Union must have appreciated and decided to risk the

increased danger of both general U. S. -Chinese war and global
war, which Chinese intervention on the then existing scale might
cause.

Kremlin probably saw advantages to it in
-Chinese war flowing from the diversion, attrition, and
Finally, the

U. S.

the

containment of U. S. forces in an indecisive theater; the creation
of conflict between the United States and her European allies
and the obstruction of NATO plans; the disruption of UN unity
against the original aggression in Korea, thus also aiding Communist
objectives in Southeast Asia. If, however, the United States
should decline the gamble of war with China and withdraw from
Korea, the USSR might be counting on collecting the stal^es in
Korea and Indochina. Iq any event, the United States Government
should expect aggressive Soviet pursuit of its attack on the world
position of the United States. Other aggressions in Asia and

Europe were not

to be counted out.

Truman accepted some recommendations
Nations and rejected others.

llDid.

,

pp. 473-74.

Acheson wrote:

for U. S. course at the United
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We were

directed to put immediately on the agenda of

Assembly an item with an accompanying memorandmn
raising the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.
It should
leave open the action that we would urge after consultation
with
Attlee, who was arriving in thirty-six hours. We should,
however
propose to him to renew in the General Assembly under the
"Uniting for Peace" doctrine the resolution that the Soviet Union

the General

had vetoed in ttie Security Council and which com.bined assurance
to China concerning its "legitimate interests" with an urgent
appeal to desist from interference in Korea. Its provisions were
not wholly appropriate to the changed fortunes of war, but it
had the advantage of keeping our own position steady and calm
and holding our UN allies together for a while, at least. The

President wished us to meet with the Chiefs of Staff first thing
the next morning to consider latest developments and report to
him again immediately afterward.

On December

MacArthur reported

3,

to the Joint Chiefs, calling for

ground reinforcements, or else his command would be forced

head bastion" positions.
Eighth

Army

and

X

to take

MacArthur remained firmly against any

Corps

at this time.

up "beach-

junction of the

After explaining the reasons for his

objection, he went on to state:

do not believe that full comprehension exists of the
basic changes which have been v/rought by the undisguised entrance
by the Chinese Army into the combat. Already Chinese troops to
the estimated strength of approximately 26 divisions are in line
of battle with an additional minimum of 200, 000 to the enemy
rear and remnants of the North Korean Army are being reorganized
in the rear and there stands, of course, behind all the entire
.^^
military potential of Communist China.
I

^^

Ibid.

,

p. 474.

'"^Truman, H, 392; see also Schnabel, p. 281.
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MacArthur said

that because of the nature of the terrain and the distance

from

the

sea where the major fighting was taking place the effectiveness of his superior
air

power and the potentials

"the

of

of naval gunfire support

comparison more and more becomes one

ground forces.

"

were greatly reduced.

of relative

Thus,

combat effectiveness

He continued:

clearly evident, therefore, that unless ground
reinforcements of the greatest magnitude are promptly
It is

Command will be either forced into successive
with
diminished powers of resistance after each
withdrawals
such move, or will be forced to take up beachliead bastion
positions which, while insuring a degree of prolonged resistance,
supplied, this

hope of anything beyond defense.
command actually under present conditions
is facing the entire Chinese nation in an undeclared war and
unless some positive and immediate action is tal^en, hope for
success cannot be justified and steady attrition leading to
final destruction can reasonably be contemplated.-'-'^

would afford

little

This small

In the face of strong Chinese counterattacks,

MacArthur

still

wanted the

kind of "success" which would require substantial ground reinforcements speedily
supplied to defeat Chinese troops and achieve military victory in Korea.

he used such exaggerated terms as "This small command.
Chinese nation,

"

to

emphasize his need and demand.

.

.

Thus

facing the entire

He pictured

the alternative

course as ignominious v/ithdrawals to the beachhead positions for defense only.

The Joint Chiefs obtained Truman's approval on December
to

MacArthur on December

4:

"We consider

3

and replied

that the preservation of your forces

^"^Truman, H, 392. See also Schnabel, pp. 281-82.
MacArthur 's message of Dec. 3, see Truman, II, 391-33.

For the

full text of
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is

now

primary consideration.

the

concurred

Truman

in. "

sacrifice men.

seemed best

Consolidation of forces into beachheads is

took the position, he later wrote, that "we must not

Until the United Nations decided to support a major move,

to concentrate our strength on beachheads that

we might be

it

able

to hold.

Obviously the United States Government in Washington did not share

MacArthur's desire

to

new circumstances.

win a decisive victory over the Chinese forces under the

Originally the policy of allowing

Yalu had an opportunistic aspect.
done.

But

if it

Mac Arthur

Washington had thought

did not turn out as expected, Washington

prepared to devote additional resources

it

done.

was much more important than

the defense of Japan

defense of Europe

to get

in

turn

was more

it

to

push

to the

could be easily

was neither

willing nor

For, in comparison,

the action in Korea, the

vital than that of Asia;

and America's

resources were not without limitation and could not be spent too much on Korea.
Therefore preservation of MacArthur's current forces,

at least to defend

Japan, became the primary consideration.
In early

the

Far East

at

December, Army Chief

was directed

to fly to

directly
once to get some firsthand information and to obtain

from MacArthur

him and

of Staff Collins

available to
his estimate of the capabilities of the forces then

well as to consult with his
his views about a possible cease-fire, as

'^Truman,

11,

393.

See also Schnabel, p. 282.
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principal field commanders.

During the course of discussions
the State and Defense Departments on
to obtain a cease-fire until

until the

need for

at the

Pentagon between officials

December

3,

Acheson opposed

efforts

Mr. Attlee had arrived and been consulted, and

had become unmistakably clear.

it

of

It

was agreed again

that

the United States could not in good conscience abandon the South Koreans to

their Chinese-North

Korean enemies.

last-ditch "resort. "

This made evacuation from Korea a

Acheson urged that the bombing

of

Manchurian airfields

and territory also be considered as a last-ditch operation
only

if

left to

American forces, and

to save

Mac Arthur

but retained by the President and General Marshall with

wrote: "I had lost

Acheson

finally

emergency.

at the front to

all faith in

The meetings

it.

be undertaken

necessary

General Collins remaining

of the

to

at the

that the decision should not be

report the facts.

MacArthur's judgment.

Acheson later

" 20

Pentagon were then reported to the White House.

urged the President to declare the existence

His reasons:

of a national

"Only in this way could the public be made aware

seriousness of the situation and that the Government was

fully alive to

Furthermore, the President might soon need the powers the proclamation

Truman, H,

393; Collins, p. 229.

'Acheson, p. 475.

251

would bring him to control prices and wages and
production controls.

As

Truman

"

to establish far-reaching

indicated agreement.

the discussions continued within the State Department on

Dean Rusk told Acheson
needed some do-or-die

that the military

he bears what happens to him.
negotiate with the

"

is

it

"In international, as

not really what happens to someone but how

Kennan added

Communists was from

correctly interpret

4,

too dejected and that they

George Kennan advised,

spirit.

what counts most

in private, life

men were

December

that the worst possible time to

a position of defeat.

as weakness; threats would only

They would

make them refuse

altogether

Kennan 's feeling was:

to negotiate.

If

we could prove

or beachhead

that

we could hold some

sort of line

or southern Korea, which would piu
down a large number of enemy forces, I was not sure that the
prospect of continuing such a contest in the face of air attacks
on their lines of communications would prove attractive to the
in central

enemy.

Under Secretary James Webb contributed the thought

that the best

way

to start

on a campaign to revive spirit in the Pentagon was for Acheson to talk with
Marshall.

21
Ibid.

,

pp. 475-76.

99
Ibid., p. 476;

George

F. Kennan,

Memoirs

Atlantic -LittTe Brown, 1972), pp. 28-29, 31-32.

23

Kennan,

^^Acheson,

II,

32.

p. 476.

,

Vol.

II,

1950-1963 (Boston;

Acheson telephoned Marshall

at once.

He said

that the

Korean

campr.'.gn

had been "cursed by violent swings between exuberant optimism and the deepest
despair, "

depression and

Both seemed to Acheson unwarranted.

'We had

enough logic and analysis; what we needed was dogged determination

ha.d

to find a

This was a far better stance

place to hold and fight the Chinese to a standstill.

for the United States than to talk about withdrawing from Korea or going off on a
policy of our own of bombing and blockading China, " Acheson recalled his

conversation.

Marshall replied that he agreed, with two conditions:
with what success MacArthur got the

X

Corps out

"amendments" and sent Rusk and Kennan

State

Department was not trying

to

exit.

to see Marshall.

the two conditions for making a stand in Korea.

Acheson accepted
Marshall repeated

Kennan told Marshall

determine military policy.

true that an attempt to hold a beachhead would

he must see

of the east coast area; second,

the United States must not dig itself into a hole without an
the

first,

mean

If it

that the

was

the loss of entire

really

American

forces or any other exorbitant price, that was that, and had to be accepted.
the State Department

must point out the

and make sure that they were borne
taken by the military authorities.

25

Ibid., pp. 476-77.

2^Ibid.

,

p. 477.

26

in

political implications of this decision

mind

in

whatever decision might be

But
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Lovett, on joining the group, said that he had just
Hill,

come from

Capitol

where he and Admiral Sherman had been briefing the House
Armed Services

Committee.

The prevailing feeling there seemed

America's entry

Korea had been a

into

to pull out as rapidly as possible.

fluctuation of

to

him

to have

mistalce and that the United States ought

Marshall was not impressed.

congressional opinion

been that

was

not

new

to

him.

This sort of

The present mood

might not last for long.

stay in

By midday

of

Korea and

fight as long as possible.

December

4,

Truman-told Acheson that his decision was

Truman had no

patience with

to

tlie

suggestions that the United States abandon Korea.

Consultation with British

In preparation for the British

State

Prime Minister Attlee

Prime Minister's

visit to

Department drafted recommendations on December

Chiefs of Staff, and submitted them to the President.

3,

The

Washington, the

consulted the Joint

State

Department

proposed that President Truman discuss with Attlee two possible courses
action in Korea.

The

on the 38th parallel

first of these involved a withdrawal of

in conjunction with a possible cease-fire

second course was the evacuation

27ibid.; Keiman,

^^Kennan,

1.1,

^^JCS 2176/1,

11,

of all of

Korea.

UN

32-33.

33.

3

Dec

50, Incl. B.

;

forces to a line

agreement.

29

see Schnabel, p. 290.

of

The
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With regard

to the first

course of action, the State Department's proposal

held:

Before the Chinese Communists have reached the 38th
Parallel in strength we should try to establish a cease-fire on
the basis of the 38th Parallel with the armies separated by a
demilitarized zone. The principal purpose of this effort would

be to deny success to aggression and to consolidate aii overwhelming majority of the United Nations members behind the
cease-fire effort. Arrangements for a cease-fire on the basis
of the 38th Parallel would not, however, be conditioned on agTeement to other issues, such as Formosa and the seating of
Communist China in the United Nations.

During the cease-fire

effort, the United Nations

would retire

to the Seoul-Inchon

area, but would not begin any evacuation until the results of the cease-fire were

determined.

from Korea

The

State

Department also held that the

X

Corps should withdraw

to Japan in the event of military necessity.

The second course

of action

assumed

the failure of a cease-fire effort

and the possible necessity of evacuating Korea.

In such a case, the State Depart-

ment's position
,

.

.

[did]

not exclude the possibility of some military

action which would harass the Chinese pending their acceptance
Korea and would not exclude

of a United Nations settlement for

any efforts which could be made to stimulate anti-Communist
resistance within China itself, including the exploitation of
Nationalist capabilities,

The Joint Chiefs
State Department.

^^Ibid.

31

Ibid.

,

p.

of Staff

were consulted about

the

recommendations

of the

While they agreed that a cease-fire might be militarily advan-

290-91.
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tageous for the United Nations Commajid under conditions then obtaining,
they

wanted
in

to be sure of

two things:

first, the considerations offered the

Chinese

exchange for a cease-fire agreement must not be too great, and secondly,

the United Nations

commander must

not be operationally restricted.

Such a

plan as the State Department proposed, dictating not only the area into which

Army would

the Eighth

Mac Arthur might

retire but also restricting the conditions under which

evacuate his troops, was unacceptable.

The Joint Chiefs

in

revising the State Department proposals, cut out any reference to the evacuation
of the

X

"Arrangements for

Corps.

which would jeopardize the safety
maintained.
the Eighth

They also objected

Army

In the

to

withdraw

second case

this cease -fire

must not impose conditions

of United Nations forces, " the Joint Chiefs

to the provision that

would have compelled

to the Seoul-Inchon area.

of the possible evacuation of all of

Korea, the Joint

Chiefs seized upon the State Department's discreetly worded hint of retaliatory

measures and reworded

it,

not only in stronger terms, but by adding several

possible retaliatory measures later proposed by MacArthur, to

include a

naval blockade of China and bombing of Chinese lines of communication outside
of Korea.

As a

result of these recommendations and revisions,

Truman read

policy memorandimi to Attlee at their first ccnference on December 4.

Ibid.

,

p. 291.

a

Truman
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later wrote that the

memorandum

Departments and

which

to

I

had been agreed on by the State and Defense

had given

my

approval. "

It

read:

would be militarily advantageous in the immediate
situation if a cease-fire order could be arranged provided that
considerations offered were not so great as to be unacceptable.
This might insure full support of the United Nations. Arrangements for a cease-fire must not impose conditions which would
1.

It

jeopardize the safey of United Nations forces nor be conditioned
on agreement on other issues, such as Formosa, and the
Chinese seat in the United Nations.
If a cease-fire should be effected which permits a
2.
stabilization of the situation, United Nations shoiild proceed
with the political, military and economic stabilization of the

Republic of Korea while continuing efforts to seek an independent
and unified Korea by political means.
If the Chinese Communists reject a cease-fire and
3.
move major forces south of the 38th parallel, the United Nations
may face a forced evacuation of Korea. The consequences of a
voluntary abandonment of our Korean allies would be such that
any United Nations evacuation must be clearly the result of
military necessity only.
4. If the situation in the preceding paragraph develops,
the United Nations must talce immediate action to declare
Communist China an aggressor and must mobilize such political
and economic measures as are available to bring pressure upon
Peiping and to affirm the determination of the United Nations
not to accept an aggression. Also, there is the possibility of
some militai7 action which would harass the Chinese Communists
and of efforts which could be made to stimulate anti-communist

resistance within China

itself, including the exploitation of

Nationalist capabilities.

"^"^

At the end of the third point, Truman later wrote,
the

memorandum

we should

a3id

emphatically repeated that

get out volimtarily.

"^^Truman, H, 400.

All the

Koreans

it

left

"I

paused

was

in the reading of

out of the question that

behind who had been loyal
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to the United Nations

human

life.

would face death.

The Communists cared nothing about

"^'^

The memorandum also included other steps about which
and the United Kingdom should consult immediately

the United States

to strengthen

non-communist

Asia.

The

talks

between Truman and Attlee were held daily from December 4

through December

and included their advisers, principally Acheson, Marshall

8,

and British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks.

came
with

to an ag^reement on

Communist China;

two major points:

4, that the central opponent

war

against China

was

the avoidance of a generid

(a)

the determination to

(b)

Acheson expressed the U.

out

Regarding the Far East, both sides

S. position,

was not China but

remain

at

in

Korea.

Truman's request, on December

the Soviet Union.

foolish and irresponsible.

It

The talk for

all-

had been repudiated by

Acheson assured the British leaders

the Administration.

war

that not

many

of the

President's advisers would urge him to follow that course with the involvement
it

implied.

On

the other hand,

Acheson pointed

out, the

worst one for negotiation with the Russians since 1917.
holding the cards and would concede nothing.

37

Ibid.

3^See Truman, E, 400-401.
^

^Ibid.

,

409.

^^Acheson,

p. 482;

Truman, H, 397-98.

moment seemed

the

They saw themselves
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La the

course of discussion on December

the consideration of the admission of

and then negotiations

that "there

China unless we wished

to

Communist China

The American

was not very much

engage

We
we were

British side suggested
into the United Nations

Chinese Communists within the framework of
the

witli the

principles of the United Nations.

Though admitting

7, the

in all-out

war,

side disagreed strongly.
that
"

we

could do to Communist

Acheson emphasized:

should not get into negotiations until we knew where
If we had a cease-fire now, we would
be

going.

from weakness. If we could hold on and perhaps
improve our position, we could approach a cease-fire quite

negotiating

differently. Of course if we got thrown out of Korea there
would be no negotiations, but we would have made our point.

Truman added
home

that "we

the Chinese

if

would face terrible divisions among our people here

Communists were admitted

to the United Nations. "

President could not see any gain that would offset this loss
the Chinese

from

were admitted

the Russians?"

The
disagreed.

The

morale.

to the United Nations "would they be any different

Truman asked. He expected them

other satellites of Russia.

in public

at

to

behave just like the

38

talks helped both sides to understand better

where they agreed and

As

communique

to the

use of the atomic bomb, the

final

stated:

The President stated that it was his hope that world
conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb.
The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his

Trumtui,

11,

406-07.

If
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desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of
developments which might bring about a change in the
situation.

Army

Chief of Staff Collins arrived in Tokyo on Decmeber 4, 1950.

After a brief meeting with General MacArthur, he flew to Korea, visiting the

headquarters of the Eighth

December

Army

and

X

Corps.

6 and conferred with Generals

He returned

to

Tokyo on

MacArthur, Stratemeyer, Hickey,

Wright, and Willoughby and Admiral Joy for a thorough review of actions that

might be taken

in

Korea.

As

a

framework for

their discussion, they projected

three hypothetical situations covering the next few weeks or months.

The

first

two assumed a continuance of an all-out attack by the Chinese Communist
forces; the third

was based on a possible Chinese agreement

south of the 38th parallel.

The

As

not to advance

Collins later wrote:

first case

was examined under

the assumption that

existing restrictions against allied bombing north of the Yalu
would be continued, that there would be no blockade of China,

^

that there would be no reinforcements to the United Nations
Command from Formosa, that there would be no substantial

reinforcements from the United States imtil April 1951, when
four National Guard divisions might be available and, finally,
that the atomic bomb might be used in North Korea. General
MacArthur protested strongly that any such limitations would
be tantamount to surrender. Under these conditions an
armistice might be helpful for political purposes but would
not be essential militarily, since the United Nations forces
would have to be withdrawn from Korea and this could be done
safely from Hungnam and Pusan with or without an armistice.

S^Dept. of State Bulletin (Dec. 18, 1950), p. 961. For greater details
Truman, H, 396-413 and Acheson,
of Attlee's visit to Washington, see
pp„ 480-85.
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second situation it was assumed that an effective
naval blockade of China would be established, air reconnaissance
and bombing of the Chinese mainland would be permitted, Chinese
Nationalist forces would be exploited to the maximum, and the
atomic bomb might be used if tactically appropriate. General
MacArthur said that under such conditions he should be directed
to hold in Korea as far north as possible and that he would move
the X Corps overland to join the Eighth Army in the Pusan
bridgehead.
In the third case, General MacArthur felt that, if the
Chinese agreed not to cross the 38th Parallel, the United Nations
In the

should accept an armistice. The NK forces as well as the CCF
forces should remain north of the 38th Parallel, NK guerrillas
in the south should be withdrawn, the Eighth Army should continue
to cover Seoul-Inchon while the X Corps withdrew to Pusan, and
a United Nations Commission should oversee the implementation
of the armistice.

MacArthur

felt that this

would be the best

course to follow, unless the United Nations should decide to act
as assumed in the second case. In any event Chiang Kai-shek
should be permitted to send troops to Korea without delay, and
the participating United Nations powers should increase their
fighting contingents to at least 75, 000. He concluded by saying
that unless substantial reinforcements were sent quicldy, the
United Nations Command should pull out of Korea.
the United Nations did not support fully
the operations in Korea in the face of continued all-out Chinese
attack, General MacArthur should be directed to take the necessary
I

agreed that

if

and prepare plans for evacuation
from Korea. Wliile I did not presume, to argue the point with
General MacArthur, I did not feel that, even with the limitations
Chinese
to be placed upon the United Nations Command, the
steps to safeguard his

command

likely

judgment
could force its \vithcb:avv^al from Korea. I based this
primarily on the views expressed by the field commanders,

Walker and Almond.
General Collms returned to Washington on December
to the Joint Chiefs, Collins

8.

and Bradley went to the White House

^^Collins, pp. 231-32.

See also Schnabel, pp. 283-84.

After reporting
at the invitation

260
of

if

Truman

British-American conferees.

to brief the

the Chinese continued i^eir all-out attack

Seoul -Inchon area.

Army

the Eighth

would not be possible

to hold the

However, Collins quoted General Walker's conviction

that

could retain a sizable bridgehead based on Pusan, particularly

when reinforced by the
agreed to

it

Collins pointed out that

X

Corps

— a reinforcement that by then MacArthur had

— when that Corps was withdrav/n from Hungnam on the east coast.

Collins concluded by expressing his personal judgment that, although the military
situation

remained "serious,

" it

was no longer

41
"critical. "

MacArthur's views on the three possible courses
to

Truman

in

secrecy by Collins.

"General MacArthur was ready

On December

Truman

of action

were reported

later wrote that his conclusion was:

to risk general

war.

I

was

"
not. "

12, 1950, the Secretary of State informed General

MacArthur

about the conclusions of the talks between the President of the United States and

the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom: a cease-fire and peaceful solution
of the conflict in

Korea was desirable

in the

immediate future,

if

they coidd be

However, such a solution would not be bartered

secured on honorable terms.

with the Chinese Communists in exchange for the United States withdrawal of
protection

from Formosa or

Indochina.

American and British troops would
out.

If

no solution could be obtained, the

fight on in

Korea unless they were forced

43

41

Collins, pp. 232-44;

42,

Truman,

II,

'Truman, n, 415-16.
43
'Collins, p. 233; Sclmabel, p. 293.

410.
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Preparedness in America and the Cease-Fire
Attempt at the United Nations

Follomng the Chinese Communist attack
retreat in North Korea, President

advisers

all felt the

Truman and

need to take drastic action

in late

November and

his principal political and military
to strengthen U. S. Military

forces and to build up industrial mobilization potential for meeting U.

commitments
against China.

to the

newly-created

S.

and for faciag a possible major war

44

On December

members

NATO

U. S.

of the

13

and

Congress

14, the

President met with two different groups of

to discuss the

proclamation

emergency

of national

and economic allocations and control.

On December

14, the

accomplish the expansion

comparable increases
an accelerated rate.

National Security Council approved a plan to

of the U. S.

in the

Army

to eighteen

combat divisions- -with

Navy and Air Force— by June 1952.

The original plan, approved on November

for the achievement of such an expansion by June 30, 1954.
this acceleration policy. President

Truman

in

December

As

This represented
22, 1950, called

a result of

called two

more

Federal service,
National Guard divisions, the 31st and the 47th, to active
beginning in January 1951.

'^^Collins, p. 233;

46

Truman,

II,

475-76.
417; Sclmabel, p. 299; Acheson, pp.

4"^

See Truman, n, 420-26.

46

Collins, p. 233; Schnabel, p. 299.

262

On December

16, 1950,

Truman proclaimed

the existence of a national

emergency which required:
the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of
this country be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end
.

.

.

we may be

that

able to repel any and all threats against our

national security and to

fulfill our responsibilities in the efforts
being made through the United Nations and otherwise to bring
^''^
about lasting peace.

The United

States also decided to initiate a blockade of trade with

On December

Communist China.
State and

Treasury

to

work

16, the

Department

ships and aircraft

of

On December
from

17, these assets

Communist

without the cooperation of other nations, including

with forces in Korea, could not be fully effective.
in

Communist

On December

issued orders prohibiting United States

visiting Chinese

At the United Nations

of

were brought under

the Department of the Treasury.

Commerce had

from

Trimian authorized the Departments

out the application of controls over Chinese

assets in the United States.
control by a blocking order

14,

ports.

members

But economic sanctions
of the

United Nations

48

December, 1950, the

Soviet Union and

Communist

Council to participate
China, whose representative had been invited by the Security
in the

(Formosa),
discussion of the complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan

Hearings

,

Pt. 5, 3520.

'^^Schnabel, p. 318.
1950.
'^^See Security Council resolution of Sept. 29,

49
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were attacking the United
States

was

States for its stand on

trj'ing to rally its friends to vote a

Korea and Formosa.

The United

condemnation of Chinese aggres-

sion in Korea, while the Indians and others were stTiving for a cease-fire
CA

resolution.

According to Acheson, "Since the United Nations was one

of the belligerents,

a cease-fire resolution was obviously an appeal by the weaker to the stronger side.

For

this

reason the United States Government in the current military situation

would neither participate

On December

in the effort

nor block

it.

14, 1950 the United Nations

" 51

General Assembly adopted a

resolution which had been sponsored by thirteen Asian powers.

Assembly "requests

the President of the General

Assembly

The General

to constitute a group

of three persons, including himself, to determine the basis on which a satisfactory

cease-fire in Korea can be arranged

and to make recommendations to the

General Assembly as soon as possible. "^^ The President of the General Assembly,
Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, accordingly constituted a group consisting of Lester
B. Pearson of Canada, Sir Benegal N.

Rau

of India

and himself.

The group

first

S^Acheson, pp. 512-13.
^^Ibid.

,

p. 513.

Korea,
^^See Report to the General Assembly from Group on Cease-fire in
Bulletin
State
January 2, 1951. U.N. doc. A/C.l/643. Reprinted in Dept. of
Hearings Pt. 4, 3505-13.
(Jan. 15, 1951), pp. 113-16. Also reprinted in
,
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consulted the representatives of the Unified

what they considered

Command was

Command, on December

to be a satisfactory basis for a crease-fire.

established by the

UN

15, as to

The Unified

Security Council resolution of July

to place military forces and other assistance, offered
by

members

7,

1950

of the United

Nations in support of the Security Council resolutions of June 25
and 27 to assist
the Republic of Korea, under the United States.

Thus the consultation was,

effect, with the United States

Government, which insisted on the following

conditions as the basis for a

cease-fire:

in

•

All governments and authorities concerned, including
Government of the People's Republic of
China and the North Korean authorities, shall order and enforce
(1)

the Central People's

a cessation of all acts of armed force in Korea.
fire shall apply to all of Korea.

This cease-

There shall be established a demilitarised area
across Korea of approximately twenty miles in depth with the
(2)

southern limit following generally the line of the 38th parallel.
(3) All ground forces shall remain in position or be

withdrawn to the rear; forces, including guerrillas, within or
in advance of the demilit arised area must be moved to the rear
of the demilitarised area; opposing air forces shall respect the

demilitarised zone and the areas beyond the zone; opposing
Naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the land
areas occuped by the opposing armed forces to the limit of 3
miles from shore.
(4) Supervision of the cease-fire shall be by a United
Nations Commission whose members and designated observers
shall insure full compliance with the terms of the cease-fire.
They shall have free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea.
All governments and authorities shall co-operate with the
Cease- Fire Commission and its designated observers in tlie

performance

of their duties.

(5) All governments and authorities shall cease promptly
the introduction into Korea of any reinforcing or replacement
including volunteers, and the introduction
units or personnel,

of additional v/ar

equipment and material.

Such equipment and

2G5

materi^

will no mclude supplies
required for the maintenance
of health and welfare and
such other supplies as may
b7
authorized by the Cease-Fire
Commission.

Prisoners of war shall be exchanged
on a one-for
pending final settlement of the
Korean question
(7) Appropriate provision shall be
made in the cease
fire arrangements in regard
to steps to insure (a) the
(6)

one basis

security

the

1.

movement

o other specific
V""^ problems
of

mcluding

civil

of refugees; and (c) the
arising out of the cease-fire

government and police power

in the

zone.
(8)

handllg

demilitarised

The General Assembly

shall be asked to confirm the
ceasc-lire arrangements, which should
continue in effect until
superseded by further steps approved by the
53
United

Nations.

It is

were

interesting to note that the ideas of
conditions

later included in the final armistice
agreement of 1953.

paragraphs were:
(3);

(1),

13(c)

12

for condition

and 13(d) for condition

Even though condition

(8)

(1); 13(a),

(5); 5,

6,

13(b).

7.

was not incorporated

8, 9,

14. 15,

(3),

(5),

and

The comparable
and 16 for condition

and 10 for condition

(c).^^

(7)

into the final agreement, the

General Assembly, soon after the armistice agreement was
signed on July

_

(7)

UN

27,

1953 by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on
the one hand.

and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's

Army

and the Commander

of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, adopted
a resolution on

August

28,

1953, having received a special report of the

UN Command

on the

53

See Hoarings. Pt. 5, 3505-06. Also Dept. of State Bulletin (Jan. 15,
1951), p. 113. For the discussion of U. S. position on cease-fire terms at the
Nitional Security Council meeting on Dec. 11, see Truman, II, 417-19.

For the

text of the agreement, sec U. S.

Korea; Selected Statements and Documents
Scries 61. Released August 1353.
in

,

Department

of State,

Armistice

Publication 5150, Far Eastern
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armistice in Korea, "Notes with approval the Armistice Agreement
concluded
in

Korea on 27 July 1953,

the fact that the fighting has ceased, and that
a major

step has this been taken towards the full restoration of international
peace and

security in the area. "^^

The General Assembly Group on Cease-fire also communicated with
Peking Government.
of

December

Cta

Communist China, replied

mitting his statement of
fire in Korea.

solution of

ted in nor agreed to

December 22 concerning

14, 1950

its

Republic of China and

Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister

to the President of the General

In his statement,

December

23, 1950,

was

adoption.

its

Chou argued

the

the

same

Assembly trans-

subject of a cease-

that the General

illegal since his

Assembly re-

government neither participa-

"Therefore, the Government of the People's

Delegates are not prepared to make any contract with

the above mentioned illegal 'three -man committee. '"^^

When

Chou maintained:

the invading troops of the United States arrogantly

crossed the 38th parallel at the beginning of the month of
October, the United States Government, recklessly ignoring
warnings from all quarters and following the provocative
crossing of the border by Syngman Rhee in June, thoroughly
destroyed, and hence obliterated forever this demarcation
line of political geography.

57

^^See UN General Assembly, Official Records Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20B (A/23G1/Add. 2), p. 2.
,

56

Hearings
Ibid.

,

Pt. 5, 3510.

:
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Chou could not accept America's sincerity

in the cease-fire.

He explained:

not difficult to understand that, when the
American
invading troops were landing at Inchon, crossing the
38th
parallel or pressing toward the Yalu River, they did
not favouj?
an immediate cease-fire and were not willing to conduct
negotiations. It is only today when the American invading
troops have sustained defeat, that they favour an immediate
It is

cease-fire and the conducting of negotiations after the ceasefire. 58

The Peldng Government regarded

ment
of

to

it

an "intrigue" of the U.

want a cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards.

S.

Govern-

Chou's statement

December 22 concluded:

We

firmly insist that, as a basis for negotiating for
a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem, all foreign
troops must be withdrawn from Korea, and Korean domestic
affairs must be settled by the Korean people themselves. The
American aggression forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan.
And the Representatives of the People's Republic of China
must obtain a legitimate status in the United Nations.
To put aside these points would make it impossible to settle
the Koresn problem and the important problems
.

In these

.

.

circumstances, the three -man Group reported to the General

Assembly on January

2,

1951:

has been unable to pursue
discussion of a satisfactory cease-fire arrangement. It
therefore feels that no recommendation in regard to a

The gToup regrets

that

it

cease-fire can usefully be made by

^^Ibid.
^

^Ibid.

,

3513.

,

3509.

60
Ibid.

it

at this time.
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Which Strategy; Resistance, Evacuation
or Retaliation?

On December
from

7,

1950, General MacArthur decided to evacuate
the

Hungnam area on

the

and then put

it

under the

evacuation of the

X

the east coast of North

command

of the Eighth

Corps had been completed.

effort to overrun the

Hungnam beachhead or

The Eighth Army had abandoned

December

5

Korea and sea-Mft

Army.

it

By December

X

to

Corps

Pusan

25, the

The Chinese made no concerted

to disrupt the evacuation operation. ^2

the North

Korean

capital of

and continued to pull back toward the 38th parallel

in

Pyongyang by

mid-December.

These displacements had not been forced by the Chinese Communist forces,
which
failed to press a pursuit.

American

intelligence agencies

were puzzled by the

lack of aggressive Chinese follow-up,

On December

Army, was

killed in a vehicle accident.

Matthew B. Ridgway,
in the

23, General Walker,

Commanding General

He

v/as

of the Eighth

succeeded by Lieutenant General

then Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration

Department of the Army.

61
Collins, p. 234; Sclmabel, pp. 300-01.

^^Collins, p. 235; Schnabel, pp. 303-04.
^•^Ridg-way, pp. 72-73; Collins, pp. 235-36; Sclinabel, p. 304.

^"^For Ridgway's qualifications to step in immediately, see Schnabel,
p. 306.
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Eighth Army halted uneasily near
tiie
^^^'f^^^
38th ParaUel,
awaiting its new commander and the
new enemy
Signs were increasing that the Chinese
were closing the gap and
were advancing down the peninsula in a
co-ordinated effort to
feel out the Eighth Army's defenses
before launching another
major attack. A tense calm hung over the battle
area. ^5

Under these circumstances, President Truman
summoned Secretary
State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Marshall.
Staff

Chairman

Bradley and Secretary of the Treasury Snyder

House on the day

after Christmas.

It

of the Joint Chiefs of

to a strategy

was a long meeting.

rewriting and clarification of MacArthur's directives.

of

meeting

at Blair

Acheson proposed a

Acheson later recalled:

The stakes in Korea were so high that the United Nations
should not withdraw until we had tested Chinese strength fully
and found that dire military necessity required it. General
MacArthur should not be required to defend any particular line
but to inflict the

maximum

losses on the enemy by the use of
and land power including Korean forces (the strategy
later adopted by General Ridgway). He should not risk the
destruction of his troops, since on them lay the ultimate reair, sea,

,

sponsibility for the defense of Japan.

The generals saw an
increased threat of general war and were clear that it should
not be fought in Korea. They agreed to the rewriting of the
directive, and the President authorized it.

The next day a draft was discussed by Marshall and Bradley with Truman
and Acheson,
to

On December

29, 1950, the Joint Chiefs sent the following

MacArthur:

65

^

A

description by Schnabel, p. 306.

^Acheson,

p.

514.
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It appears from all
estimates available that the
Chinese
Communists possess the capability of forcing
United Nations
forces out of Korea if ^ey choose
to exercise it.

of this capability might be
prevented by maldng
costly to the enemy that they would
abandon
it

The execution

tlie

effort so

or by committino-

substantial additional United States
forces to that theatre thus''
seriously jeopardizing other commitments
including the safety
of Japan. It is not practical to
obtain
significant additional

forces for Korea from other members
of the United Nations
We
believe that Korea is not the place to
fight a major war. Further
we believe that we should not commit our remaining
available
ground forces to action against Chinese
Communist forces in
Korea in face of the increased threat of general
war. However
a successful resistance to" Chuiese- North
Korean

some

position in

Korea and a

deflation

aggi^ession at'
of the military and

political prestige of the Chinese
Communists would be of gTeat
importance to our national interest, if they could

be accomplished

without incurring serious losses.

The Joint Chiefs further

stated:

Your basic

directive.
light of the present situation.

.

.

requires modification

You are now directed

in the

to defend

in successive positions.
.. subject to the primary
consideration
of the continued threat to Japan, [and] to determine
in advance
our last reasonable opportunity for an orderly evacuation.
.

The message concluded:

seems

to us that if

you are forced back to positions in
River and a line generally eastward therefrom, and if thereafter the Chinese Communists mass large
forces against your positions with an evident capability of forcing
us out of Korea, it then would be necessary, under those
conditions, to direct you to commence a withdrawal to Japan.
Your views are requested as to the above outlined
conditions which should determine a decision to initiate evacuation.
It

the vicinity of the

67
68

MacArthur, pp. 377-78.

Kum

See also Whitney, pp. 429-30.

See also MacArthur, p. 378. Whitney is more diligent
p. 430.
than MacArthur in indicating any deletion of words from the original message.

Whitney,

.
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particularly in light of your continuing primary
mission of
defending Japan for which only troops of the Eightli
Army are
available

Following the receipt of your views we will give you
a
definite directive as to the conditions under which you
should
initiate evacuation. ^9

According

to Collins

of Staff also directed

and Schnabel, this message from the Joint Chiefs

MacArthur

to

damage

the

enemy as much as

"subject to the primary consideration of the safety of your troops,

MacArthur 's continuing responsibility for

the defense of Japan.

"^^

possible,
"

and to

hi the

phrase of the summary of this message, presented by the Joint Chiefs

para-

to the

Senate Committees during the MacArthur hearings, the pertinent passage

concerning MacArthur 's modified directive contained additional and somewhat
different phrases

from Whitney's
Therefore

(or

MacArthur' s) version.

present situiition your basic
ROK assistrmce as necessary to
repel armed attack and restore to the area security and peace,
is modified. Your directive now is to defend in successive
positions, subject to safety of your troops as your primary
consideration, inflicting as muchdainage to hostile forces io.
in light of

directive, of [sic] furnish to

Korea as
In

is possible.

view of continued threat

possibility of forced withdrawal

make advance

Collins, p. 247.

important to

71

See also Schnabel, p. 311; Whitney,

p. 378.

"^^Colliris, p.

it is

determination of last reasonable opportunity^ for

orderly evacuation.

MacArthur,

to safety of Japan and

from Korea

247; Schnabel, p. 311.

"^Hearings, Pt. 3, 2179.

p. 430;
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This directive to MacArthur made

Korea was secondary

to the

Korea and Japan,

the safety of

commit

substantial additional

in

Korea.

For

this

to a decisive action against

American troops, especially

troops had suffered.

JCS report

1950.

72

in

Chinese forces

view

No attempt would be made

to the Senate

of the

this

MacArthur's message

JCS message and

expense of

heavy casualties these

to achieve a victory in

Korea

According to Acheson and

Committees, this message was dated December

MacArthur and Whitney do not mention
in

American forces

at the

But Collins and Schnabel give the date of December 30,

Later on,

view of the

reason evacuation from Korea

while the security of Japan might be thereby threatened.
the

In

the defense of Japan would require the preservation
of

MacArthur's present troops
would be preferable

abundantly clear that the problem of

importance of the defense of Japan.

fact that the United States could not
to

it

identified

it

the date of this

message

of January 10, 1951, he

29,

1950.'^'^

ia tlieir

books.

made reference

by the date of December 30, 1950.

to

'^'^

Late in the evening of Decem.ber 30, MacArthur sat down to compose his
reply to the Jomt Chiefs' message.

"This reply,

"

Wliitaey writes, "is probably

MacArthur's most important single comment on the Korean war.

7?

"Acheson, p. 514; Hearings, Pt.

3, 2179.

73
Collins, p. 246; Schnabel, p. 310.

74

See Hearin gs, Pt. 2, 906.

75
Wliitney, p. 432.

"

75

It

outlined
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four specific measures that MacArthur advocated to turn
the tide:

Any estimate

of relative capabilities in the Korean
campaign
appears to be dependent upon political- military policies
yet to be
formulated vis-a-vis Chinese military operations being conducted
against our forces. It is quite clear now that the entire
military
resource of the Chinese nation, with logistic support from the

Soviet, is

committed

to a

maximum

effort against the United

Nations command. In implementation of this commitment a
major concentration of Chinese force in the Korean-Manchurian
area will increasingly leave China vulnerable in areas whence
troops to support Korean operations have been drawn. Meanwhile,

under existing restrictions, our naval and air potential are being
only partially utilized and the great potential of Chinese
Nationalist force on Formosa and gxierrilla action on the mamland
are being ignored. Indeed, as to the former, we are preventing
its employment against the common enemy by our own naval
forces.

Should a policy determination be reached by our govern-

ment or through it by the United Nations to recognize the state
of war which has been forced upon us by the Chmese authorities
and to take retaliatory measures within our capabilities, we
(1) blockade the coast of China; (2) destroy through naval
gun fire and air bombardment China's industrial capacity to
wage war; (3) secure reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison
in Formosa to strengthen our position in Korea if we decided to
continue the fight for that peninsula; and (4) release existing
restrictions upon the Formosan garrison for diversionary action,
possibly leading to comiter -invasion, against vulnerable areas
of the Chinese mainland.
I believe that by the foregoing measiu'es we could severely
cripple and largely neutralize China's capability to wage ag;:pres sive war and thus save Asvd from the cn-xiilfment otherwise facing
it. I believe furthermore that we could do so with but a small
part of our overall military potential committed to the purpose.
There is no slightest doubt but that this action would at once
release the pressure upon our forces in Korea, whereupon

could:

determination coidd be reached as to whether to mamtain the
fight in that area or to affect a strategic displacement of our
forces with the view to strengthening our defense of the littoral
island chain while continuing our naval and air pressure upon

274

China's military potential. I am fully conscious of the
fact that
this course of action has been rejected in the past for
fear of
provoking China into a major war effort, but we must now
realistically recognize that China's

commitment thereto has
already been fully and uncquivocably made and that nothing we
can do would further aggravate the situation as far as China is
concerned.
Whether defending ourselves by way of military
retaliation would bring in Soviet military intervention or not is
a matter of speculation. I have always felt that a Soviet decision
to precipitate a general war would depend solely upon the Soviet's

own estimate

of relative strengths and capabilities with little

regard to other factors. ... If we are forced to evacuate Korea
without taking military measures against China proper as
suggested in your message, it would have the most adverse [sic]
affect upon the people of Asia, not excepting the Japanese, and a

material reinforcement of the forces now in tills theater would be
mandatory if we are to hold tlie littoral defense chain ag ainst

determined assault
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that evacuation of
our forces from Korea under any circ umstances would at once
release the bulk of the Chinese forces now absorbed by that
campaign for action elsewhere quite probably in areas of far
greater importance than K^orea itself
.

—

.

Mac Arthur went

on:

On the other hand, the relatively small command that we
have in Korea is capable of so draining the enemy's resources
as to protect the areas to the south which would in itself be
possibly a gxeater contribution to the general situation than could
be made by such a force disposed in other areas for purely defense
purposes, but not possessing the power to pin down and localize
so massive a part of the enemy's potential as now committed in

Korea.

77

Wliitney, pp. 432-34.
'^'^Schnabel, p. 316.

took place, the
itself

ROK Army

Emphasis

is Wliitney's.

MacArthur also
w^ould disintegrate

JCS that if a general evacuation
or become of negligible value; Japan

told the

would become eirtremely vulnerable following the loss

of

Korea. Ibid

.

,
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I understand thorouglily the
demand for European security
and fully concur in doing everything possible
in that

sector, but
not to the point of accepting defeat aaiywhere
else-an acceptance
which I am sure could not fail to insui-e later defeat
in Europe
itself.
The preparations for the defense of Europe,
however,
by the most optimistic estimate are aimed at a condition
of
readiness two years hence. The use of forces in the
present

emergency

in the

basic concept.

Far East could not in any way prejudice this
the contrary, it would ensure thoroughly

To

seasoned forces for later commitment in Europe— synchronously
with Europe's own development of military resources.
So far as your tactical estimate of the situation in Korea
is concerned, under the conditions presently implied, viz:
no
reinforcements, continued restrictions upon Chinese Nationalist
action, no military measures against China's continental
military potential, and the concentration of Chinese military
force solely upon the Korean sector, would seem to be sound.

The

tactical plaji of a successively contracting defense line
south to the Pusan beachhead is believed the only possible way
which the evacuation could be accomplished. In the execution of
this plan it would not be necessary for you to make an anticipatory

decision for evacuation until such time as we
that beachliead line. '^8

may be forced

Essentially MacArthur did not like the idea of evacuation from

as was being considered by Washington.

and thus adversely affecting attitudes
Japanese.

He further argued

He regarded

it

to

Korea,

as accepting a defeat

of the people of Asia, including the

that this defeat in Asia "could not fail to insure

Whitney, p. 434. See also Selmabel, pp: 31G-17; MacArthur, pp. 378paraphrase
of MacArthur's reply in Hearings Pt. 3, 2180-81. On the
the
80;
possibility of Soviet military intervention, Gen. MacArthur also stated that
,

his recent request for reinforcements by four divisions had as its purpose the

defense of Japan in the contingency of Soviet attack.
2180.

See Hearings

Pt, 3,

"
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later defeat in Europe itself, " which he

Imew was

the focus of Washington's

concern.

His contention was that the action

in

Korea could so drain

the enemy's

(Chinese) resources as to protect the areas to the south, such as Indochina.
In

order to hold

in

measures not only
Korea, but

Korea, he was prepared

to

recommend

four retaliatory

to release at

once the pressure upon American forces

in

to "severely cripple

and largely neutralize China's capability

to

wage aggressive war.

On New Year's Eve,

the Chinese launched a major offensive and advanced

across the 38th parallel toward the south.
1951.

The next day

On January
of

9,

it

was taken by

the

Seoul was evacuated on January 3,

Communists.

1951, the Joint Chiefs, with the approval of the Secretary

Defense and the President, replied

to

MacArthur's recommendations on

retaliatory measures:

The retaliatory measures you suggest have been and
continue to be given careful consideration. There is little
possibility of policy change or other eventuality justifying the
strengthening of our effort in Korea. Blockade of China coast,

undertaken, must await either stabilization of our position
naval
in Korea or our evacuation from Korea. However, a
blockade off the coast of China would require negotiations with
the British in view of the extent of British trade with China
through Hong Kong; naval and air attacks on objectives in
if

79

Ridgway,

Rces,

p.

p. 95.

177.
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Communist China probably can be authorized only if the
Chinese Communists attack United States forces outside of
Korea and decision must await that eventuality. Favorable
action cannot be taken on the proposal to obtain Korean reinforcements from the Chinese Nationalist garrison on

Formosa,

in

of improbability of their decisive effect on

view

the Korean outcome and their probable greater usefulness

elsewhere.
In the light of the foregoing and after full consideration
of all pertinent factors, defend in successive positions as
required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff's message, inflicting

maximum damage

to hostile forces in Korea, subject to

primary consideration

of the safety of

your troops and your

basic mission of protecting Japan. Should it become evident
in your judgment that evacuation is essential to avoid severe
losses of men and materiel you will at that time withdraw from

Korea

P

to Japan.

-1

Thus Washington did not accept MacArthur's proposals.
a query right back, " in his
the following

message

own phrase, asking

But MacArthur "shot

for clarification.

82

He sent

to the Joint Chiefs on January 10, 1951:

Personal for J CS.
This refers to your message of January 9. Clarification
requirerequested of your directive in the light of its qualified

ments that

^\lacArthur,

(1) I

p. 380.

321-22; Truman, E, 433-34.

continue to defend in successive positions

See also Wliitney, pp. 434-35; Sclinabel, pp.

The paraphrase

of this

also stated:
"In event stabilization in

Korea not

message from

JCS

the

^
feasible, security ot

forces which may be evacuated
Japan must be served by portion of the
commitment of addtionai
from Korea. If stabilization in Korea without
of two National Guard divisions
forces can be accomplished, deployment
blockade
expected. Intensification of economic
partly trained may be
of Chinese trade being pressed. "

,
The Joint, Ch
•

nl^o

Pt. 1. 333.
See Marsh^ul's testimony in Hearings,
^^^^^^^^^^
United
of the
coast required the concurrence
that any blockade of the China
gs, Pt. 1, 332.
See Schnabel, p. 321 and Hearin

Nations.

^^MacArthur,

p. 380.
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subject to my basic mission of protecting Japan and to primary
consideration of the safety of my troops; and (2) that if in my

judgment it becomes evident that evacuation is essential to
avoid severe loss of materiel and men that I withdraw from

Korea

to Japan.
In

stituted

view

of the self-evident fact that as presently con-

my command

is of strength insufficient to hold a

Korea and protect simultaneously Japan against
external assault, strategic dispositions taken in the present

position in

situation must be based upon overriding political policy
establishing the relativity of American interests in tlie Far
East. That a beachhead line can be held by our existing forces
for a limited time in Korea, there is no doubt, but tliis could

not be accomplished without losses.

Whether or not such
losses were regarded as "severe, " would to a certain extent
depend upon the connotation one gives the term. The command

was committed

to the Korean campaign to fight the North
Korean invasion army which in due course was effectively
destroyed. It was not the intent that it engage the armies

of the Chinese nation and

had there been foreseeable prospects
that it would find it necessary to do so in its own defense,
doubtless it would not have been committed at all. The troops
are embittered by the shameful propaganda which has falsely
condemned their fighting qualities and courage in misunderstood
retrograde maneuver, are tired from a long and difficult
campaign, and unless the political basis upon which they are
asked to trade life for time is clearly delmeated, fully understood, and so impelling that the hazards of battle are accepted
cheerfully, their morale will become a serious threat to their
battle efficiency.

agreement, as I stated in my message of
December 30 in reply to your message of the same date, with
your estimate that the conditions and limitations, namely: no
reinforcements, no measures permissible against China's
continental military potential, continued restrictions upon
I

am

in full

Chinese Nationalist military action, and the concentration
the

Korean-Manchurian

in

sector of China's military force, will

eventually render untenable the military position of the
command in Korea. In the absence of overriding political
considerations, under these conditions the command should

be withdrawn from the peninsida just as rapidly as
feasible tactically to do so. If, on the other hand,

it

is

Uie

—
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primary

political interests of the United States in the

Far East

lies in holding a position in ICorea and thus pinning down a large
segment of the Chinese military potential, the military course

and we should be prepared to
accept any attendant hazard to Japan's security and whatever
casualties result.

is implicit in political policy

The issue involves a decision

of highest national and

international importance, far above the competence of a theater
commander guided largely by incidents affecting the tactical
situation developing upon a very limited field of action, and
really boils down to the question of whether or not the United

Nor is it a decision which
should be left to the initiative of enemy action which would in
effect be the determining criterion under a reasonable interStates intends to evacuate Korea.

Therefore my query amounts to
present objective of United States political
policy to minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it can be
accomplished, or to maintain a military position in Korea
indefinitely, for a limited time?
Under the extraordinary limitations and conditions
imposed upon the command in Korea, as I have pointed out,
its military position is untenable, but it can hold, if overriding
political considerations so dictate, for any length of time up
to its complete destruction. Your clarification requested.
pretation of your message.
tliis:

Army

Is it the

Chief of Staff Collins later \vrote:

must admit that I personally, and I believe, the JCS as
a group, had considerable sympathy for MacArthur in the dilemma
presented to him by this directive [of December 30, 1950]. In
I

our regular periodic mettings with representatives of the State
Department the Chiefs constantly tried to pin down at any
particular time after the Chinese intervention, just what our
remaining political objectives were in Korea, but our diplomatic
colleagnies would always counter with the query 'What are your
military capabilities?" The discussion v^^ould almost invariably
come down to the age-old question of the chicken and the egg.
The Chiefs could only deduce that our State Department co-

Hearings Pt. 2, 906, testimony
322-23.
also Whitney, pp. 435-36; Schnabel, pp.

^^Quoted

in

,

of

General BracUey.
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workers, torn as they were by the often conflicting domestic
and international political considerations, wanted us to attain

maximal military results within our military capabilities.
But the military would have to assume all the responsibility if

the

things went \vrong.

^'^

The same dilemma would again arise on February
1951,

when

State and Defense

tlie

Departments both took the position that each

department could not make definitive recommendatiais
conclusions of the other.

memorandum

of

13 and Februarj^ 23,

in its

The Joint Chiefs commented on a

February 23 as "an unsound approach,

"

own

State

field without

Department

since State should

first formulate the political objectives before the Chiefs could devise the

military

means

to achieve

them.

85

Both Truman and Acheson were "deeply disturbed" by MacArthur's

message

of

January 10, 1951.^^ There followed a hasty series

including one of the National Security Council on January 12.
that the Joint Chiefs would send a

the military aspect of the

Korean

message

to

Mac Arthur

87

foreign policy.

84

p. 517.

Truman, H, 434; Acheson,

^"^Truman, H, 435.

Truman would

to date on political

and

of the Joint Chiefs, Generals Collins and

Collins, p. 248.

^^Acheson,
86

Two members

was decided

dealing mainly with

situation, while President

send a separate personal message bringing him up

It

of meetings,

p. 515.
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Vandenberg, were dispatched

to

Korea and Tokyo

to report

back on what the

actual situation was.

Thus the

Joint Chiefs sent a

message

to

MacArthur on January

12, 1951,

repeating their current operating directive:

We

are forced to the conclusion, based upon all the
to us, including particularly those presented by
you in your present message, that it is infeasible under existing
conditions, including sustained major effort by Communist
China, to hold the position in Korea for a protracted period.
It would be to our national interest, however, and also

factors knowm

UN, before you issue firm instructions
evacuation of troops from Korea, to gain some

to the interest of the

for initiation of
further time for essential military and diplom.atic consultations
with UN countries participating in Korean effort.
It is important also to future of UN and NATO organi-

zations to the United States prestige world-wide, and to
efforts to organize anti- Communist resistance in Asia that
maximum practicable punishment be inflicted on Communist
aggressors and that Korea not be evacuated unless actually

forced by military considerations.
In Washington it is not possible to evaluate present
state of morale and combat efficiency of UN forces.
[Deleted]

your messages of December 30, 1950 and January 4,
necessary to mal^e
1951, you had indicated that it would not be
anticipatory decision to evacuate until our forces had
In

an
arrived at the old Pusan beachhead.
your
Including consideration of factors outlined above,
which
estimate is desired as to timing and conditions under
you will have to issue instructions to evacuate Korea.
message of
Directions contained in paragra|)h C our

January

9

meanwhile remain

in effect.

Hearrngs.. Pt. 2 907.
SSparaphrase. testimony of General Bradley,
records of the HearmS£. See also
in original in the published

Deletion

is

323-24.
Collins, p. 252; Sclmabel, pp.
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In this

effect on

same message,

MacArthur'

s forces, especially

evacuation should reach them.
to

the Joint Chiefs

of

ROK

quite concerned about the

soldiers,

if

news

of

imminent

In the Joint Chiefs' opinion, aay instructions

evacuate would become known almost

and any resulting collapse

on

were

ROK

at once, despite security

measures,

resistance could seriously endanger the

Eighth Army's ability to reach a secure beachhead about Pusan and hold

it

long enough for actual evacuation.

Immediately after

this

JCS message

of

January 12, 1951, was

approved by President Truman, Generals Collins and Vandenberg
evening for Korea, carrying with them a copy of the JCS
study of the

same

date, to be

shown

to

left that

memorandum

General MacArthur by Collins

or

in

The Joint Chiefs' memorandum was transmitted by Secretary

person.

Defense Marshall to the National Security Council for

January

The entire document was

17.

information "by

more or

later sent to

its

of

consideration on

MacArthur for his

less routine procedure in the form of a message

dated January 22."^^

89

Schnabel, p. 324.

^^Testimony of General Bradley, Hearings Pt. 2, 907-08. See also
Ache son, p. 516. For the background of the preparation of this memorandum,
,

see Secretary Marshall's testimony, Hearings, Pt.
91

Hearings, Pt.

1,

1, 331.

332, 334.

^^Testimony of General Bradley, H earings, Pt.
Hearings, Pt.

1,

330.

2,

908.

Also,
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In the

JCS memo

of

January

12, 1951, the Chiefs discussed

be done should the situation worsen and
the

Korea.

UN Command

be forced to evacuate

Sixteen possible actions, including
MacArthur's four,

which might be taken after evacuation, were
put forward for
for military and diplomatic consultations.

what might

all

or some of

staidy in

The Joint Chiefs had

preparation

"tentatively"

approved them for this purpose.
Marshall stated some of these actions

in his

testimony before the Senate

Committees during the MacArthur hearings:A. With the preservation of the combat
effectiveness of
our forces as an overriding consideration, stabilize
the situation
in Korea or evacuate to Japan, if forced
out of Korea.
[Deleted.

]

E.

Continue and intensify now an economic blockade of
trade with China.

F

Prepare now

impose a naval blockade of China and
Korea is stabilized,
or when we have evacuated Korea, and depending upon the
circumstances then obtaining.

place

it

.

to

into effect as soon as our position in

G.

Remove now

restrictions on air reconnaissance of

China coastal areas and of Manchuria.
H.

Remove now

the restrictions on operations of the

Chinese Nationalist forces and give such logistic support to those
forces as will contribute to effective operations against the

Communists.
I.

J.

Continue to

bomb

military targets in Korea.

Press now for United Nations action branding Communist

China as an aggressor.
Send a military training mission and increase
Chinese Nationalists in Formosa.
Now here is one I cannot mention. I will have

93

Acheson,

p.

516.

MDAP
to skip

to

it.
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Initiate

damaging naval and air attacks on objectives in
at such time as the Chinese Communists
attack

Commimist China

any of our forces outside of Korea.

The Joint Chiefs also agreed,

in their

[Deleted.

memo

of

]

January

I

omitted one.

12, that the

United States should support the South Korean Government as
much and as long
as practicable, even an exile government,

forced to evacuate Korea.
that

major U.

S.

to those already engaged.

the United Nations

recommended

the Joint Chiefs

recommended

Far East should not be increased, but limited
to force

out of Korea, two of the recently mobilized National

Guard divisions might be sent
further

in the

Command were

however, the Chinese should prove unable

If,

Command

the United Nations

same memorandum,

In the

ground forces

if

to

Japan for defense

of that nation.

The Chiefs

that the United States furnish logistic support not only to

the Chinese Nationalist forces in their operations against the Communists, but also
to Nationalist guerrillas in China.

It

if

may be

noted that the Joint Chiefs did not specify that the naval blockade,

imposed, should be a

UN

Kai-shek's troops be used

blockade.

in

Korea.

Neither did they recommend that Chiang

96

^'^Hearings, Pt. 1, 333-34. The rest of the sixteen possible actions were
omitted
either
by Marshall or deleted in the published records of the Hearings
.

95

Schnabel, pp. 328-29. These items may be used to supplement the
missing part of Marshall's testimony mentioned above.

^^See Schnabel, pp. 328-29.
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President Truman sent his personal message to General MacArthur on

January 13, 1951, setting out authoritatively "our basic national and international

purposes

in continuing the resistance to aggression in

Korea.

"

The idea

of a

Presidential message was urged by Acheson, Marshall and Bradley, for other-

wise, MacArthur would argue with the Joint Chiefs.^''' As Acheson later wrote:

The President

listed ten specific purposes to which

continued resistance to aggression would contribute; stressed
the necessity of consolidating and holding support for

America

in the United Nations as a .strong deterrent to Soviet intervention

and, for the

same reason,

of avoiding widening the

war; and
referred to the adverse possibilities against which the President
was urgently increasing U. S. military strength.

The complete

text of President

I

Truman's personal message follows:

want you to know that the situation

in

Korea

is

receiving

the utmost attention here and that our efforts are concentrated

upon finding the right decisions on this matter of the gravest
importance to the future of America and to the survival of free
peoples everywhere.
I wish in this telegram to let you have my views as to our
basic national and international purposes in continuing the
resistance to aggression in Korea. We need your judgment as to
the maximum effort wliich could reasonably be expected from the
United Nations forces under your command to support the
resistance to aggression which we are trying rapidly to organize
on a world-wide basis. This present telegram is not to be taken
in any sense as a directive. Its purpose is to give you something
of v/hat is in our minds regarding the political factors.
1.
A successful resistance in Korea would serve the
following important purposes:

Acheson,
^ ^Partial

p. 516.

summary by Acheson,

see Acheson, p. 516.
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(a) To demonstrate that aggression will
not be
accepted by us or by the United Nations and to provide a rallying
point aroimd which the spirits and energies of the free world
can
be mobilized to meet the world-wide threat which the Soviet
Union now poses.

(b) To deflate the dangerously exaggerated political
and military prestige of Communist China which now threatens
to undermine the resistance of non-Communist Asia and to
consolidate the hold of Communism on China itself.
(c) To afford more time for and to give direct

assistance to the organization of non-Communist resistance in
Asia, both outside and inside China.
(d) To carry out our commitments of honor to the
South Koreans and to demonstrate to the world that the friendship of the United States is of inestimable value in time of

adversity.
(e) To make possible a far more satisfactory peace
settlement for Japan and to contribute gTeatly to the post-treaty
security position of Japan in relation to the continent.

To lend

(f)

resolution to

many

countries not only in

Europe and the Middle East who are now living
Communist power and to let them know
that they need not now rush to come to terms with Communism
on whatever terms they can get, meaning complete submission.
Asia but also

in

within the shadow of

(g)

To inspire those who may be

against great odds

called upon to fight

subjected to a sudden onslaught by the
Soviet Union or by Communist China.
(h) To lend point and urgency to the rapid build-up
if

of the defenses of the
(i)

western

To bring

v^/orld.

the United Nations tlirough its first

great effort on collective security and to produce a free -world
coalition of incalculable value to the national security interests
of the United States.
(j)

their masters

crime

To

alert the peoples behind the Iron Curtain that
are bent upon wars of aggression and that this

will be resisted by the free world.
2.

time should be such as
the great majority of the United Nations. This

Our course

to consolidate

.

of action at this

majority is not merely part of the organization but is also the
nations whom we would desperately need to count on as allies
Further, pending
in the event the Soviet Union moves against us.
the build-up of our national strength, we must act with great
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prudence in so far as extending the area of
hostilities is
concerned. Steps which might in themselves
be fully justified
and which might lend some assistance to
the campai"ii in
Korea would not be beneficial if they thereby
involved Japan
or Western Europe m large-scale hostilities.

We

3.

recognize, of course, that continued
resistance

might not be militarily possible with the limited
forces with
which you are being called upon to meet large
Chinese armies.
Further, in the present world situation, your
forces must be
preserved as an effective instrument for the defense
of Japan
and elsewhere. However, some of the important
purposes
mentioned above might be supported, if you should think
it
practicable, and advisable, by continued resistance
from offshore islands of Korea, particularly from Cheju-do, if it
becomes impracticable to hold an important portion of Korea
itself.
In the worst case, it would be important that, if
we
must withdraw from Korea, it be clear to the world that that
course is forced upon us by military necessity and that we
shall not accept the result politically or militarily until the
aggression has been rectified.
4. In reaching a final decision about Korea, I shall
have to give constant thought to the main threat from the Soviet
Union and to the need for a rapid expansion of our armed forces

to

meet

this great danger.
5.

getthig a

I

am

encouraged

much clearer and

to believe that the free

world

is

realistic picture of the dangers

before us and that the necessary courage and energy will be
forthcoming. Recent proceedings iti the United Nations have
disclosed a certain amount of confusion and wisMul thinking,
but I believe that most members have been actuated by a
desire to be absolutely sure that all possible avenues to peaceful
settlement have been fully explored. I believe that the great
majority is now rapidly consolidating and that the result will
be an encouraging and formidable combination in defense of
freedom.

The entire nation is grateful for your splendid
6.
leadership in the difficult struggle in Korea and for the superb
performance of your forces under the most difficult circumstances.
[s]

Harry

S.

Truman^S

^^Truman, 11, 435-36. See also Sclmabel, pp. 324-25; Collins, pp.
250-51; MacArthur, pp. 381-82; Whitney, pp. 437-38.
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MacArthur replied

"We

at once:

will do our best. "

gentlemen, finally settles the question

There

will be

Army

no evacuation.

of

And he

told his staff:

"That,

whether or not we evacuate Korea.

"-^^^

Chief of Staff Collins did not agree with this simple interpretation

by MacArthur of no evacuation and told him so

The problem would

in Tolcyo.

not be solved until the military situation in Korea

was

stabilized later in January

1951.

MacArthur had seen no middle ground between evacuation and no evacuation.

in

His concept of no evacuation was such that losses of men in fighting to hold

Korea were

why he treated

inevitable, which would weal^en the defense of Japan.
this question as a political decision and

demanded

That was

clarification.

Wasiiington did not want to evacuate unless the safety of American troops made
it

necessary to do so.

MacArthur making

Thus

the question

the judgment.

much damage on enemy forces

in

was treated as a

Washington wanted MacArthur

Korea as possible and

positions without sacrificing the safety of his forces.

How

then evacuation would follow.
tion should be initiated

were

military decision with

If

to try to hold

MacArthur.

some

this could not be done,

this could be done and at

all left to

to inflict as

what stage evacua-

MacArthur did not want

to

retaliatory
accept this kind of responsibility, especially after his proposals of

measures were not accepted.

10*^ MacArthur, p.

Under the circumstances he tended

382.

254-55.
^^-^See Collins' report to the JCS, in Collins, pp.

to favor
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evacuation.
letter of

in

In

order to urge him to try

January

13,

to hold in

Korea, Truman's personal

1951 emphasized the advantages of a successful resistance

Korea while maintaining

his basic mission of the defense of Japan.

The "Five Principles,

" the Stabilization of the

Fighting

Situation, and the Finding of Chinese Aggi-ession in

the United Nations General

When President Truman wrote
in the United Nations,

the First

Committee

On January

General MacArthur, about ccnfusion

to

he apparently was referring to the "Five Principles"

of the United Nations General

11, 1951,

Group on Cease-Fire

in

Committee, suggesting
ful settlem.ent of the

Assembly Resolution

in

Assembly.

Lester B. Pearson of Canada, on behalf of the

Korea, submitted a supplementary report

to the First

five principles as a basis for a cease-fire and the

Korean problem and other Far Eastern problems.

peace-

If

approved by the First Committee of the

UN

would be transmitted to the Government

of the People's Republic of China for

its consideration of acceptance.

The

General Assembly, these principles

five principles

were as follows:

order to prevent needless destruction of life
and property and while other steps are being fallen to restore
peace, a cease-fire should be immediately arranged. Such an
1.

In

arrangement should contain adequate safeguards for ensuring
that it will not be used as a screen for mounting a new offensive.
If and when a cease-fire occurs in Korea, either as
2.
a result of a formal arrangement or, indeed, as a result of a

^^^See

UN

General Assembly, Official Records

Committee, 422nd Meetmg, Jan.

11, 1951, p. 475.

,

Fifth Session, First
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lull in hostilities

pending some such arrangement, advantage
should be taken of it to pursue consideration of
further steps
to be taken for the restoration of peace.

To permit

the carrying out of the General Assembly
resolution that Korea should be a unified, independent,
democratic, sovereign State with a constitution aad a government
based on free popular elections, all non-Korean armed forces
will be withdrawn, by appropriate stages, from Korea,
and
3.

appropriate arrangements, in accordance with United Nations
principles, will be made for the Korean people to express
their own free will in respect of their future government.
Pending the completion of the steps referred to in
4.
the preceding paragraph, appropriate interim arrangements,
in accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for
the administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace and

security there.

As soon

as an agreement has been reached on a
cease-fire, the General Assembly shall set up an appropriate
body which shall include representatives of the Governments
of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the
5.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the People's Republic
of China with a view to the achievement of a settlement, in
conformity with existing international obligations and tlie
provisions of the United Nations Charter, of Far Eastern
problems, including, among others, those of Formosa (Taiwan)
and of representation of China in the United Nations. ^^^^

The choice

of v/hether to support or

"murderous" one for the U.

S.

oppose this peace plan was a

State Department, threatening, on one side, the

loss of the Koreans and the fury of Congress and press and, on the other, the
loss of America's majority and support in the United Nations.

wrote

Acheson later

;

^^"^UN Doc. A/C.1/645, Jan. 11, 1951.
Bulletin (Jan. 29, 1951), p. 164.

Reprinted in Dept. of State
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We

chose, after painful deliberation in the Department-and after I recommended to the President what may well have
been even without hindsight, the wrong alternative— to support
the resolution. We did so in the fervent hope and belief that the
Chinese would reject it (as they did) and that our allies would
then return (as they did) to comparative sanity and follow us
in censuring the Chinese as aggressors. The President
bless
him- -supported me in even this ajiguishing decision. ^^"^

—

On January

13, the First

Committee, with U.

five principles and decided to transmit

consideration.

them

"At once the political roof

public and congressional disapproval in

Democrats joined with Republicans
appeaser or worse.

S.

support, approved the

Government for

to the Peldng

fell in, "

and a tremendous blast of

America followed

UN

the

in stigmatizing Secretary

decision.

-^"^

their visit, Collins read the

MacArthur later claimed

JCS memorandum

of

During

January 12 to MacArthur.

that he and the Joint Chiefs had been in agreement on

actions to be taken against the Chinese.
actions were included in the

JCS memo

It

MacArthur wanted

all the

is true that his

of January 12.

essential difference which lay in the timing of

some

recommended

However, there was an

of the

recommended

military actions against the Chinese to

'^^Acheson, p. 513.
^^^Ibid.

;

Even

Acheson as an

Collins and Vandenberg arrived in Tokyo on January 15, 1951.

measures.

its

Lichterman

^^^Hearings, Pt.

1,

in Stein, p. 624.

13.

See also Goodrich,

p.

175.
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take place at once in order to halt the Chinese drive in Korea.
did not want to take

some

of the

recommended

of China, until the United Nations

or until after the

UN

Command's

The Jomt Chiefs

actions, such as a naval blockade

position in Korea

forces were forced out of Korea.

was

stabilized

Neither did the Joint

Chiefs want to initiate damaging naval and air attacks on objectives in Communist

China

until the

Chinese attacked U.

S.

forces outside of Korea.

After the initial conference with

Collins and Vandenberg flew

of inspections and observations.

to

Korea for two days

to

Tokyo from Korea on Jajiuary

man

Mac Arthur,

As soon as they returned

17, Collins radioed to General Bradley, Chair-

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Just returned Tokyo from Korea.

Eighth

Army

in

good

shape and improving daily under Ridgway's leadership. Morale
very satisfactory considering conditions. ROK forces lack
confidence and instinctively fear Chinese but are still capable
of resistance against NK troops. No signs of disaffection or
collapse though tliis could change quickly in event of serious

reverses.

Barring unforseen development, Ridgway confident he
can obtain two to three months' delay before having to initiate
evacuation. Does not want to do this before Army is back in old
beachhead.
Chinese have not made any move so far to push south
from Han River. Wlien counterattacked they have usually fled.

They are having supply

difficulties

and there are many indications

low morale.
Ridgway taldng steps to check
of X Corps.

of

On

NK

the whole, English [sic Eighth]

infiltration on front

Army now

attack.
and prepared to punish severely any mass

^^'^An Extract, Collins, pp. 253-54.

See also Schnabel, pp.

in position
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This cheering message from Collins was quickly shown

to

Truman.

Collins and Vandenberg had a second conference with MacArthur in

Tokyo before leaving for

MacArthur the message

the United States on January 19.

that he

had

just sent to Bradley.

Collins read to

Vandenberg outlined

the results of his inspection of Air Force activities, which he had found highly
satisfactory.

UN

After some discussion, MacArthur stated that in his opinion

forces could

now hold a beachhead

in

Korea

MacArthur

indefinitely.

tlie

felt

that with continued domination of the sea and air by the United Nations, Chinese

forces would never be able to bring up adequate supplies, over their lengthening
lines of communications, to enable

them

to drive the

UN

forces from Korea.

But he reiterated his belief that a decision to evacuate Korea was a

political

matter and should not be decided on military grounds.

When

both

members

of the Joint Chiefs arrived

reported to the Joint Chiefs and briefed the President.

back

in Washington, they

Collins later wrote:

The President and his chief advisers, who had access
the
to our reports, were reassm*ed. For the first time since
previous November responsible authorities in Washington were
no longer pessimistic about our being driven out of Korea and,
us,
though it was realized that rough times were still ahead of
no longer was there much talk
alone

was responsible

of evacuation.

General Ridgway

for this dramatic change.

^^^Collins, p. 255; Truman, H, 436-37.

^^^For a summary of the report by Collins and Vandenberg
327.
see Collins pp. 254-55. Also Schnabel, p.
^^^Colims,
pp. 190-91.

p.

255.

to the JCS,

H, 437; Roes,
See also Schnabel, p. 327; Truman,

294

On January

17, 1951,

Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister

replied to the latest United Nations cease-fire proposal..
principles of

Ms

statement of December 22, 1950.

principles of the First Committee of the
still

UN

of the

PRC

Chou reiterated

He regarded

the five

General Assembly as essentially

a procedure of "a cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards.

fore his government "cannot agree to this principle.
Instead,

Chou submitted

the

"

There-

"

to the United Nations the following proposals:

Negotiations should be held among the countries
concerned on the basis of agreement to the withdrawal of all

A.

from Korea and the settlement of Korean
domestic affairs by the Korean People tliemselves, in order
to put an end to the hostilities in Korea at an early date.
B. The subject-matter of the negotiations must include
the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Taiwan
and the Taiwan Straits and Far Eastern related problems;
C. The countries to participate in tlie negotiations should

foreign troops

be the following seven countries: the People's Republic of
China, the Soviet Union, the United IQngdom, the United States
of America, France, India and Egypt, and the rightful place
of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic
of China in the United Nations should be established as from
the beginning of the Seven-Nation Conference;
D. The Seven-Nation Conference should be held in
China, at a place to be selected.

Chou concluded:

''If

the above-mentioned proposals are agreed to by the countrie

concerned and by the United Nations, we believe that

prompt termination
Asian problems

of the hostilities in

Korea and

it

will be conducive to the

to the peaceful settlement of

to hold negotiations as soon as possible.

^^^U.N. doc. A/C. 1/653, dated Jan.
State Bulletin (Jan. 29,

3

951), pp. 165-66.

17,

1951.

"^^^

Reprinted

in Dept. of

295
In Washington, Secretary

Acheson released a statement, on January

17,

commenting on Chou's reply:
Their so-called "counterproposal" is nothing
less than an outright rejection.
There can no longer be
any doubt that the United Nations has explored every possibility
of finding a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Now,
we must face squarely and soberly the fact that the Chinese
Communists have no intention of ceasing their defiance of the
.

.

.

.

.

.

United Nations. I am confident that the United Nations will
do that. The strength of the United Nations will lie in the
firmness and unity with which we now move ahead.

On January

1951, the U. S. House of Representatives passed a

19,

" Resolved

resolution which stated:

,

That

it is

the sense of the House of

Representatives that the United Nations should immediately act and declare
the Chinese

authorities an aggressor in Korea. " The resolution

Communist

was introduced by Rep. Jolm M. McCormack

of

Massachusetts, Democratic

leader of the House, with the collaboration of the Republican leader, Rep.

Joseph W. Martin, Jr.

House on the same date.

The next day,

of Massachusetts, on January 19 and adopted by the

,

113

tlie

First Committee of the

United States introduced a draft resolution before the

UN

General Assembly which would "find" that the

Chinese Communist government had engaged
of the U. S. draft resolution of

^^Dept.
^^^See

in

aggression in Korea.

January 20 foUows:

of State Bulletin (Jan. 29, 1951), p. 164.

Ibid.

,

p.

168.

Tlie text
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The General Assembly

NOTING that the Security Council, because of lack of
unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to
exercise
its primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international
peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea;
NOTING

that the Central People's

Government

of the

People's Republic of China has rejected all United Nations
proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with
a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue
their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon
United Nations forces there;
Finds that the Central People's Government of the People's
Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those
in hostilities against United Nations forces there,

has itself
aggression in Korea;
Calls upon the Central People's Government of the People's
Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to
cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea;
Affirms the determination of the United Nations to continue
its action in Korea to meet the aggression;
Calls upon all states and authorities to continue to lend every
assistance to the United Nations action in Korea;
Calls upon all states and authorities to refrain from giving
any assistance to the aggressors in Korea;
Requests a committee composed of the members of the
Collective Measures Committees [sic] as a matter of urgency to
consider additional measures to be employed to meet this
aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly;
Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United
Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the

engaged

in

achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful
means, and Requests the president of the General Assembly to
designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any
suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.

U.N. doc. A/C. 1/654, dated Jan. 20, 1951; see Dept. of State Bulletin
(Jan. 29, 1951), p. 167. The Collective Measures Committee v/as set up under the
"Uniting for Peace" Resolution of the General Assembly on Nov. 3, 1950 to study
and report on methods to maintain and strengthen international peace and security.
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Domestically
the

same

goal.

in the

United States there was continued pressure toward

On January

23, the U. S. Senate

passed the following two

resolutions, introduced by Senator John L. McClellan:

Resolved

That it is the sense of the Senate that the
United Nations should immediately declare Communist China
an aggressor in Korea.
,

Resolved, That

it is

the sense of the Senate that the

Communist Chmese Government should not be admitted to
membership in the United Nations as the representative of
China.
In the course of the debate in the First

Committee

Assembly, twelve Asian-Arab states urged that further

of the

efforts be

worldng out a peaceful settlement before considering the U.

The United States
by Lebanon,

finally accepted, on

to its draft resolution of

replace ihe words "has rejected

all

UN

S.

General

made toward

draft resolution.

January 30, two amendments, submitted

The

January 20.

first

amendment would

United Nations proposals" by the words "has

not accepted United Nations proposals" in the second paragraph of the draft
resolution.

The second amendment would insert

of the eighth paragraph:

to defer its report

if

the

"it

the following

words

being understood that the Committee

Good Offices Committee, referred

paragraph, reports satisfactory progress in

second amendment was that the results

its efforts.

of the

ll^See Dept. of State Bulletin (Feb.

5,

work

is

at the

end

authorized

to in the following

" The purpose of the

of the

Committee envisaged

1951), p. 208.
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in the eighth

only

if

paragraph would be brought to the attention of the General Assembly

the conciliation efforts envisaged in the ninth paragraph did not

meet

with success.

When

the First

Committee came

to a vote in the evening of

1951, the British delegate, Sir Gladwyn Jebb,

amendment
compelled
Sir

to the eighth

made

January 30,

clear, "if the Lebanese

it

paragraph was not carried, his delegation would be

to vote against the

117

United States draft resolution as a whole.

Gladw^m had pointed out earlier, on January

25, that the United

Kingdom was

broadly in agreement with the first five paragraphs of the United States draft
resolution; but

when the question arose

the intentions of the Peking
the United

of considering further

Government had been

Kingdom delegation entertained

fully

measures before

and exliaustively explored,

the gravest doubt on the

wisdom

of

any such action.

The Lebanese amendments were carried, and
resolution

was adopted by

the First

the

amended U.

S.

Committee on January 30 by a vote

draft

of 44

to 7, with 8 abstentions.

ll'^UN General Assembly, Official Records Fifth Session, First
final
Committee, 435th Meeting, Jan. 29, 1951, at 3 p.m. p. 577. For the
see Hearings,
version of the UN General Assembly resolution of Feb. 1, 1951,
,

,

Pt. 5, 3513-14.
^^'^

Official

Records, First Committee, 438th Meeting, Jan. 30, 1951,

p. 602.

547.
^^^Official Records, First Committee, 431st Meeting, p.
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The United Nations General Assembly met
1,

in plenary session on

February

1951 and adopted, without debate, the First Committee resolution by a vote of

44 to

7,

with 9 abstentions.

The seven negative votes were cast by Burma,

Byelorussia, Czechoslovalda, India, Poland, the Ukraine, and the Soviet Union.
Abstaining were Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden,
Syria,

Yemen, and Yugoslavia.
Acheson wrote that America's

allies "rather grudgingly" voted for the

General Assembly resolution of February

May

1,

1951 and "dragged their feet until

in taking any action to punish the aggressor.

^^^^^

The retaliatory measures which had been recommended by
Chiefs in their

memorandum

of

the Joint

January 12, 1951, encountered opposition

in the

National Security Council and were not approved, although discussion of the

various courses continued.

On January

24, 1951, President

Truman met

with

the National Security Council and reviewed the recommendations of the Joint

Chiefs and the counterrecommendations of the National Security Council Senior
staff.

But no decision was reached.

Truman

then directed a continuation of the

in connection with a
study by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense

joint

review

of

American politico-military

''^Acheson,

p.

513.

120schnabel, pp. 329-30.

strategy.

120
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Secretary of Defense Marshall testified
of

January 17 from

American forces

in

Army

that, after the

encouraging report

Chief of Staff Collins in Tolcyo, the situation of the

Korea continued

to

improve and during the

January the enemy forces did not take the offensive.

latter half of

Marshall further stated:

Throughout February and March our forces maintained
the initiative against the enemy.
As a result of this radical change in the military situation
from that which prevailed in the early part of January, it was
not considered -wise to put into immediate effect all of the courses
of action outlined in the Joint Chiefs' memorandum of January
12.121

Toward

the end of January 1951, America's foreign policy

was perceived

by President Truman in the following way, as recorded in his memoirs:
the very beginning of the Korean action I had always
as a Russian maneuver, as part of the Kremlin's plan

From

looked at it
to destroy tlie unity of the free world. NATO, the Russians Imew,
would succeed only if the United States took part in the defense of
Europe. The easiest way to keep us from doing our share in
NATO was to draw us into military conflict in Asia. We could
not deny military aid to a victim of Communist aggression in Asia
unless we wanted other small nations to swing into the Soviet
camp for fear of aggression which, alone, they could not resist.
At the same time, it served to weaken us on a global plane and

was Russia's aim.
Our policy was to maintain our

that, of course,

position in Asia, promote

As I
the defense and unity of Europe, and prepare America.
depended
saw it then, and as I see it now, these three purposes
three
each other, and one could not be attained without all
upon

parts of our policy being vigorously pursued.

^^^Hearings, Pt.

1,

332.
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had occasion to malce my position clear
when the French
Prime Minister, M. Rene Pleven, visited Washington
at the end
I

of January.

The Choice

-'^^^

of Limited

War

in

Korea; An Assessment

After the Chinese Communist forces intervened in

some

of

America's policy choices

to deal with the

tive did the United States finally choose and

America's decision

in

new

full strength,

situation?

what were

mat

alterna-

why? What consequences followed

reaction to Chinese attacks in late

November 1950 through

January 1951?
Militarily, the United States had, at least, three policy alternatives:
(1)

take additional, strong, and retaliatory military measures against the

Chiaese Communists both in Korea and

Korea;

(3)

against

them outside

resist the Chinese

m Korea without taking retaliatory

measures

America

also had at least three choices:

seek United Nations condemnation of Communist China as an aggressor

Korea;
(3)

from

of Korea.

In the non-military field,

(1)

in China; (2) evacuate voluntarily

(2) undertal<.e

economic embargo by the free world against China;

negotiate at once to obtain peace ia Korea, with

concessions

to China, siace

advantages

time.

at the

Truman,

in

II,

437.

some necessary and

inevitable

China possessed relatively favorable military
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To

take additional, strong and retaliatory military measures would

include General MacArthur's recommendations concerning the use of Chiang

Kai-shek's Nationalist forces both in Korea and on the Chinese mainland, the

bombing

of

Manchuria, and the application

The United States
in

of a coastal blockade against China.

finally decided to resist militarily the Chinese offensive

Korea without expanding the war

to

Manchuria or

the Chinese mainland, but

with a contingency plan of taldng retaliatory measures against China
troops were forced out of Korea.

Diplomatically,

if

Americaa

America decided not

negotiate unless no concessions were made, but rather to seek

UN

to

condemnation

of Chinese aggression.

It is

easier to understand why no voluntary evacuation from Korea was

contemplated, unless the safety of U.
it;

since

it

S.

forces and the

UN Command necessitated

would be a military defeat and damage considerably America's world-

wide prestige and leadership, while a successful resistance

in

Korea would

serve many important purposes for the United States, such as enumerated

in

President Truman's personal letter of January 13, 1951 to General MacArthur.
Butj in view of the fact that American troops were suffering severe and

even humiliating reverses

in

Korea

at the time,

why

did the United States decide

recommended by
not to take additional retaliatory military measures, as
MacArthur? This issue would

later

Truman-MacArthur controversy.

become one

of the

major items

in the
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Basically there were four considerations from the viewpoint of the

Truman

administration.

First of

measures, such as the bombing
to a general

undesirable.

all,

of

it

was believed

that immediate retaliatory

Manchuria, would expand the war and lead

war with Communist China.

This consequence was deemed

As General Bradley explained

at the

MacA.rthur hearings: 'In

the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the

wrong war,

at the

pRed China].

"'•^•'^

wrong place,
"It

wrong time, and with

at the

would necessarily

tie

down

the

wrong enemy

additional forces, especially

our sea power and our air power, while the Soviet Union would not be obliged
to put a single

man

into the conflict. "

afraid of allowing the

war

in

Korea

124

to

The Truman administration was

expand to such an extent as

the United States incapable of meeting aggression
potential trouble -spots, such as

in the decision against

the fear of provoking Russian intervention in the

China and starting a third world war.
during the MacArthur hearijigs:

^

^Ibid.

,

p.

^^^Osgood

any of a half-dozen other

Western Europe, Japan, Berlin, Yugoslavia,

The second consideration

Hearings

render

'^^^

Iran, and Indochina.

^^•"^

in

to

,

wake

expanding the war was

of a general

war with

Secretary of Defense Marshall argued

"Russia possesses a very valuable

Pt. 2, 732.

731.

(1957), pp. 109-70,

ally in
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China.

.

Now

.

government,
fight in

m

if it

view

of their treaty with the

appears that they have failed

Chinese Communist regime or
to

support that government,

Korea, we have a very special situation because

satellite of

tiio

it

in its

affects every other

Soviet Government. "^^^

The Sino-Soviet

alliance of February 14, 1950 stipulated in Article

I:

"In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by
Japan or

states allied by

it,

and thus being involved

in a state of

war, the other High

Contracting Party will immediately render military and other assistance with
all the

means

at its disposal. "

Since the United States

base to support the war in Korea,
if it

was using Japan as

the

could be easily construed by the Soviet Union,

it

so desired, that the United States was allied with Japan, even though no

formal treaty
retaliatory

of alliance

or security had been signed.

measures as the bombing

of

Manchuria,

it

And

if

America took such

would make the Sino-Soviet

alliance automatically operative for the Soviet Union to render immediately

military and other assistance to China with
v/ould increase the danger of a

the Soviet Union,

major war

Communist China and

further world-wide complications.
intervention,

if

all the

in the

means

at its disposal.

This

Far East with the involvement

the United States, which would entail

America's estimate

additional military actions

of the risk of

Russian

were taken against China, was based

upon judgment about Russia's self-interest, prestige, and obligations under the

'Hearings, Pt.

1,

594.

of
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Sino-Soviet treaty. ^27

The third consideration was
to the risks they

would

entail.

the effectiveness of the

measures as compared

Wliile the Joint Chiefs recognized
the military

advantages that might accrue to the United Nations'
position

in

Korea and

to the

United States position in the Far East by these
additional measures,
of global

risk

war would be increased without any commensurate assurance

of a

quicker, less costly military decision. ^29

The fourth consideration was
Once the Chinese intervened
opposed

to

the support and unity of

in full strength,

Western

America's European

allies

were

any furtlier expansion of the war since they were worried by the

possibility that United States resources might be committed to a

that

allies.

programs

of

economic and military assistance

to

war

them might be

in

Asia,

curtailed,

and that the North Atlantic Treaty might become a mere paper treaty.

America's additional measures with regard
her allies and might even disrupt the
United Nations.

NATO

to

Korea would lose

coalition and

the support of

Western unity

in the

"^^^

-^^^Osgood (1957), p. 175.
128

129

See Bradley's testimony, Hearings

Osgood

(1957), p. 174.

,

Pt. 2, 730.

For arguments

in favor of taking

some

of the

additional measures, such as the use of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces,

extending operations beyond the Yalu River, see Alvin J. Cottrell and James E.
Dougherty, "The Lessons of Korea War and the Power of Man,"" Orbis n
(Sijring, 1958), pp. 39-60.
,

^•^^Reitzel et al
1 "^1

,

p. 275.

See Acheson, pp. 472-73.
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In the diplomatic field, as early as

Acheson expressed

allies

settlement first.
to

Formosa,

As long

132

But this action required cooperation from

as no concessions were made, especially with regard

Communist regime,

her allies and friends

in

The United States was not willing
domestic political considerations.

reverses

in the

of peaceful

Chinese seat in the United Nations, and to the diplomatic

recognition of the Chinese

of

1950, Secretary

and friends, who insisted on exploring the means

to the

to the efforts of

1,

the desirability of holding the United Nations to a condemna-

tion of Chinese aggression.

America's

December

the United States did not object

seeking ways for peaceful settlement.
to

make concessions, mainly because

One way

to interpret the administration's

congressional elections of 1950 was, "the electorate had

apparently listened attentively to those who attributed the 'loss' of China and
other gains of

Communism

to a conspiracy within the

American government and

voted for candidates who advocated a more vigorous anti-Mao policy, a reduction
of

economic

aid, less deference to our allies in

Western Europe. "^^^ Wlien

the

United States painfully decided to vote for the "Five Principles" in the United
this
Nations on January 13, 1951, America's policy- makers were aware that

" action would awal^en

the fury of Congress and the press.

Shortly afterwards,

the United Nations
the U. S. Congress passed resolutions to the effect that

132 Acheson,

p. 473.

133 Spanier, p. 151.
134

Acheson,

p.

513.
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should immediately declare Communist China an aggressor in Korea.

The

U. S. Senate also adopted a resolution on January 23, 1951 that the Communist

Chinese Government should not be admitted to membership in the United Nations
as the representative of China.

With the United States having no intentions

domestic pressures, there could be
a peacefxil settlement.

European
felt that

allies and

Thus the

to

concede

because of

little possibility of fruitful

negotiations for

efforts in the United Nations by America's

some neutral nations

failed.

It

was only

after these nations

they had exhausted the means of peaceful settlement that

reluctantly supported the U. S. proposal in the

condemn Chinese aggression.

UN

General Assembly

Moreover, America's

measures

of an

them

to

Thus, U.

S.

economic embargo against China could not be

effective during the critical period of

The

of

allies refused to tal^e

economic sanctions against Communist China mtil May 1951.
unilateral

many

December 1950

-

January 1951.

fact that the United States did not take additional, strong, retaliatory

military measures against Comm^jnist China (for whatever reasons) enabled
the Chinese to attack initially with as

occurred.

much power and consequent damage

This produced two results:

(1)

the Chinese

had no desire

negotiate either, until they could obtain a favorable military position;

United States was

such as

all

the

UN condemnation

more

in

as

to

(2)

the

need of a strong diplomatic counterattack,

of Chinese aggression, to balance military reverses.
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Epilogue

To carry

out the policy of limited war, Lieutenant General Matthew B.

Ridgway, in command

of the Eighth

Army, adopted

began to launch limited counteroffensives starting

March

15, Seoul

was recaptured from

the

the strategy of attrition and

in

late

January, 1951.

Communists and never

The Eighth Army gradually pushed northward

On

lost again.

to the vicinity of the 38th parallel.

General MacArthur was strongly opposed to the principle of limited

war, which he regarded as prolonged indecision, even "appeasement.
insisted that the object of
is

war should be

no substitute for victory.

"

He did not hesitate

through his communications with Republican

disagreement with the war policy

On April
to give his

His conviction was:

victory.

of the

11, 1951, President

to

express

members

Truman

and of the United Nations, and relieved him of

of U. S.

lie

"There
or

Congress his

administration.

Truman decided

wholehearted support to the policies

in public

"

that

MacArthur was unable

of the United States

all his

commaiids.

Government

Ridgway

succeeded MacArthur.
After two spring offensives

over Ridgway's forces.

On June 23

By June

<Iie

Chinese had failed to gain an upper hand

a military stalemate emerged.

the Soviet Union proposed that discussions should be started

for a cease-fire in Korea.

The United States responded

readily.

Truce

sides of the belligerents;
negotiations were opened on July 10, 1951, between two
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but they proved to be extremely difficult and
frustrating and lasted for two years

while

bit-ter fighting

continued for local advantages.

It

was not

until after the

Republican administration of Dwight Eisenhower had
replaced Truman's

Democratic one and after the death

was

finally signed

of Stalin that the

Korean armistice agreement

on July 27, 1953, with a military demarcation

line

near the

38th parallel.

Though the

fighting

came

1954, participated in by the 16

to an end, a political conference at

member

states of the

UN

Geneva

which had aided the

during the war and the representatives of South Korea, North Korea,

USSR, failed

to solve the

problems

of the

method

PRC

Korea remained

South Korea were hostile to each other

in the

midst

divided.

of the cold

ROK

and

of bringing about a united

independent Korea by peaceful means.

in

and

North and

war.

Shortly after the Korean armistice agreement was concluded, a Mutual

Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic
on October

1,

Korea was signed

1953.

American forces under

the United Nations

Chinese withdrew their forces from Korea
In the

of

wake

North Korea made

of President

of July 4 on principles to reunify

linldng Seoul and Pyongyang

visit to

The

Peldng in 1972, South and

each other and agreed

Korea by peaceful means.

was opened.

stayed in Korea.

in 1958.

Richard Nixon's

official contacts with

Command

A

in a joint

communique

telephone hot line

Political talks for reunification on the

governmental level of North-South Coordinating Committee were held.

North
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Korean-South Korean Red Cross talks were also started for arranging reunions
of families dispersed across the border.

Both kinds of dirJogue proceeded

slowly and were subsequently suspended.
In the latter part of 1973, a delegate

addressed for the first time the

The

with South Korea's observer.

Assembly agTeed

in

UN

November

from North Korea attended and

General Assembly as an observer, along
Political

Committee

of the

to dissolve the United Nations

UN

General

Commission

for

the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which all parties believed had

outlived its usefulness.

The

effort by friends of

Algeria, China (now represented by
to liquidate the United Nations

United States to withdraw

its

PRC

Command

in the

in

North Korea, particularly

UN

since 1971) and USSR,

Korea, and thus pressure the

forces from Korea, was opposed by the United

States, Great Britain and Japan.

The debate

without voting on the status of the

UN Command. The

matters as they stood.

in the Political

effect

Committee ended

was

to leave

CHAPTER

VII

CONCLUSION

Shortly after the outbreak of the Koreaa War, the United States decided
to intervene

by fighting a limited war under a United Nations command.

was a new experience for America,

at least in

two respects.

War, America never fought a war on behalf or with

Prior to the Korean

the support of world-wide

U. S. initiative and leadership in the

international organization.

This

UN

Security

Council to adopt the resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950, with the key

absence

of the Soviet delegate

military action in Korea

from the Council meetings

became

,

means

to

honor

its

that U. S.

teclmically and legally a United Nations action,

even though American interest and prestige were as much
those of the United Nations.

meant

The United

firm commitment

States

was

to the United

at stake in

Korea as

willing to provide military

Nations

as a world body for

attacked
maintaining international peace and security, when North Korean forces

South Korea.

Moreover, the United States had been committed

the Republic of

Korea since

its

creation in 1948.

The experience was also new

America had always fought
to go all-out to crush the

its

to the support of

wars

to

America

in a total

enemy and win

in

terms

of the nature of

maimer, devoting

its full

war.

resources

a total victory as rapidly as possible.

312
In

Korea, however, this traditional pattern of war was not followed.

formal declaration
word,

i.e.

,

of

war was not made,

regular forces of

all

arms

it

was a war

(air,

in the real

Though a

sense of the

sea and gro\md) were engaged

in

conventional battles against enemy forces for the control of specific territory.

But the

initial objective of

both the American and the United Nations action in

Korea was

to assist the Republic of

Korea and

to restore

by members of the

Korea

peace and security

UN which

to repel the

in the area.

supported the

UN

armed

attack

As understood

from North
at the time

resolutions and which provided

military assistance, including the United States, this was merely to push the

North Korean forces back behind the 38th parallel and restore South Korea's

border

at this line.

In

America's traditional approach

to war, the objective should have been

to crush the North Korean forces totally, meaning to force their surrender not

only in South Korea but also in North Korea.

This might have necessitated

conducting military operations into North Korea to destroy those enemy forces
that refused to surrender.

Why

did the United States accept or even initiate the kind of limited

objective in Korea, which
this

was

to the

was

alien to its military tradition?

partially affected by America's

Korean problem which had been

that at the early stage of the

commitment

tiling,

to United Nations approach

initiated in 1947.

war other members

For one

of the

It

was inconceivable

UN would

support the
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goal, even

if

the United States desired

strongly, to defeat the North Korean

it

forces completely and thus eliminate the North Korean regime eventually.

For

they all understood that behind the North Korean Communists stood the Soviet

Union and possibly the Chinese Communists, too.
the North

Koreans

totally

would have

Any such attempt

to

crush

to consider the possibility of Soviet or

Chinese intervention and the attendant consequences.

The United States would

not have intervened even for the limited objective

had calculated that this

if it

would immediately induce Soviet military involvement.

Thus the more important

consideration in the formulation of a limited objective in Korea was possible
Soviet reaction not only in Korea but elsewhere in the world.
Ironically, the real

enemy

of the United States in the

seen by the policy-malcers in Washington, was the

American forces could

not, and did not

want

to,

So\'iet

Korean War, as

Union, even though

engage Soviet forces.

To

fight

against the troops of a Soviet satellite in their plan to conquer a weak non-

Communist area was intended
elsewhere.

to contain Soviet aggressive ambitions and threats

The dominant context was

the world-wide struggle between the

alliances since 1945.
United States and the Soviet Union for power, prestige and

Thus

it

was

to contain the Soviet

Union that the United States intervened

the security of Japan, to discourage
not only to assist South Korea, but to protect

further Soviet

moves elsewhere and

through the United Nations.

security
to uphold the principle of collective

Not to act in Korea, so ran the United States
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argument, woidd adversely affect America's position

world against the Soviet bloc.
that the objective in

major war

into a

War

in.

It

in

But

it

was also with

Korea was limited, so

that the

of leadership in the free

the Soviet Union in

war would

not be expanded

Asia with Soviet involvement, leading eventually

was decided

that to fight either a

mind

to

World

major war or a third world war

over Korea was not worthwhile, as far as America was concerned.

The United

States would rather preserve necessary resources to defend other areas, such

as Europe, which were considered

more

vital than

Korea, against Soviet

threats.

Thus the policy

of limited

war emerged.

Tlie objective of the

war was
0

limited to the restoration of South

Korea's border

at the 38th parallel without

attempting to defeat the North Korean forces completely.
hostilities

was limited

to the

of

Korean peninsula, even though the enemy forces

might receive supplies from Siberia or Manchuria.
to the

The area

North Koreans, with precaution

talcen to

The enemy was limited

reduce the chances

of Soviet

or Chinese entry.
Since the policy of limited

especially since
face

it

was put

in the

war was

a

framework

new experience

of the United Nations,

many problems. One was how a general

international force

was

to

for America,

of one nation in

it

had

command

to

of an

be held accountable to the United Nations for the

conduct of tactical and strategic operations in the

field.

Obviously the
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commander

of

such a force had to be an American general, since the United

States had contributed the great bulk of personnel,

arms and

United States Government rejected any proposal to have a

The

assistance.

UN committee

inter-

fere with the direct channel of control between American authorities in

Washington and the American general
force.

command

of such an international

The United States insisted on an arrangement

would be directly responsible
it,

in

to the United States

be responsible only indirectly

out and formalized in the

UN

in

which the commander

Government, and through
This was worked

to the United Nations.

Security Council resolution of July

7,

1950,

adopted again in the absence of the Soviet delegate from the Council.
military forces, offered by
in

a "unified

retained

members

command under

much freedom

of the

UN

for Korean action,

the United States. "

in field operations.

The

Thus

All the

were placed

the United States

initiative rested with the

United States Government to report to the United Nations, or to consult other

members

of the

UN

on a particular tactical issue such as hot pursuit.

the resolutions and decisions by the

UN

would serve as the guiding principles

for America's day-to-day operations in Korea.

drive to the Yalu

became a

Only

mat1;er within

Subsequently, the crucial

America's discretion without

adequate influence for restraint from other m.embers of the UN.

Another problem for U.
effort of

America's

allies

S.

policy of limited

and friends

war

in

Korea was

at peaceful settlement.

Though

the

tliey
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had supported UN action
for negotiations which

in

Korea, they were also quick to mal^e proposals

were not

totally ignored, since allied unity
natTire of the

prepared
of

UN

As noted,

allies and friends

abroad had a

the influence of Am.erica's traditional approach

total victory

over the enemy in war was a deep-rooted

to voice such a desire, they

war with respect

that

price to the United States.

concept among American military officers.

of limited

Formosa and

in the United Nations with the peaceful

America's

at a high

A third problem was

them

to continue the collective

to accept a British proposal to link the issue of

tendency to desire peace

for

which could not be

For example, the United States was not

Chinese Communist representation

war.

liking, but

was necessary

action in Korea.

settlement of the Korean War.

to

America's

to

to the

of the fear of Soviet reaction that

As soon as

were not hesitant

North Koreans.

there was an opportunity
to challenge the policy

Initially

no thought had been given

of winning a total victory over the North

Korean forces.

it

was because

to the objective

But as the war went

intention to interon, the Soviet Union continued to give no mdication of any

vene.

At an early date General MacArthur urged strongly that the objective

should be the destruction of the North Korean forces.

by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff in this attempt.

It

He was later supported

was subsequently decided by

would be strictly
United States Government that the policy of limited war
applied
maintained with respect to the Soviet Union, loosely

to

Chinese

the
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Commimist forces
The

tradition

in

Korea, but not applied

had reasserted

North Korean enemy.
circumstances:

(1)

itself to

the policy of competely crushLag the

crossing the 38th parallel to pursue

The policy toward China

America had

North Korean troops.

This policy produced two major moves under the

retreating North Korean troops;

first

form

at all to the

(2)

tlie

remaining and

driving to the Yalu to destroy them.

in the

Korean

fighting

was less

cleas-cut.

At

a genuine fear of Chinese intervention mainly because they

could tip the balance by helping the advancing North Korean forces push American

and UN forces
a threat to
in

America as

When

Europe.

States

was

be able

But China alone did not and could not pose as great

the Soviet Union, which could strike elsewhere, particularly

the victory at Inchon turned the tide of the war,

tlie

United

confident that Chinese entry, however undesirable, would no longer

to force

intervention

it

out of Korea.

American and UN forces out

was reduced

of

Korea.

So the fear of Chinese

to such an extent that China's official warning,

came, was not taken seriously and America was prepared

Chinese units in Korea with an overconfidence

when

to fight against

in the decisive effectiveness of

air power.

The appearance and disappearance
Korea

in late October and early

November complicated

and destroying North Korean forces.
changed.

of powerful Chinese units in

North

the mission of pursuing

The mission was re-examined but not

One big problem was the lack

of precise

knowledge of Chinese strength
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and whereabouts
intentions

in

North Korea.

The United States chose

were merely a limited-scale intervention

in

to believe that Chinese

Korea, even though Chinese

troop deployment in Manchuria indicated clearly their capabilities to intervene in
full strength.

IvIacArthur argued strongly that he should advance to destroy

whatever enemy forces there were

until

he reached the Yalu.

Washington

finally

decided that on the condition of the non-violation of the Manchurian border

MacArthur would be allowed
and should defeat both
North Korea.

to do

the North

what he wanted on the assumption that he could

Korean remnants and

America's estimate

of

Chinese strength in North Korea turned out

to be less than one-fourth of the actual

number

Chinese forces in North Korea by advancing
hostilities to

there.

to the

So this policy of defeating

Yalu without extending

in military disaster for the United States.

Manchuria resulted

The overwhelming strength

the Chinese forces in

of the

Chinese

in

North Korea was a surprise

to her,

their
since they had been skillful and successful in secretly deploying and hiding

major troops

in

Korea.

Could MacArthur have made better preparations against the Chinese
attack?

Perhaps he was

respect to China.

filled with an

of

power— air power— with

But, unless the United States had had

of China's real strength in North

narrow "neck"

arrogance of

Korea,

it

was

Korea before

the

UN

more accurate Imowledge

forces passed beyond the

unlikely that MacArthur, or even the Joint

narrow "neck" to defend against
Chiefs, would be willing to withdraw to the
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possible Chinese attacks.
in face of the

Chinese.

Soviet assistance,
the United States.

It

would have been regarded as a sign

was not taken seriously nor was

it

respected at the time by

Once the 38th parallel was crossed, military and
to

The UN General Assembly resolution
tlie

push his forces
of

October

climate supporting MacArthur 's northward drive.

7,

political

to the Yalu.

1950 also contributed

The resolution re-

stated the goal of Korean unification without explicitly making

it

wealmess

Moreover, Chinese power standing alone, without

circumstances seemed to drive MacArthur

to

of

it

a

war aim, but

implied that MacArthur was thereby authorized to conduct military operations

anyv/here in Korea.

Here the collective wisdom

of the United Nations still

could not avoid the mistake of giving the United States and MacArtliur a blank

check for conquering North Korea.

Communist

Only India, excluding the enemy side

bloc, challenged and opposed the assumptions of the

UN

of the

resolution.

India had expressed the fear that the result might be to prolong North Korean

But the opportunity to stop

resistance, and even to extend the area of conflict.
at the

edge of the original policy objective of a limited war with respect to

North Korea was lost largely because

optimism and overconfidence on

members

of the political -military climate of

the part of both

of the United Nations about

American leaders and most

easy victory

in the waive of the Inchon

success.
After the Chinese intervened in
to

UN

full strength,

America's commitment

of limited
action asserted its influence on the policy

war through

the
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pressures of America's
of the

war.

allies,

which were now strongly opposed

Not only would they abandon the goal of a

total military victory in

Korea, which seemed impossible unless the war was extended

perhaps

still

more broadly, but they were eager
S.

UN, and U.

recognition of the People's Republic of China.

S.

China and

to

to obtain peace even at a high

price to the U.

,

to any expansion

e.g., concessions on Formosa, Chinese representation in the

the United States resisted making concessions

because

of

As

it

turned out,

domestic opposition

and opinion, which even resulted in her insistence on branding China an aggressor
in the

UN

General Assembly resolution of February

reverses in Korea.
to

1,

1951 to balance military

But the commitment to a limited war

in

Korea with respect

China and North Korea became more urgent, since allied unity v/as necessary

to continue collective

UN

action in Korea.

More importaat was America's new

realization in the midst of military

retreat and heavy casualties that the Chinese could not be easily defeated in

Korea without expending substantial
into

Manchuria or other parts

additional resources and exioanding the

of China.

war

This would probably provoke Soviet

intervention and involvement in viev^ of the newly concluded Sino-Soviet aJliance.

The result might be a major war
think that

in the

Far East.

The United States did not

Korea was worth such an eximnded war, especially

in

view of America's

limited resources in the context of a global antagonism between U.
U.

S. S.

R.

The United

S1;ates did not,

nor was

it

S.

A. and

willing to, devote all of its
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war

available resources to the

in

Korea, even though America's overall military

strength had been rapidly and massively increased as a resiilt of the outbrealc of

the Korean War.

Consequently the policy of limited war in Korea was insisted

upon and maintained:

i.

e.

,

without attacldng Manchuria or other parts of China,

the resistance against the Chinese and North Korean forces in Korea would be

made without immediate troop reinforcements and
enemy

the

totally, since

without any attempt to destroy

MacArthur's more basic and more important mission,

the defense of Japan, required the preservation and safety of his forces in Korea.
In

in

summary,

Korea and

its

the

major problems surrounding the policy

maintenance were:

(1)

war

of limited

America's exclusive control

of the

influence
international force for field operations, which reduced the restraining
of other

allies,

UN

members

of the

UN

in

some important

tactical

whose cooperation and support were needed

action in Korea, but

who were eager

moves;

(2)

America's

to continue the collective

to seek peace at a high price to the

in opposing the
United States, even tliough their influence was significant

expansion of the war to China;
victory over, first, the North

(3)

General MacArthur, who demanded a total

Kovam

forces, then, over the Chinese troops in

China after their full-scale
Korea, even advocating extending hostilities to
intervention in Korea;
jserted its
as!

Korea.

(4)

America's traditional approach

to

war, which once

with respect
mfluence to change the policy of limited war

to

North
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Because

of these problems, U. S. policy of limited

go through various stages before
first the

in

terms

it

was

war was limited with respect
of

finally

worked

to the Soviet

in

Korea had

out and maintamed.

of Siberian

At

and

to bring their forces into Korea.

respect to North Korea, the war was also limited in

its objective:

With

to restore

South Korea's border at the 38th parallel with no intention of destroying

forces completely.

to

Union and Communist China

geography and military contact: non-violation

Manchurian borders and no provocation

war

enemy

Soon, due to the lack of any indication of Soviet intention to

intervene and due to American military tradition, the objective was changed to

a total victory over North Korean forces with the consequent necessity of

crossing the 38th parallel and driving to the Yalu.

The change

of policy also

produced Chinese reaction and limited military contact with China

Now

in

Korea.

there were two enemies in Korea to fight against: the North Koreans

and the Chinese.

The policy objective further became

enemy forces, including

the Chinese, in Korea, but without attacldng Manchuria.

Finally, China's full-scale intervention and attacks in

abandon the goal of a

the destruction of all the

total victory

Korea forced Ainerica

over North Koreans or a

victory^

to

over the

involve the
Chinese in Korea, since this would necessarily expand the war to

Soviet Union.

Soviet
First and foremost, the United States wanted to prevent

do so throughout the war.
intervention in Korea and over Korea, and managed to
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In retrospect, one wishes that the initial policy of limited

war

coiild

have been maintained without any change with respect to North Korea and China,
or that the change of policy elements could have been prevented by the influence
of other

members

disregardj.ng
of

human

of the United Nations.

American military

war did succeed

human judgment. Nevertheless,

in preventing a general

Korea from achieving military

to

tradition, the passions of war, the wealaiess

nature and the feUibility of

of limited

But this would be tantamount

victory.

the policy

war and preventing North
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